A little while ago I read Annika Mombauer's book Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, and came across something which didn't make much sense to me.
On page 102, she says,
"In April 1913, it was decided to discontinue the annual updating of the Eastern Deployment Plan. At the end of the July Crisis [she's referring to August 1st here] such a plan might have provided Germany with a feasible alternative when, for a short while, it looked as if French neutrality, contrary to all expectations, was a possibility. In the event, this turned out to be merely wishful thinking, but the fact remains that no alternative plan existed: if France had decided to remain neutral, Germany would still have had to attack her... No matter what the political situation, military planning dictated the events."
But later on, she recounts a confrontation between Moltke and the Kaiser on August 1st, 1914, when it seemed like the British were offering to guarantee French neutrality. The Kaiser wanted to turn the troops around and only attack Russia, while Moltke famously refused and insisted that the deployment plan couldn't be changed without causing chaos. Mombauer writes at page 222,
"Eventually, Moltke was able to achieve a compromise: deployment was allowed to continue as planned, but had to stop just before the border. Depending on French assurances, an orderly move to the East could then be undertaken, rather than halting the deployment immediately and causing chaos."
I cannot reconcile these two excerpts. Clearly, if Moltke (begrudgingly) conceded that the troops could be turned around at the border after mobilization was completed, how can Mombauer state that Germany would be 'forced' to attack France in the case of French neutrality because of the Schlieffen Plan?
As mentioned here by /u/Rob-With-One-B, Schlieffen did not leave behind a strict plan with tight operating time tables. He left behind four rough ideas, which the Germans ended up using different pieces of two of them. And it still had room for flexibility. That the mobilization became so strict was more due to Moltke the Younger than anything.
Greetings! Whilst u/ParallelPain's linkdrop and u/Rob-With-One-B's follow-up remark have provided great insight into the origins and development of the so-called "Schlieffen Plan", I wanted to touch a bit further on Mombauer's seemingly contradictory remarks that OP has brought up in their question.
As a preamble to all that however, it should be noted that in the recent decade there has been a side-debate in First World War historiography regarding whether the Schlieffen Plan ever existed. Terence Zuber is most commonly associated with this theory, and his paper arguing as such is a most interesting (if somewhat speculative and evidence-lacking) read on the matter. Several notable First World War historians have joined in on this debate, including Mombauer herself, Holger Herwig, and Hew Strachan. Zuber's main thesis is essentially that the Schlieffen plan was little more than a post-war fabrication by German historians and army staff to justify Germany's actions (and mistakes) in 1914. Included in the "Sources" section are a selection of relevant articles by Zuber and other historians regarding this interesting thesis.
For the sake of argument however, we shall set aside this curious theory and go with the more widely-accepted belief that there was a Schlieffen Plan, or to be more precise, a Schlieffen-Moltke Plan: a strategic-operational plan for the Deutsches Heer (Imperial German Army) which involved a two-front war. With this established, let us begin by looking at the context in which the two assertions by Mombauer were put forth.
The Last Days of Peace
"It was generally assumed that mobilization led inevitably to Aufsmarsch, the deployment of armies for the invasion of their neighbours, and that such deployment led with equal inevitability to war. Mobilization was thus like drawing a gun, whoever did so first enjoyed a huge advantage."
- Historian Michael Howard
The idea echoed above is a key consideration we must keep in mind throughout this entire narrative. In the highly militarised continental Europe of 1914, it was clear to both military and civilian figures in the government that whichever nation mobilised first would (at least theoretically) be able to gain the upper hand over their opponent(s). In an era of timetabled deployment schedules, industrialised warfare, and en masse call-ups of reserves, no country wished to fall behind in their preparations for hostilities.
By the end of the July Crisis, the window for a localised conflict in the Balkans between Austria-Hungary and Serbia had already narrowed significantly. The fait accompli which sparked a panic in Berlin was the news that Russia was conducting a partial mobilization. This in of itself was a curious decision by St. Petersburg, as they had no plans for a partial mobilization against only Austria-Hungary. Their war plans had adopted an "all-or-nothing" approach by 1914: either full mobilization was to be enacted against Germany and Austria-Hungary, or no mobilization was to take place at all.
Ever since the 26th of July, the Russian government had declared their Period Preparatory to War, the state of preparations preceding mobilization. On the evening of the 30th, a general mobilisation was ordered (the first, it should be noted, to be ordered in all of Europe). At this time, the German Empire had not even entered its State of Impending War, as the government was still clinging onto the fast-fading hope that they could remain out of the coming war. In other words, whilst the Russians were busy packing troop trains with army corps and calling up reserves across the Empire, the Germans had not even prepared their armies for the eventuality of mobilization. The following dispatch from the 28th of July by the "intelligence assessment board" of the German General Staff provides some glimpse of the descent towards war:
"Russia apparently partial mobilization. Extent not yet discernible with certainty. Military districts Odessa and Kiev fairly certain. Moscow still uncertain. Isolated reports regarding mobilization of the Warsaw military district not yet verified. In other districts, notably Vilna, mobilization not yet ordered. Nevertheless, it is certain that Russia is taking some military measures also on the German border which must be regarded as preparation for a war. Probably proclamation of her 'Period preparatory to War', proclaimed for the whole empire. Frontier guard everywhere equipped for combat and ready to march."
Recall here the "mobilization advantage" mentioned earlier. If the Germans did not make the necessary decisions to move their own troops to a war-footing, then it was believed they would be at a disadvantage the moment war was declare. With this decision in mind, minister of war Erich von Falkenhayn managed, on the same day as the Russian partial mobilization, to enact early preparatory measures across the nation. Troops in training areas were ordered back to their bases, wheat was bought in the western attack zones, special guards were placed to patrol railway lines, and troops were ordered to garrisons as well.
However, do not be swayed into thinking that such measures pre-disposed the Germans to a two-front war. These measures could easily be reverted, and the fact that they could be carried out in secrecy meant that the diplomatic channels were still open to the imperial government in Berlin. The debate amongst Kaiser Wilhelm II and his imperial cabinet centered around when to declare the State of Imminent Danger of War (SIDW), the last stage of preparations before general mobilization. Falkenhayn was in favour of declaring this state as soon as possible, whilst Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke (the Younger) and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg wished merely to extend guard duties on key transport infrastructure. The Kaiser himself drifted between these two camps, but finally sided with Bethmann and Moltke at the end of a meeting on July 29th.
It is crucial here that we step back for a moment and understand the implications of ordering the SIDW and the subsequent mobilization for the overall strategy of the German government. In order to do so, we shall turn our attention to two nations which factored increasingly heavily into Berlin's decision making as July turned to August: Great Britain and France.
Part 1 of 3