It's not clear exactly what your passage is supposed to be saying, but it appears to be claiming that Russian fire control was superior to that of the Japanese Combined Fleet. If that's what it's claiming, that doesn't seem to be correct.

At Tsushima, the Baltic Fleet had 41 12-inch guns available to the Combined Fleet's 17. Despite that, both fleets would score similar numbers of 12-inch hits on eachother (about 40). More critically, the the Japanese fire control was superior at critical distances where smaller guns were effective. This combined with the devastating effects of the Shimose powder that allowed the Combined Fleet to devastate the upper decks of the Russian battleships.

Outside of gunnery, there were other factors that skewed technical superiority in favor of the Combined Fleet. Their British-built battleships were standardized designs with minor differences between them. This meant that their performance at sea was largely identical, which made fleet maneuvers simpler and more effective. The British-built ships were also faster than the Russian battleships, giving the Combined Fleet complete superiority with respect to maneuver. The Russians, on the other hand, lacked similar standardization and were further beset at Tsushima by the presence of obsolete battleships that limited the performance of the rest of the fleet. This would be another decisive factor at Tsushima - not only with respect to Togo's famous maneuvers that opened the engagement, but with the great difficulty the Baltic fleet had with maneuvering its ships into combat formation. This meant Togo could maneuver his ships into position and focus fire on the leading ships of the Baltic Fleet's formations, disrupting command and control and preventing the Baltic Fleet from coordinating its efforts.

And then there were softer factors at play. Quality of ammunition was a major issue for the Russians, with many hits being duds, and even successful detonations were less damaging than the Japanese shells' Shimose powder. Quality in crews on all levels also was significant. Crews were better trained on their guns, officers better trained in handling their ships, and commanders were consistently capable of learning from experience and aggressively pushing to retain initiative. Compare that to the Russians - apart from Admiral Makarov, they lacked a competent naval commander. A potential breakout at the battle of the Yellow Sea was stopped just as much by passive Russian commanders as it was skillful deployment of the Combined Fleet. On lower levels, crews were poorly trained and suffered from very poor morale. The Baltic Fleet was the most infamous case of this, having performed minimal gunnery training during its doomed voyage due to concerns over ammunition expenditure.

Really, the only area where the Japanese fleet was technically behind the Russians was in terms of shipbuilding. While the Russians had domestic shipyards to produce even their largest capital ships, the Japanese Navy was dependent on foreign shipyards for all but their smallest ships. That meant that, in an extended conflict, the Russians would be able to replace losses, while the Japanese would not.