Why were the Ulster loyalist paramilitaries so divided? Some even became worse enemies than their intended opposition the IRA and the INLA. Also what exactly was the UDA? Was it an umbrella term for all Loyalist paramilitaries or was it a Paramilitary in itself?.
I'm going to explain the start of the UDA to hopefully explain why the perception of them as an umbrella group comes about.
The UDA was formed in 1971 in a meeting between several defence associations from the North, East and West parts of Belfast, the two strongest units at this stage were the Woodvale and Shankill Defence Associations, which became the nucleus of the West Belfast Brigade, smaller groups united in the east to become the East Belfast Brigade while the South Belfast Brigade was formed at a later date (initially the units were battalions before promoting themselves). Over the years new brigades were added or became defunct but the three permanent additions were the North Belfast, South East Antrim and the North Antrim and Londonderry Brigades.
The local organisation of the initial UDA founding groups, despite their addition of experienced military veteran to their ranks left them wholly unprepared for the rapid expansion that would see it stand at a claimed estimate of 40,000 in 1972 only a year after it’s founding. To alleviate this problem the UDA quickly began organising around pubs, social clubs and workplaces, in essence smaller UDA units were made up of men who knew each other and took on the social dynamics of those relationships, quickly popular local names rose through the ranks as well as “hard men” who people knew could handle themselves in a fight. This local organisation and lack of central authority led to protagonism, or unit’s identities being based around whoever led them.
The West Belfast Brigade was quickly dominated by Charles Harding Smith and Davy Fogel, a local and an Englishman respectively and both former soldiers who had been founding members of the WDA. Smith’s position as the leader of the largest initial grouping and now largest brigade very soon was recognised as the overall Chairman of the organization but his arrest on an arms smuggling charge in England quickly left a power vacuum into which fellow WDA member Jim Anderson stepped, becoming the new chairman while Fogel became the new West Belfast Brigadier.
Meanwhile in the east of the city the local brigade was led by Tommy Herron, who unlike his allies in the west of the city sat upon a fairly unified command. While Smith, Fogel and Anderson who all came from the WDA would have to deal with John McKeague and Andy Tyrie of the SDA, Herron had no such issues and quickly began to see himself as the de facto leader of the UDA by simple terms of strength. Herron’s reign quickly got out of hand during the months Smith was detained in England with actions that including gun battles against the army that resulted in UDA deaths and racketeering. In October 1972 Herron too, left the city for a tour of Canada giving the more moderate factions some breathing space as attacking the RUC and British Army was seen as major problem. Both men would be back in the city before the year was out and the stage was set for a clash.
Fogel had greatly increased his reputation due to his strong handling of stand-offs with the Army but regardless he found himself on the losing side of the power struggle that came with Smith’s return. Smith declared himself the boss, had Fogel kidnapped and forced out of Northern Ireland back to England in only a few weeks and soon presented himself as the joint-chairman of the UDA. Herron initially supported Smith against Fogel but soon positioned himself as his chief opposite and as the deputy leader of the UDA, second only Anderson who increasingly relied on the East Belfast Brigade to keep his authority but in the summer of 1973, a few months after the fall of Fogel, Anderson choose to step aside as leader and return to civilian life. The news of Anderson’s retirement led to increased fears that a Herron-Smith feud was inevitable but instead the two agreed to a comprise leader, Andy Tyrie of west Belfast.
Without a brigade backing him Tyrie wasn’t seen as a threat to the two warlords and Smith viewed him as potential puppet but things quickly spiralled. Herron was accused of criminality by Smith, and Smith of being too close to the UVF by Herron with the accusations against Herron not being exactly false as he was arrested carrying several thousand pounds and many people commented on his lavish lifestyle. Barely after Tyrie was elected leader Herron’s home was attacked by rival UDA gunmen who killed his brother in law likely on the orders of Smith, three months later Herron was kidnapped shot and his body dumped south of Belfast, this time likely on the orders of Tyrie who quickly placed a calmer, less criminally inclined member in control of the East Belfast Brigade.
With Herron removed and the East Belfast Brigade now loyal to Tyrie Smith began to fear for his position and began to attack Tyrie and his policies but the Ulster Workers Council Strike in May 1974 had helped solidify Tyrie’s position and weaken Smith’s. In attempt to hold onto power Smith decided to lead the West Belfast Brigade out of the mainstream UDA and make it an independent organization (the first of three times this would occur). Smith, always quick to display his bravado pushed his luck a bit too far when heading to a meeting spotted a sniper on a nearby roof top, assuming he was from the Tyrie supporting faction Smith opened his jacket to show off his bullet proof vest as a challenge. The sniper promptly shot him twice. Smith survived but during his hospital stay Tyrie had convinced many leading West Belfast Brigade leaders to abandon Smith’s camp, not long after his short stay in hospital Smith was shot again and only narrowly survived due to the gun jamming. Returning from hospital the second time Smith was taken from his home and placed on a plane to England, never to return and leaving Tyrie as the first true leader of the UDA.
Tyrie was in charge but had to take steps to protect his position, firstly he had to maintain his spot outside of a brigade so that no other brigade felt that one was dominant, secondly, he gave the brigadiers virtual autonomy in most decisions so as to not provoke another power struggle and thirdly he attempted to create more professional force through training younger members to be loyal to the UDA. Each one of these steps would eventually lead to his fall nearly two decades later, without a brigade as a base of power he was reliant on the majority support of the Brigadiers, the virtual autonomy of whom gave them plenty of time to plot against him and the new more militant members eventually overthrew most of his supporting brigadiers.