Greetings! I am afraid that this is a fairly misleading question, but I shall give the benefit of the doubt nonetheless and deal with the larger problems facing the Allied powers - as the Entente had come to be formally known by 1919 - in the postwar years. As a note, the terms "Entente" and "Allied Powers" are often used interchangeably in literature about the First World War's alliance systems, but for the sake of some pedantry on my part we shall stick to "Entente" until the entry of America in 1917, when "Allied powers" became the norm. Let's begin.

Misconceptions with the Entente

Firstly, it is necessary to address a key misconception within the question: the Entente was not an alliance. It is a common misconception mind you, but it is one which must be cleared up before we progress any further in this response. The Entente Alliance was an informal understanding between Russia, France, and Britain regarding the closer state of relations between the three nations which had developed as a result of various bilateral agreements in the leadup to 1914. These included the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894, the Entente Cordiale of Britain and France in 1904, and the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. Of these three agreements, only the Franco-Russian Alliance contained any clauses regarding mutual defense, that is, the obligation that one power come to the aid of the other if it were attacked by the nations in the Triple Alliance (Italy, Austria-Hungary, Germany):

"France and Russia, being animated by a common desire to preserve peace, and having no other object than to meet the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against either of them, have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany."

[Note: this extract taken from the Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention of 1892, though the formal alliance was consolidated by 1894, hence the disparity in dates mentioned]

Britain had no obligation to come to either Russia or France's aid, and the Entente Cordiale alongside the Anglo-Russian Entente were more "agreements" rather than "alliances" in the sense that they merely formalised both party's commitment to the status quo in non-European territories. During the leadup to continental war in 1914, the British parliament was divided on whether its previous agreements with France and Russia (though the latter was discussed to a lesser extent) actually amounted to any sort of "obligation of honour" that the British Empire was meant to uphold. This was evident in the clear divide between those cabinet ministers and political parties which were pro-war on the side of intervention, and those who wished to keep the conflict confined to the continent (more on that here if interested).

When America entered the war in 1917 on the side of the Triple Entente, which by now had become more commonly known as the Allied powers, the concern of Llyod George (Prime Minister of Britain), Georges Clemenceau (Prime Minister of France), and Woodrow Wilson (President of the USA) was to end the war quickly and minimise any further damage to Europe. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Allied powers each had their own aims and desires for the postwar order; many of these desires were incompatible with those of their former co-belligerents.Based on their aims at the onset of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the final revision of the Treaty which was signed represented a compromise, and one which is historiographically criticised as being a poor one. Here's historian Manfred Boerneke echoing such a claim:

“Scholars, although remaining divided, now tend to view the treaty as the best compromise that the negotiators could have reached in the existing circumstances. The delegations in Paris and their entourages had to work quickly. Troops had to be sent home, food shipments needed to enter blockaded ports, and revolutionary movements required containment. None of those endeavours allowed for delay. ”

Below is a primary excerpt from Llyod George himself while the conference was ongoing regarding his assessment of the French aims for revenge (or more accurately, his fears about an overly harsh peace settlement):

"You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth rate power; all the same in the end. If she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919 she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors... If we are wise, we shall offer to Germany a peace, which, while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternative of Bolshevism."

Clearly, Llyod George feared (given the Bolshevik Revolution which had neutralised Britain's Russian ally in 1917), that any overly harsh Treaty which favoured the French would lead to another Bolshevik revolution in Europe, which might in turn inspire revolt across the Empire. Clemenceau for his part, was aware of this fear, but also believed that Wilson and Llyod George were being a tad overcautious with their stances:

"We cannot take unfair advantage of our victory; we must deal tolerably with peoples for fear of provoking a surge of national feeling…Mr Lloyd George has excessive fears of possible German resistance and refusal to sign the treaty…They will dispute on every point, they will threaten to refuse to sign…they will contest or refuse everything that can be refused…President Wilson warns us against giving the German’s a sense of injustice.

Wilson was perceived by both Clemenceau and Llyod George as something of a New World idealist, with his push for the League of Nations, disarmament, and free right to the seas (something which deeply troubled Great Britain) being seen as Wilsonian ideals. After the Treaty of Versailles was signed, the three powers went about assisting (or at least attempting to) with the administration of League cities and territories (most notably the Saar region, jointly occupied by troops from all three Allied powers).

Part 1 of 2