This is a great question that delves into the long and rocky relationship between Iran and the United States, which was as complex and contradictory in the 1910s as it is today. Despite the animosity displayed publicly between the two states today, America and Persia have a long history of mutual fascination, especially on the part of the public, and of less-than-mutual exploitation, especially on the part of the U.S government and American elites. I highly recommend John Ghazvinian’s recent America and Iran: A History, 1720 to Present if you want to know more about the long-term history and context of this relationship.

So, let’s start with the background. What was going on in Iran and the United States in the decade leading up to the famine of 1917? In 1914, World War I broke out in Europe, and while America was initially neutral, it was emotionally and financially invested, and officially joined by April 6, 1917. The war also spilled over into Iran, first in the winter of 1914, when the Ottoman Empire invaded Persia to conquer Russian-occupied Tabriz and Urmia. American missionaries embedded in Iran became deeply invested in the fate of the local Christians, and even allied with its Russian patrons openly against the Ottomans, in spite of the usual practice of staying out of politics. This portion of the conflict saw great slaughter but ended abruptly with the Russian Revolution, which also left a power vacuum in Iran, as Russia was the traditional great power there. The British and the Americans were eager to fill this vacuum, and American missionaries in Persia in particular enthusiastically organized and armed Armenian and Assyrian militias to resist the Ottomans. For them, it was a kind of Holy War, and they did not object when Christian militias exacted revenge against tens of thousands of Muslim civilians after the assassination of an Assyrian bishop. While America exploited Persia less than most countries during the war, many Americans did so individually in that lawless era, including John Caldwell, the U.S minister in Tehran, who illegally exported Persian carpets to line his pockets, or John Merrill, who misrepresented himself and trained Persian soldiers despite flunking out of West Point.

Back home, however, the U.S government was less eager to get involved. Although Woodrow Wilson had promised that the United States would "play a leading part in the world drama" and deal fairly with "the people of small and weak states...exactly as the people of big and powerful states", these promises did not always seem to apply to non-European countries. While it was Britain that was more eager to block Persian aspirations in Paris, the Iranian state was repeatedly rebuffed by the United States in its requests for aid during the war.

How bad was the suffering? I will leave it to Ghazvinian, who says it more eloquently than I could:

"…The suffering was almost biblical. Urmia - and northwestern Persia generally - saw the worst of the fighting during the war, but hardship and misery were felt nationwide. The presence of foreign troops in Persia meant many more mouths to feed, and when the Russian revolution broke out in 1917, the crisis became a catastrophe. Food imports from the north fell dramatically. Across Persia, bellies distended and rib cages grew more visible. In 1918 and 1919 one hundred thousand people starved to death. Ten thousand villages were deserted as their inhabitants succumbed to famine. In Hamedan and Kermanshah, people were reduced to living in caves, and the traditional carpet-weaving industry of western Persia collapsed entirely. For a country that had asked to play no part in the war, it was quite a punishment. 'Persia,' said the British minister Harold Nicolson at the close of the conflict, 'has been exposed to violations and suffering not endured by any other neutral country.'"

In spite of this situation, the American government seemed unmoved. The public was, but it reserved its concern primarily for Christian minorities. Missionaries held aid drives through an organization called the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, and pious Americans donated, but it's unclear where the money went, and in some cases was simply used to pay rent to local landlords to support the Christian missions. The Committee also sent a “Persian Commission” to Tehran in 1918, headed by the president of Columbia University, but the participants spent most of their time at elegant dinner parties held by the European legation, shielded from the famine and suffering around them. These details, of course, were not made public, while the visit was hailed as a historic example of American concern for the weak and downtrodden.

Iran repeatedly asked the United States for help directly and was rebuffed. Attempts to intervene with Morgan Shuster, an American official who once served as the treasurer-general of Iran, were shot down by the State Department as Shuster had fallen out of favor. Over the next year or so, several secret requests were made – the Shah offered to sell the Persian crown jewels for $35 million dollars, asked to take refuge at the American legation, and even offered to fly the American flag from the Imperial Palace! All of these requests were refused.

In public, America still continued to support Iran in theory. The British eventually negotiated a massive loan and aid package, but in exchange, Iran had to give up the majority of its sovereignty. When the terms of the Anglo-Persian Agreement were announced in 1919, the Persian public exploded in anger. John Caldwell published an open letter in the Persian press that publicly criticized British policy, an extraordinarily rare move for a country that was typically reluctant to criticize its ally so openly. The reaction was a “pro-US riot” in Tehran, with many Iranians pouring into the streets to celebrate that the United States had opposed the Anglo-Persian Agreement, and hundreds seeking refuge from their own country at the American legation, from what they claimed was “a government that sells its own people into British slavery”.

So, although they publicly supported Iran in a way that was appealing to the Iranian public and U.S missionaries (who had significant political clout), in private the United States was not interested in extending the principles of Wilsonian diplomacy to include real solidarity with Iran, at least not if it was at any substantial cost. This was in spite of repeated, increasingly desperate (and quite embarrassing) pleas from the monarch. There were, of course, practical reasons – the Americans wanted to reserve funds for loans to Europe during and after the war. In effect, Wilson’s statement that "We are to play a leading part in the world drama....We shall lend, not borrow," did not apply to Iran.