Hello, expat. I'll try to answer your questions as objectively as I can.

How strong were Goulart's ties to "international" communism? Did his government enjoy the support of the Soviet Union?

Two factions existed within Goulart's party, Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), a moderate one, heir to Getúlio Vargas and his vision of an alliance between the national bourgeoise and the state, and the radical one, willing to make compromises with the clandestine Communist Party with the prospect of radical social and economic reforms. The most distinguished leader of the radical wing was Leonel Brizola, Jango's brother-in-law. Jango himself was politically inept and stood between the two factions. He was nevertheless greatly detested and distrusted by sectors of the elites and the literati.

There was a dispute within the labor movement between the unionists close to the PTB and more independent leaders, including the communists. By the early 60s the latter were becoming more powerful. The Cuban Revolution had caused a frenzy through the continent, and Brizola – although not a communist himself – was willing to work with the communists in order to stage a national revolution in Brazil. But he didn't really trust them. Brizola was at the time governor of Rio Grande do Sul (1959-63). The communist leadership chose to work with Goulart, defending his administration while simultaneously pushing for more radical measures.

The Communist Party (PCB) was supported by the Soviet Union in many ways, but Moscow's center of attention lay elsewhere. The vanguard of marxist revolution in the continent was Cuba, which gave material and logistical support to communist organizations in Brazil. The Brazilian communists were also aided by the Czechoslovak secret service (StB). One such organization was the Ligas Camponesas ("Peasant Leagues") in the northeast. The Ligas were led by the left-wing lawyer Francisco Julião, who was also supported by Maoist China. He was opposed to armed struggle, but his wife, Alexina Crespo, was favorable. In 1962 a proto-guerrilla controlled by the Ligas was uncovered in Dianapólis and documents apprehended there exposed Cuban economic support to the organization. Goulart felt betrayed by it and complained to the Cuban ambassador. The sensitive documents were sent back to Cuba, but were discovered by CIA when the plane carrying them landed in Peru. The public exposure of Cuban involvement with attempts of armed struggle and Goulart's omission caused a sensation in Brazil.

As parliamentarism was scrapped in 1963 and Goulart regained his powers as Head of Government, the radicals began using their control over unions and the labor movement to encourage a massive number of strikes and forcefully approve their demands. Goulart attempted to decree a state of siege in 1963, which was seen as the first step towards a dictatorship. A secret plan by pro-Jango military officers was designed to kidnap and execute Carlos Lacerda, the rightist governor of Guanabara and the president's main adversary. The maneauver was rejected both by the right and the far-left, which saw it as an attempt to control the independent labor movement. As moderate voices diminished, the country was becoming increasingly polarized and calls for revolution and counter-revolution became more frequent.

The radical wing of the PTB mistakenly believed they could use the unions and their military allies to force a profound transformation in the country. Brizola was the most radical and by 1964 he was intermittently considering the dissolution of the Congress, the making of a new Constituent Assembly, and the organization of an armed revolutionary organization called Grupo dos Onze ("Group of the Eleven"). The inept Goulart wouldn't choose between the weakened moderate wing of his party and the radicals, but he gradually relied more on the latter.

The right-wing prepared for armed conflict, the big centrist party Partido Social Democrático (PSD) was turning against Goulart and the military leadership was increasingly alarmed, particularly by Goulart's attempts to gain the support of disquiet soldiers and sailors. The American ambassador Lincoln Gordon followed the events closely and thought Brazil was nearing a communist revolution. When Goulart amnestied a group of disgruntled sailors in March 1964 and made a massive rally in support of land reform and reinforcement of executive powers, many military leaders saw it as the final straw and turned against him. Former president Juscelino Kubitschek (PSD) attempted to reason with Goulart and proposed an agreement to pacify the country. The president rejected. Jango was easily deposed on 31 March - 1 April without opposition. The military had taken over.

The Goulart administration was dimly supported by Cuba and indirectly aided by other communist states, but Jango himself never attempted a definite approximation with the red bloc. He was closer to a non-aligned position just like his predecessor Jânio Quadros. His more radical allies, however, were close to and supported by the Cubans, and in a lesser degree by the USSR and China. Jango's opponents saw him as the "window" through which the communists would reach power in Brazil.

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Did Goulart have any plans to centralize the Brazilian economy in the style of other communist countries?

In the style of other communist countries? No. Goulart's initial economic policies were based around the Reformas de Base ("Fundamental Reforms"), a wide set of political, social and economic proposals, including a stronger grip of the state over the economy; land reform with the regularization of irregular farming and dismantling of latifúndios; and a more strict policy regarding foreign investments and capital outflow.

In the 1961-63 period Goulart's powers were diminished because the military imposed parliamentarianism as a condition for his inauguration. The first minister of economy was Wálter Moreira Salles, who sought an orthodox economic policy to correct the mistakes of the Quadros administration. The initial economic situation wasn't promising; inflation was rising and the public finances were in bad shape. The fragile and diverse pro-government majority in the parliament and the radical wing forced Jango to scrap the orthodox policy and print money in order to fulfill political compromises. State companies were also used to fund and employ government supporters. Déficit and inflation increased and public finances worsened.

In December 1962 the government announced the Plano Trienal to restore the economy. It included the curbing of subsidies, the control of inflation through a reduction of public déficit and the emission of money, a more strict access to credit, and the growth of foreign investments and exports. The results of the plan were disappointing and, pressured by a disgruntled political base, Jango restored subsidies and artificially increased wages, ignoring agreements made with the IMF. He couldn't conciliate his political base with an orthodox economic policy.

Faced with increasing isolation by the end of 1963, Jango turned to the radical faction of his party and promised measures to their liking in the rally of March 1964 – including the expropriation of foreign oil refineries and private land benefited by public works. His final minister of economy Nei Galvão, a moderate, was constantly attacked by Brizola, who wanted the position for himself. Jango left the economy in shambles with a 1% growth rate and an inflation of 80%.