Greetings! This is certainly an interesting question, and it does reveal a fair bit about the state of the British Parliament in the weeks and days leading up to the conflagration of Europe which it eventually took part in. For contextual framing, remember throughout this response that the British declaration of war against Germany was officially given on the 4th of August, 1914, ostensibly as the result of Germany failing to respond by a given deadline to a British ultimatum on Germany's infringement on Belgian neutrality. With this in mind, let us see if we can uncover just how divided (or united) the British government was in joining the war.

The House of Commons and the Balkans

By the summer of 1914 the British government was under the prime ministership of Herbert H. Asquith, who was the head of the Liberal government in a "hung parliament", where they relied on the support of the Irish Parliamentary Party against the Labour and Conservative opposition. The British were officially represented in any sort of foreign matters on the continent and beyond by Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, who was a rather odd choice for the job (having never, for example, picked up any foreign language with the exception of poor French). He was often criticised by parliament backbenchers for "dividing Europe into two camps", siding too closely with the French (after the Entente-Cordiale of 1904 this seemed an interesting remark), and antagonising the Germans on the continent.

When however, Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo on the 28th of June, 1914, the British government was dealing with the troublesome question of Home Rule for Ireland. All of the parties involved in the British government were occupied with debates and conferences on the brewing instability within Ireland, and the fear of civil war was certainly a more profound sentiment amongst the public than events which had occurred on the other side of Europe. When word reached the British government that the Archduke had been assassinated, there were several speeches in the House of Commons to remember the Archduke, and King George V himself dropped in unannounced at the Austro-Hungarian embassy to express his sorrows to Count Albert Mensdorff, who was also greatly touched by the flow of sympathetic letters from the British aristocracy.

Yet events in the Balkans seemed too distant compared with the rising threat of armed revolt in Ulster and the rest of Ireland, and the death of Franz Ferdinand had been overshadowed by the death of Joseph Chamberlain on July 2nd, a notable British statesman who had been in both the Liberal and Conservative parties as well as various breakaway groups. It was not until the 24rd of July, when the government was informed of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, that the matter escalated further. That same day, the Buckingham Palace Conference had broken up after four days of unsuccessful debate between the Irish Unionists, Irish Nationalists, and members of the government. It was only after Grey read the ultimatum the following day that he began to realise the general move towards war in the Balkans, and began to push for another "Concert of Europe" type of mediation whereby the Great Powers would meet to discuss the Austrian-Serbian question. His requests were rebuffed by both the Austro-Hungarians and the Germans.

The British government had on their hands a "mini-crisis" which had been thrown down by the whole question of war. Being the only one of the Great Powers without a national conscription law, her armies in wartime would have to be raised by voluntary enlistment. If the anti-war elements of Parliament were to break off and form a wider "anti-war" coalition against the leading Liberals, it would spell disaster for the unity of British war efforts. Barbara Tuchman comments on this interesting proviso:

"Alone in Europe Britain had no conscription. In war she would be dependent on voluntary enlistment. A secession from the government over the war issue would mean the formation of an antiwar party led by the dissidents with disastrous effect on recruiting. If it was the prime objective of France to enter war with Britain as an ally, it was a prime necessity for Britain to enter war with a united government."

This was far easier said than done. Remember, at this stage of the tension-building, Germany had yet to issue an ultimatum to Belgium. Only at the constant urging of the French government had the British been forced to seriously debate the matter of war. The Entente-Cordiale was not a mutual defense pact, and Britain had no obligation to join with France in war if the latter was attacked. It became clear to Grey, as it would to the entire British parliament, that only violation of Belgium's neutrality would secure the support of the antiwar elements. Until such an occurrence, Britain's government could do little more than prepare for a continental war with limited, if any, British involvement.

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