Hello there,

I've previously discussed why Germany and Japan allied together from the Japanese perspective here. It's an older post, but it checks out. There's also further useful discussion on the topic here. I'd like to expand on my original, and will do so in response to this comment in the future.

I'll leave discussion of the German perspective, especially as to how the Japanese fit into Nazi ideas on race to others who are more familiar with that particular topic. However, I would recommend this comment by /u/ParkSungJun on why Germany switched from supporting the KMT to signing an alliance with Japan.

As far as opening up a second front against the Soviet Union in 1941, despite the thrashing the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had taken at Nomohan in 1939, even into 1940, discussion as to whether Japan should advance north into the Soviet Union or south into the European colonies of South East Asia continued. By summer of 1940, with the Germans occupying Scandinavia, France, and the Low Countries, the IJA' General Staff and War Ministry hosted a series of conferences that culminated in the Outline for Dealing with the Changes in the World Situation. This document pressed for autarky, by seizing the resources of the European colonial powers to the south. Howeverr, despite this commitment, there were still voices within the IJA which called for operations in the North. The Kwantung Army in particular remained a very strong advocate of operations against the Soviet Union. However, despite the opinion of field officers in Mukden, Army General Staff officers in Tokyo were very concerned by the prospect of war with the Soviet Union, and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was concerned about being sidelined if Japan's main focus turned towards the Soviet Union. Thus, while there were advocates within the Army and outside of it (Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke being one of the most strident) for an immediate attack on the Soviet Union once Operation Barbarossa had commenced, the consensus approach between the IJA and IJN remained on the southward advance. Preparations were made in the Kantokuen (or Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers) plan for potential operations against the Soviet Union, which saw the Kwantung Army increased to 16 divisions, but operations were only to be launched if the German-Soviet War had developed "extremely to Germany's advantage." Yet, the IJA's focus remained on southern operations. The biggest obstacle to the Army's goals was, ironically, the Navy.

The Army's focus on southern operations left the IJN in an extremely awkward position. It could not countenance operations north, as such a campaign would leave it at a distinct disadvantage compared to the army. At the same time, the IJN operated under the assumption that operations against the British and Dutch colonies in South East Asia would mean war with the United States, a war they were not at all confident in their ability to fight. Yet, to admit to this would be to admit that the IJN's vast consumption and demand for resources had all been worthless, as all that expense had not bought Japan the ability to fight a war against the US. The IJN thus waffled slightly. It tried to use the threat of war with the United States to bargain for an increased allocation of Japan's resources, while simultaneously trying to minimise the threat of that war taking place at all by making advances at a much slower pace than what the Army wanted. This delicate dance within Japanese decision making circles continued throughout 1940 and into 1941, when the Japanese occupation of southern Indochina led to the US asset freeze and total oil embargo. Combined with the commencement of Operation Barbarossa severing Japan's trade links to Germany, the US reaction to Japanese operations in Indochina presented Japanese policy makers with a rough situation.

Japanese policy makers had expected harsh reactions to their operations against Malaya or the East Indies, but such a sharp reaction to the occupation of Indochina was unexpected. Within the IJA, even those who still wanted war with the Soviet Union were now convinced that the seizure of resources in the South must be taken first. The German invasion as well presented an opportunity and shield. The Soviets would be unlikely to threaten Japan while the Germans stood at the gates of Moscow, and if the German invasion succeeded and the Soviet Union collapsed, subsequent Japanese operations would be much more feasible. The US embargo also left Japan in a highly precarious economic position, all of which led to the usually conservative and cautious Cabinet Planning Board pushing for a rapid decision on whether Japan would accede to US demands in order to restore trade, or go to war to seize the resources it needed. As each day passed, the situation grew worse for Japan, both as available resource stockpiles shrank and American strength grew. War would have to be decided on soon, and the South had priority. War with the Soviet Union could be handled later, after Japan had seized the resources it needed in the south and secured an autarkic economic sphere.

I hope this has helped to answer your question. Please feel free to ask any follow ups. I'll hopefully be able to expand a bit more on the Japanese decision to ally with Germany a little later.

Sources

• Michael A Barhnart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941

• Edward J Drea, Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945

• Stuart D. Goldman, Nomohan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory Which Shaped World War II

• David Evans & Mark Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941

The friendship between Germany and Japan stemmed from, fundamentally, a mutual hostility to the Western powers (France, Britain, and the United States) as well as to the Soviet Union, however to describe it as an "alliance" in the traditional sense is misleading.

