A telegram from Lumumba's government to Khrushchev asking him to monitor the Katanga crisis, along with examples of cultural and educational cooperation, is often cited as evidence that the DRC and Pan-African movement that Lumumba led were falling under Soviet influence. The depth and direction of this relationship are also often cited as one of the core reasons that the CIA organized Lumumba's assassination at Eisenhower's personal direction with support from the Belgian colonial apparatus.
However, this relationship with the Soviet Union is variably described as a desperate reaction to Western betrayal during the Katanga crisis, an attempt to scare the West into an at least less nakedly neo-colonial stance on the crisis, the irrelevant afterthought of a man with many more pressing priorities, nothing more than an attempt to stake out a genuinely non-aligned position in the still young Cold War, or a reflection of communist ideology being deeply rooted in Lumumba's contribution to the Pan-African movement.
To the extent that we can interrogate his priorities today, can any of these competing narratives be said to accurately describe Lumumba's relationship with Khrushchev, the Soviet Union, ideological communism, and the communist world in 1960?
In short, yes. Patrice Lumumba was murdered for the fear of what was perceived to be a pro-Soviet alignment. I've written about his death, and American involvement in the past, including previously, along with another user. However, to suggest that he was actually Soviet-aligned is something of a misreading of the situation.
Africa, as a continent, from 1957 to 1961, starting with the transition of the Gold Coast into the Dominion of Ghana, and eventually full independence with the constitutional reforms of 1960, tried to look both east and west for aid in its path to independence. The former colonies of Africa, whether British, or French, or Belgian, all knew that they needed help, and often that help initially came from the former colonial powers. However, the limits of that aid were apparent quite readily, as many of the colonial powers saw independence as the end of an obligation, and the dawn of a new era of a different sort of control over the continent. Further, there can be a degree of spitefulness or callousness in the handling of the independence transition, and this was the case in the former Belgian Congo.
Decades of benevolent neglect by the Belgians begat a haphazard rush for independence. For context, the Belgians believed in a 100 year plan, with the Congolese perhaps gaining eventual self-rule...sometime around 2050. Of course this was untenable, and in short order the 100 year plan was cut to 80 years, then 50, and eventually the entire process was condensed, by political necessity, to a mere 4 years. This meant that in the Congo's case, and in Belgium's case, that there simply was no preparation that had meaningfully been done to help prepare the Congo for independence. This created a very understandable air of distrust. Further, tense negotiations and an imperial-paternalistic approach which essentially bequeathed the Congolese a variety of Belgian political structures that they neither necessarily desired, nor intended for by those seeking independence. Indeed one cause of the Congo's significant political troubles was the tension inherent with the presidential-parliamentary system, between the President and the Prime Minister. The Belgians essentially gave the Congolese their own pollical system, with an elected, but non-governing president, as the Head of State, with many of the same rights, powers, and responsibilities of the King; and a Prime Minister with the same rights, responsibilities, and powers as the Belgian one. Indeed, except for a few changes regarding references to monarchy, the Belgian constitution as it was in 1960 and the First Congolese Constitution are nearly identical! And in the aftermath of the handover, the Belgians were very deliberate, especially as tensions grew between Brussels and Leopoldville throughout July, to try and impose themselves more and more as advisers and the like, but only after essentially leaving the Congolese an empty shell of a government.
There were less than 50 college-educated Congolese in the country, and the University of Lovanium, established in 1954, had only created 16. Further, the Belgians, upon leaving, went so far as to rip out the wires, to remove all light fixtures, to remove most furniture, and to take everything that wasn't bolted down in their offices. As such, the Congolese were incredibly unprepared for independence, and were understandably untrusting of the Belgians, especially when men like General Émile Janssens were simply carrying out a colonial duty, essentially and felt no obligation towards the Congo when he stated: "As I have always told you, order and discipline will be maintained as they have always been. Independence brings changes to politicians and to civilians. But for you, nothing will be changed...none of your new masters can change the structure of an army which, throughout its history, has been the most organized, the most victorious in Africa. The politicians have lied to you." There was significant distrust within the Congolese state, both its army and citizenry, of the government, because of their enforced closeness with the Belgians.
Lumumba here was in a tight spot. He needed additional help, and he knew that the help would mostly come from the Belgians, the French, the Americans. He also knew that they were the same parties, in various ways, backing the breakaway states of Katanga and South Kasai and were working actively against the Leopoldville government, because of his calls for greater levels of independence from the world orders. He had hoped, by and large that he could play the game that the Unaligned Movement would later play. He hoped that by inviting and entreating with the Soviets, that he could gain greater Western aid, while also reminding the Americans and West as a whole that they were not to be some neo-colonial states, re-colonized by economics by the West. By bringing the Soviets in, he could create a bit of a counterbalance to American and Western influence, while also using threats of further Soviet cooperation to engage with them for greater help.
Soviet military aid was present, however, by the time it arrived, in August and early September 1960, the Soviet military advisers had scarcely settled in before, on 17 September, Colonel Mobutu sized power and attempted to mediate the dispute between the President and Prime Minister. As part of Mobutu's coup, foreign military advisers were expelled, including both any remaining Belgian and French advisers, as well as the recently-arrived Soviet ones. I have also written previously about this Soviet military aid (in passing) as well as the July military coup and Mobutu's September Coup previously.
The practicality of Soviet aid for Africa was...questionable at best, even so. To quote Emmanuel Gerard in Death in the Congo: "The Soviets’ inexperience of what they called the Dark Continent exceeded even that of the United States. The USSR had little to offer, and geography made the military logistics difficult if not impossible. The gap between Soviet bombast and reality aside, Khrushchev also harbored a feeling that black Africa was of minor import." Rather famously, Soviets sent snowplows to tropical Guinea. And according to Larry Devlin, former Chief of Station to the Congo, a shipment of Soviet grain was sent to the Congo but rather notably never got far. The ship had the bad luck, as I recall, of being too large to navigate upriver to the railhead on the Congo River at Matadi, the furthest navigable portion of the Congo River prior to the Yellala Falls, and thus being forced to turn back, with its cargo still aboard. These kind of incidents show that the Soviets meant well, perhaps, and certainly had designs on influencing Africa, but were entirely out of touch with the capabilities or resources required by many in the region.