I recently read that Charles Cornwallis, who surrendered to the Americans at Yorktown, later went on to lead a successful campaign against the Irish and also commanded in India.
I would have guessed Cornwallis would be on the outs and barred from high command after this defeat. How did he manage to get high postings after this?
What about the other generals and admirals who were defeated in the American theater? Did the British generally forgive their losses and let them try again in other campaigns? Was getting a second chance after a major blunder unusual?
Richard Middleton’s “The War of American Independence, 1775–1783” addresses this in part. The answer is a variety of factors.
First, while the loss of the colonies was a major embarrassment, by the time of the surrender, the war had gone on for over 8 years, the logistical frustration and plain difficulty of supplying a war effort thousands of miles away was well understood by the time of Cornwallis’ surrender. This wasn’t a heroic knockout by an upstart underdog, this was a slow, messy insurgency that wouldn’t seem to quit. The perception generally was less that Cornwallis had been outfought, but rather that the colonists had fought in ungentlemanly and uncivilized ways- cheated, essentially. So to answer the first part of this question (why didn’t Cornwallis’ reputation suffer for the defeat?), it’s a combination of widespread understanding of the difficulty of fighting a far-off insurgency and the general perception that the opposing force had, essentially, cheated. That if they had fought by the standards of the day, Cornwallis would have won. And not that it’s directly relevant, but they were probably right about that.
On the second part of your question (why Cornwallis received high postings), partially it’s because as discussed previously his work in the American Revolution was not seen as a disastrous failure on his part, and beyond that, he was one of a very limited pool of men in Britain- and the world for that matter- who had experience as a wartime general, dealing with enemy insurgent tactics, and was of the aristocratic class that was part and parcel of upper-echelon command in the British military at this time. His talent as a commander made him invaluable, especially in a system where rank- to an extent- was indicative of financial/social influence first and merit second if at all. To be a high-standing aristocrat with not just experience but substantial talent for leading troops and managing campaigns was a resource that would not be easily discarded by any means.