To really understand Japan's reasons for befriending Germany, one must consider the decline in friendship between Japan and the West, and how that drove the country to pursuing a virulently anti-Western, nationalistic foreign policy in the 1930s and 40s. Japan had historically been closely allied with Britain, mainly as a counterbalance to Russian influence in the Far East, but in the aftermath of WWI, several events had soured relations between the two to leave Japan diplomatically isolated and seeking of new allies. The first was the Allied intervention to stop Japan from imposing the so-called "21 Demands" on the rapidly-collapsing Chinese government in 1915. These demands would have essentially left China a Japanese puppet state, and despite the alliance between Britain and Japan (and the fact Japan was fighting alongside Britain in the Great War), Britain and other Western powers forced Japan to back down. This was despite the fact that the West had historically no problem with enforcing its own will on China and extracting concessions. There was a growing perception in Japan that the West viewed the Empire as rising above its station, and that it was not considered an international equal, and the rejection of the 21 Demands was evidence of this. The growing gulf between the West and Japan was only worsened by how Japan was rewarded for its contribution to WWI at Versailles - while it received the lion's share of Germany's Eastern territories, including Qingdao in China, its "Racial Equality" proposal for the League of Nations was voted down due to Australian and American opposition, and in the Washington Naval Treaty, Japan's navy was limited in size to be forever smaller than the U.K. or U.S. navies. These diplomatic snubs, coupled with an economic crisis compounded by the Stock Market Crash and the freezing of global trade (upon which Japan relied greatly) led to a belief amongst many Japanese politicians that only a self-sufficient, Japanese "Co-Prosperity Sphere" in Greater East Asia could ensure Japanese independence and prosperity, which led them to their insatiable desire to conquer Western colonial territory in the region, as well as Chinese land.

Now, as for the Soviet Union, Japan had ideological reasons to back their destruction, what with Communism's dislike of monarchical regimes. It should also be noted that the U.S.S.R. was seen as an enemy in more practical ways too - Soviet influence in the nascent Republic of China, which historically had been somewhat welcoming of Japanese influence, threatened to cut off Japan from controlling the mainland, and after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Soviets had a land border with one of the Empire's most valuable possessions. Controlling Manchuria was of utmost importance to the Japanese body-politic, due to a perennial fear of resource deprivation and overpopulation on the Home Islands. Manchuria was a means to alleviate those concerns.

So, the Japanese had the same enemies as Germany, but that doesn't necessarily mean that an alliance is forthcoming. In fact, there were many reasons why the alliance wouldn't make much sense - Germany had played a significant role in modernizing the Chinese Army in the 1930s, for instance. However, the angle of racial inferiority you pose about the Nazi view on Japan is (surprisingly) inaccurate. In fact, Hitler and Nazi racial theorists considered East Asians fully equal to that of Aryans. I'll leave a quote from Hitler to specify this point:

"Pride in one's own race, and that does not imply contempt for other races, is also a normal and healthy sentiment. I have never regarded the Chinese or the Japanese as being inferior to ourselves. They belong to ancient civilizations, and I admit freely that their past history is superior to our own."

As for Japanese racism, it was definitely present, but it would perhaps be better categorized more as a virulent xenophobia and cultural supremacism, rather than Nazi eugenicism. By that I mean that Japan, while deeply racist and deeply comfortable with racial atrocities, was never primarily motivated by racial conquest in the way the Nazis were - their stated goal was never the annihilation of a racial group, nor did they attribute the ills of society to racial minorities as the Nazis had. Needless to say, this meant allying with the Nazis was not in principle against Japanese racial conceptualization of the inferiority of Westerners, and in fact could be justified as being helpful to that ideology, as it would allow them to fulfil their goals of expelling the Western colonial powers from Greater East Asia.

Continued below

Greetings! u/Lubyak has already covered rather excellently the question of Japan opening a 2nd front against the Soviets during Operation Barbarossa, so I wanted to touch a bit more on the wider geopolitical contexts in which they decided not to strike the Soviet Union and instead to firmly turn their warpath south. For further discussions on the matter (in addition to the linkdrops and responses already posted here), consider this thread about the interwar politics of Japan for a good bit of context about the rise of ultranationalism and the idea of Japanese expansionism abroad. Let's begin.

A Hill in Manchuria

We have to understand that when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union during Unternehmen Barbarossa, the Japanese nation had been at war for three years already, against the Nationalist and Communist Chinese forces in what is termed the Second-Sino Japanese War (which began following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937). However, whilst the initial year of the war in China had led to some success, with the capture of key cities such as Nanjing (then the capital), Peking, and Shanghai. Alongside the atrocities carried out during the horrific Rape of Nanjing, the Japanese soldiers frequently terrorised and murdered Chinese civilians and soldiers alike, in an attempt to "pacify" their conquered territories. They also had to weather constant guerrilla attacks, and as such had little control over the countryside and railway lines.

