Yes, definitely.

I imagine the allies knew it was good (Arsenal of Freedom, etc),

To hit this one briefly, they were not just aware of it, they were benefitting from it. The Lend Lease Act was a big escalation in our non-military involvement in the war. The act gave...

President Roosevelt virtually unlimited authority to direct material aid such as ammunition, tanks, airplanes, trucks, and food to the war effort in Europe without violating the nation’s official position of neutrality

For the Axis side of things:

The US's industrial potential was no secret. Europe was still recovering from the first world war, which never touched the mainland US. While most everyone was impacted by the great depression, GDP was increasing for most of our actors by the mid to late 30's.

In 1938 before Germany invaded Poland, the US had by a significant margin, the largest GDP in the world, Mark Harrison in his book, "The Economics of WW2" provides comparison numbers in 1990 dollars. I'm not going to update them, as I think the difference is clear. In billions the US GDP was $800 to Germany's 351 and Japan's 169. The entire Axis only had a GDP of 686 this year, less than the US by itself. Per capita, Germany's number get's closer but is still well under the US at this point.

Another important factor was the availability and development of Natural resources. By this time few things were more valuable than oil.

A league of Nation's 1940 report showed a massive disparity between the US and pretty much anyone else at 182 (million) Metric tons. Second place is the USSR at 29.7 (million) MT. The first Axis member to show up here is #5, Romania at 5.7 MT (million) The US accounted for around 60% of the world's crude oil production before their entrance into the war.

This of course played a part in Japan's decision to expand their activities in Southeast Asia, which resulted in oil embargoes by the US.

Japan wasn't really looking to fight the United States, but after the US placed the oil embargo on them along with lopsided terms, many in the military felt they had no choice.

The architect of Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto when speaking with PM Kanoe "We can run wild for six months or maybe a year, but after that, I have utterly no confidence." This seems to be a clear understanding that the US had significant natural, human and industrial resources that Japan would be unable to match.

IJN Chief of Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano apparently said around the same time

“America will attempt to prolong the war, using her impregnable position, her superior industrial power, and her abundant resources.”

Another important material, Steel, was also heavily produced by the US, I don't have a good source for numbers so hopefully someone else will touch on that, but I'm confident the US was the #1 steel producer during this period as well.

In short, the industrial power and natural resources the US already had before the war were well known and in dwarfed any single, and often the combined value, axis country.

Sources: Lend Lease act: https://www.loc.gov/item/today-in-history/october-23/

Oil production: Bulletin of International News Vol. 17, No. 13 (Jun. 29, 1940), pp. 769-776

Econ: Mark Harrison, "The Economics of WW2: Six Great Powers in international comparison" Cambridge University Press, Jun 26, 2000 

The books you want are Tooze's "Wages of Destruction" and Overy's "Why the Allies won the war".

Goering is widely quoted as saying that all that America could make was refrigerators and razor blades, not the sort of sophisticated materiel you would need to win a war.

Of course, this is fractally wrong. For all the Call of Duty fanboi-ing, almost all of the high-technology weapons that the Nazis produced were a complete waste of time, money and resources. They couldn't make enough of them, they couldn't operate enough of even those that they made, and in almost every case they were the wrong solution to the wrong problem. Conversely, a lot of the weapons that the Americans manufactured were actually little more complex than refrigerators and razor blades (both of them things that actually require a fair amount of precision to do well) but were produced in such immense volumes it didn't matter. Even if you take at face value the claims that a Tiger tank was "worth" three/five/ten Sherman tanks, it doesn't matter: the US built just short of fifty thousand M4s, whereas there were fewer than two thousand Tigers built, about six thousand Panthers. Germany 1933-45 built a total of less than fifty thousand tanks; the Allies built close to two hundred thousand. Who cares if a few thousand of the German ones "invented the modern MBT?" They were not available in enough numbers to make any sort of difference.

You can make similar arguments about almost anything: there were never enough wunderwaffe to make a difference and (turning to Overy) the continuous interference by the military in tweaking and changing everything meant that production never really ramped up.

So the problem was not that the Axis powers did not understand the productive capacity of the USA in _quantitive_ terms; they did not understand the productive capacity of the USA in _qualitative_ terms, and misunderstood their own position. They believed that a culture of high-quality engineering, both in terms of design and in terms of fit and finish, would produce a military easily able to triumph over one equipped with "good enough" weapons in vast quantities.

You can see this all the way through the war. Their response to the T34 -- a crude, mass-produced tank -- was the complex, elegant Panther, produced in small numbers with insufficient spare parts. It didn't matter that it was an elegant solution to a problem they didn't have ("design the ideal post-war universal tank"): they had set out to copy the cheap-to-make T34 and ended up with a complex, difficult to maintain nightmare whose military significance was approximately zero.

Their response to Soviet military doctrine with a lot of sub-machine guns like the PPsH-41 was not to issue a lot of MP40s (themselves already significantly more expensive to produce) but to develop a completely new rifle in a completely new round (the MP43/StG44). Germany developed and fielded two innovative rifles during the war -- the FG42 and the StG44 -- both of them complex in design and construction, and they also developed and fielded a new belt-fed machine gun, the MG42. Now you can argue that the latter is still in service and the former two were profoundly influential, but they had approximately zero effect on the fighting of the war. Meanwhile, the British Army fielded what was literally a nineteenth century rifle, a heavy machine gun that was barely younger, a crude sub machine gun made out of old pipe and a light machine gun they'd bought from the Czechs: the crucial point was that they could manufacture them in vast quantities.

And that's before we get into the V1 ("spend a lot of money to deliver, inaccurately, a total warload less than one night's bombing by RAF main force") and the V2 ("spend even more money to deliver, inaccurately, a total warload less than one night's bombing by RAF main force"). Or the Me262, which is again militarily unimportant in the quantities in which it was built and operated: imagine, as a counter-factual, that the resources invested in the V1, V2, Me262 and assorted jet weirdness had been spent on building either FW190D or what ended up as the Ta152 in large volumes?

To restate: it is not that Germany failed to understand American manufacturing capability. It's that it didn't believe it mattered.