Like other countries that fought along the US in the Korean war, France did not have diplomatic relations with the DPRK at the end of the war. However, as de Gaulle wanted France to be independent from the US, contacts were established, and ,at the end of the 1960s, the DPRK opened a commercial office in Paris, which became a general delegation in 1984 and also housed the permanent representation of North Korea to UNESCO. One can note that something similar happened with North Vietnam after 1954: France did not recognize the DRV, but there were "commercial" relationships and secret negociations that resulted in anti-French sentiment in South Vietnam and threats to French assets in the 1960s.
In the early 1980s, French president Mitterrand's plan to open an embassy in Pyongyang was met with a strong opposition by South Korea. President Chun Doo-hwan threatened to cancel lucrative contracts to build nuclear power plants and Mitterrand abandoned his idea (Ojardias, 2019). In the 1980s, accusations of terrorism against North Korea (the assassination attempt against Chun Doo-hwan in Rangoon in 1983, the Korean Air plane bombing in 1987) suspended efforts to revive diplomatic ties.
At the end of the 1990s, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung led a new initiative to reach out to the DPRK (Sunshine Policy), resulting in many states establishing diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. In October 2000, during the 3rd ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) summit held in Seoul, the UK and Germany recognized the DRPK without telling French President Chirac, who had just declared from Seoul that recognition of North Kora was premature. As told on the floor of the National Assembly by diplomat and MP Michel Suchod on 25/10/2000:
Last Thursday, the President of the Republic was in Seoul, where he was received by the President of South Korea, the Nobel Peace Prize winner. While he was explaining France's position on the problems of North Korea as President of the [European] Union, our ambassador handed him a dispatch announcing that the Foreign Office had just recognised North Korea. He discovered within the hour that the Federal Republic of Germany had done the same. There was no message, no consultation.
Chirac was reportedly angered by his EU allies (it was a difficult time for the EU, with tensions around the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy) and he decided to harden his stance toward the DPRK. Since then, the current French doctrine stipulates that France will accept to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea on 3 conditions: human rights, dismantlement of the nuclear programme, improvement of inter-Korean relations. Minister of foreign affairs Michel Barnier, answering a question on the Senate floor on 24/5/2005, :
France believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations should be done at the most opportune moment, in order to send a positive signal and an encouragement to the DPRK. It does not see any tangible improvement at present, particularly with regard to non-proliferation or human rights issues. With regard to the resumption of the Six-Party Talks process, there are currently no encouraging signs coming from North Korea, which has recently made a series of negative announcements: indefinite suspension of its participation in the multilateral talks and production of nuclear weapons (10 February), breaking of the 1999 moratorium on ballistic missile tests (3 March), willingness to transform the Six-Party Talks into disarmament negotiations (31 March), and further build-up of its nuclear arsenal (24 April). Therefore, the signal that would constitute the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and North Korea does not seem appropriate in the current circumstances. Only significant progress in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue could make it possible to envisage a normalisation of relations with this country
The situation has not changed since, though low-level diplomatic relations are maintained. According to journalist Frédéric Ojardias (who was based in Pyonyang and then Seoul for many years, and whose account of France-DPRK relations I have paraphrased in my answer):
An argument often put forward by diplomats is that non-recognition would also be a useful lever, "a means of pressure", or a way of encouraging the DPRK to take better account of its French interlocutor. At the very least, non-recognition would not harm France; "it won't change anything anyway", I often heard.
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