Alongside this, we must also shine some due light on an oft-ignored event which influenced Japanese decisions about where to expand: The Changkufeng Incident. This incident was the precursor to the Nomonhan Incident which would take place a year later (the very same one which Lubyak expands on in their comment). This time however, the Changkufeng Incident took place at the juncture of the borders between the Soviet Union, Manchukuo, and Korea (then a Japanese vassal state). On July 11th, fighting broke out when Soviet soldiers climbed a hill on the Manchukuoan frontier and constructed a fortified position, something the local garrison forces believed unacceptable and clear violation of the border. The whole affair escalated when the Kwangtung Army reinforced the local Japanese and Korean garrison troops. When it became clear to Army Headquarters that the Red Army was winning the engagement, it prepared to escalate the conflict even further, deciding to mobilise the entire Kwangtung Army for attacks on the Soviet flank (and thereby distracting the Red Army from the initial disputed point). The mobilisation effort was halted on July 21st, 1938, when Emperor Hirohito (in a rare show of resistance to the armed forces) refused to grant the imperial sanction for the use of all forces. The conflict was resolved after the Japanese accepted a counter-proposal for a truce from the Soviets, which came into effect on August 11th, 1938.

The Changkufeng Incident may have been more than a simple "accident". Major-General Ishiwara Kenji, Chief of Staff of the Kwangtung Army (and mastermind of the Mukden Incident which had initiated the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931), had sent a secret telegram less than a month before the incident broke out. Titled "Matters Relating to Various Troubles on the Soviet-Manchukuoan Border", it had been secretly sent to then Vice-Minister of War, Tojo Hideki. The telegram essentially asked for a carte blanche and outlined the problems with cooperation between the Kwangtung and Korean Army, a bold attempt to secure an even greater degree of autonomy from Tokyo in dealing with military matters in Manchukuo. Katsu H. Young on the Changkufeng debacle:

"In short, it would seem that the purpose of the Kwangtung Army in beginning the Changkufeng was not only to test the strength of the Red Army in the Far East, but to convince the army authorities in Tokyo of the importance of its existing mission in Manchukuo. As it turned out, the encounter ended in a disastrous defeat for the Japanese forces, and cost approximately 1,350 casualties."

However, the casualties sustained were not enough to convince either the Kwangtung Army or various elements of the Imperial Japanese Army back in the Home Islands that the Soviet Union was not a viable threat. On the contrary, it strengthened the conviction of the two parties that the USSR was the primary threat to the Japanese Empire in the Far East, and that a war against it would be inevitable - merely a question of time and opportunity.

Before moving forward, it is worth noting at this point that Japanese politicians, admirals, and army officers felt as though their Empire's rise faced rivals in all directions. To the north was the Soviet Union (a constant thorn in the side of the Kwangtung Army and various parts of the IJA), to the south across the Pacific were Britain and the United States respectively, each fielding powerful navies which threatened the IJN’s own fleets. There was no question that Japan’s warpath would eventually set it against all four of these threats. But as R.A.C Parker notes, the internal debate was on:

“[T]iming and priorities; how far existing resources should be first developed, how far and to where they should be extended, which threats should first be countered and when.”

Within this sphere of geopolitical debate, we have the emergence of two key ‘schools’. The first were the proponents of the Hokushin-ron (Northern Expansion Doctrine), which believed that the Soviet Union and its Siberian regions were the next prime target for Japan’s expansion. Prominent members of this group included Prime Minister Kiichiro Hiranuma, officers in the IJA, and war minister Seishiro Itagaki. Opposing them were the proponents of the Nanshin-ron (Southern Expansion Doctrine), which believed that the European colonies of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies were the next prime targets for Japan’s expansion. Prominent members in this group included PM and former navy minister Yonai Mitsumasa, as well as admirals in the IJN. This army-navy dichotomy is actually a theme that has occurred before in Japan’s political discourse, as Andrew Gordon outlines below:

“The army saw the greatest threat to Japan’s Asian hegemony—and the greatest opportunities to solve the problem—residing in China, especially North China and Manchuria. The navy focused its concerns on rival Western powers in the Pacific.”

Both directions of expansion had their selling points. Hokushin-ron would allow the Japanese to push into the USSR and neutralize the threat posed by Stalin’s Communists, whilst also being logistically easier to achieve (Manchuria for example, was a prime base from which to launch invasions into Siberia). Nanshin-ron on the other hand, if successfully carried out, would secure precious resources in Southeast Asia (including rubber and oil, amongst others), whilst also providing the Army with another direction from which to encircle Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalist forces. In a more ideological sense, Nanshin-ron also fit in with the idea of a “new order in Greater East Asia”, which was centered around the foreign policy goal of establishing a “Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere”, (Dai Tōa Kyōeiken). This goal was formally accepted by Konoe’s second government in 1940, when as Japanese historian Hajime Shimizu writes:

“It proclaimed its “general principles of national policy” (Kihon kokusaku yōkō), in which the construction of a ‘new order in Greater East Asia’ became the goal of the Japanese foreign policy of monopolistic rule over Southeast Asia under a guise of ‘Asia for the Asians’”.

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