Total novice on this topic so apologies if I'm missing something really obvious here but it seems to me that the Chinese were skilled mariners in the 1400's - the voyages of Zheng He seem particularly impressive. However, after those voyages it appears that the Chinese stopped, or slowed down, or gave up exploring the world by sea in a substantial way. In the same period, multiple European countries seemed to kick into high gear - creating colonies, expanding trade routes, and investing more into naval exploration and colonization. Why didn't China do the same?
Is this just a misconception or did something happen to make the Chinese pull back on naval exploration and overseas colonization? What am I missing?
The significance of Zheng He’s voyages is popularly misconstrued, so you aren’t the only one.
When the energetic Ming founder Hongwu passed away in 1398, he was succeeded by his grandson Zhu Yunwen, known as the Jianwen Emperor. This was not at all to the liking of his many uncles, several of whom had harbored hopes of succeeding Hongwu. They suspected (correctly) that Jianwen’s advisors would draw him away from the family’s martial tradition towards the Confucian ruling model. Amongst these uncles was one Zhu Di, who shortly opened hostilities with his nephew, and following a violent civil war, overthrew Jianwen. The victorious Zhu Di was crowned as the Yongle Emperor – not as his nephew’s, but his father’s successor.
In due course, the Ming court dispatched a succession of naval missions to tributary states around Southeast Asia. Zheng He, a Muslim eunuch, was the most well-known head of these expeditions and headed seven, all at a grand scale (and cost), throughout Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. What is not clear are the ultimate motives behind this desire. Some argue that the missions were intended to secure recognition for the illegitimate Yongle, others for (as stated in the official history) tracking down the supposedly escaped Jianwen, yet others for asserting naval supremacy, and countering maritime smuggling and piracy.
From the official dynastic history, it is at least clear that the court desired the enlargement of the tribute system. Significantly, a host of other primary sources (both Chinese and Arab), show that Zheng pursued the dual objectives of tribute diplomacy and trade expansion, successfully establishing an unprecedented level of the conduction of these combined activities. Bringing Chinese cloth and other desirables as awards for foreign states, Zheng’s fleet also carried large amounts of silver, textiles and other commodities intended for trade. In return, the Chinese received symbolic “tribute” (usually a combination of strange creatures and assorted local products).
The Chinese merchandise was exchanged for great masses of local goods, most significantly spices. These were transported back to China, to be sold at an immense profit, with the added advantage of mitigating the paper money crisis.
Herein lies the crux of the matter: While European expeditions to the Americas (and elsewhere) were driven by commercialism and conquest, Zheng’s voyages evidently meant to promote tribute diplomacy, together with commercialism. Furthermore, Zheng was not intent on conquest, though he had an intimidating force that served to overawe Indian Ocean potentates (and which occasionally saw action).
So, these missions were not exploratory expeditions (which would be a misnomer in any case, since while some areas were new to Chinese mariners, they were moving in a long-established trading arena peopled by actors from India, Persia, Arabia, Egypt, and SE Asia), nor colonizing ones. They were instead concurrent state-run commercial and power-projection ventures.
With that being said, why were they stopped? Again, there is no consensus to the causes. The opposition of the orthodox Confucian officials was certainly one, though that was likely rooted in institutional rivalry than ideological concerns, given that it was the eunuch establishment who controlled the voyages. Fiscal worries also played a role. The state coffers groaned under the burden of constructing both the new capital at Beijing, and that of the Grand Canal; as well as court extravagance; and the sums needed to deal with the increasing Mongol pressure on the northern borders.
Doubtless you notice that I haven’t addressed your question directly. That is because “Why didn’t” questions are very difficult to answer, for obvious reasons. But I think I’ve shed some light that allows you to draw your own conclusions, and explore the topic further.
#Sources#
Chen, Z. (2019). Toward a Global Network Revolution: Zheng He’s Maritime Voyages and Tribute-Trade Relations between China and the Indian Ocean World. China and Asia, 1(1), 3-49.
Finlay, R. (2008), The Voyages of Zheng He: Ideology, State Power, and Maritime Trade in Ming China. Journal of The Historical Society, 8: 327-347. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5923.2008.00250.x
Wang, Y. K. (2010). Harmony and war: Confucian culture and Chinese power politics. Columbia University Press.
Brook, T. (2010). The troubled empire (Vol. 5). Harvard University Press.