What was the structure and organisation of the military of Qajar Iran by the late 19th century?

I can answer this part of your question as the latter is beyond my scope.

The Qajar Shahs lacked both a state bureaucracy (“even in 1923 the government continued to farm out taxes simply because it lacked the administrative machinery to collect them” was the verdict of historian M. Ansari) and a standing army.

The Shah’s real power ran no further than his capital. What is more, his authority carried little weight at the local level unless backed by regional notables. The Qajars reigned over the rest of the country through amongst other personages, local A’yans (notables) and Khans (tribal chiefs). These personages retained their own sources of local power.

When Nasser al-Din Shah was assassinated in 1896 after reigning for close to half a century, he left Iran with what Prof. Ervand Abrahamian labelled as “merely the skeleton of a central government”. Of the 9 ministries 5 (interior, commerce, education and endowments, public works and fine arts and post and telegraph) were recent and existed only on paper. 4 (war, finance, justice and foreign affairs) were older BUT lacked amongst other things salaried staff and even permanent files.

The War Ministry boasted a force of more than 200,000. This army of 200,000 consisted mostly of tribal contingents officered by the own clan leaders, equipped with obsolete muzzle loading guns bought at bargain prices in the 1870s when European armies had converted to the new breech loading rifles.

In reality, the only force with any semblance of discipline and full time pay, was the Regular Army which numbered fewer than 8,000. It consisted of a 5,000 man artillery contingent with four outdated guns and, a 2,000 man Cossack Brigade created in 1879 to replace the traditional Palace Georgian slave Guard.

The Cossacks were officered by Russians; but the rank and file came partly from the Shahsaven tribe and partly from Turkic-speaking mohajers (immigrants) who had fled the Russian advance into Erivan in the early 19^th Century. They had been paid for their military service via tuyuls (a hybrid fief linked sometimes to the land tax, sometimes to the actual land itself) in the fertile region of Sefid Rud in Mazanderan.

The Palace Guard was supplemented with some 100 Bakhtiyaris officered by their own Khan who had married into the Qajar family and received tuyuls. The main Governors (almost always Princes who possessed the royal dagger), retained their own version of praetorian guards.

All this meant that, there wasn’t exactly a force which could be used to unilaterally enforce the Shah’s authority.

In fact, by the very end of the period in question (the late 19^th century), the main tribes gained access (via gun runners in the Gulf) to breech loading rifles thus increasing their power with regards to the Central government. These tribes (Bakhtiyaris, Qashqa’is, Boir Ahmadis, Turkmans, Shahsavens, Arabs and Baluchis) could now easily outgun the Regular Army.

This state of affairs however wasn’t exactly novel, a British traveller, had remarked “the tribes compose the whole military force of the kingdom except for the standing army which is not much more than a body guard for the Shah and his princely governors”. This seems to have been the case in our time period too.

In conclusion, the structure and organisation of the military of Qajar Iran, by the late 19th century was not entirely satisfactory, leading Nasser al-Din Shah to bemoan, “I have neither a proper army nor the ammunition to supply a regular army”!

Source:

Abrahamian, E. (2018). A History of Modern Iran (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 9, 10, 12 and 13.

What was the structure and organisation of the military of Qajar Iran by the late 19th century?

I can answer this part of your question as the latter is beyond my scope.

The Qajar Shahs lacked both a state bureaucracy (“even in 1923 the government continued to farm out taxes simply because it lacked the administrative machinery to collect them” was the verdict of historian M. Ansari) and a standing army.

The Shah’s real power ran no further than his capital. What is more, his authority carried little weight at the local level unless backed by regional notables. The Qajars reigned over the rest of the country through amongst other personages, local A’yans (notables) and Khans (tribal chiefs). These personages retained their own sources of local power.

When Nasser al-Din Shah was assassinated in 1896 after reigning for close to half a century, he left Iran with what Prof. Ervand Abrahamian labelled as “merely the skeleton of a central government”. Of the 9 ministries 5 (interior, commerce, education and endowments, public works and fine arts and post and telegraph) were recent and existed only on paper. 4 (war, finance, justice and foreign affairs) were older BUT lacked amongst other things salaried staff and even permanent files.

The War Ministry boasted a force of more than 200,000. This army of 200,000 consisted mostly of tribal contingents officered by the own clan leaders, equipped with obsolete muzzle loading guns bought at bargain prices in the 1870s when European armies had converted to the new breech loading rifles.

In reality, the only force with any semblance of discipline and full time pay, was the Regular Army which numbered fewer than 8,000. It consisted of a 5,000 man artillery contingent with four outdated guns and, a 2,000 man Cossack Brigade created in 1879 to replace the traditional Palace Georgian slave Guard.

The Cossacks were officered by Russians; but the rank and file came partly from the Shahsaven tribe and partly from Turkic-speaking mohajers (immigrants) who had fled the Russian advance into Erivan in the early 19^th Century. They had been paid for their military service via tuyuls (a hybrid fief linked sometimes to the land tax, sometimes to the actual land itself) in the fertile region of Sefid Rud in Mazanderan.

The Palace Guard was supplemented with some 100 Bakhtiyaris officered by their own Khan who had married into the Qajar family and received tuyuls. The main Governors (almost always Princes who possessed the royal dagger), retained their own version of praetorian guards.

All this meant that, there wasn’t exactly a force which could be used to unilaterally enforce the Shah’s authority.

In fact, by the very end of the period in question (the late 19^th century), the main tribes gained access (via gun runners in the Gulf) to breech loading rifles thus increasing their power with regards to the Central government. These tribes (Bakhtiyaris, Qashqa’is, Boir Ahmadis, Turkmans, Shahsavens, Arabs and Baluchis) could now easily outgun the Regular Army.

This state of affairs however wasn’t exactly novel, a British traveller, had remarked “the tribes compose the whole military force of the kingdom except for the standing army which is not much more than a body guard for the Shah and his princely governors”. This seems to have been the case in our time period too.

In conclusion, the structure and organisation of the military of Qajar Iran, by the late 19th century was not entirely satisfactory, leading Nasser al-Din Shah to bemoan, “I have neither a proper army nor the ammunition to supply a regular army”!

Source:

Abrahamian, E. (2018). A History of Modern Iran (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 9, 10, 12 and 13.