Given that it is now that month of the year when corporations decide to market rainbow coloured coffee mugs etc. in an effort to appeal to LGBT folks, I thought it would be interesting to have a look at how medieval society handled those with sexual preferences or gender identities that would be described as LGBT+ today. While it would be easy to just rattle off some examples of historical figures, it would be more informative to dive into some of the sources we have to work with and what they tell us. So, every Saturday of the month, that's what I'm going to do.

Week 1 was on the interrogation of John/Eleanor Rykener, which can be read here.

Week 2: "Was [historical figure] gay?" - The Case of St. Anselm

The way we think about homosexuality now is not how it was thought about in the Middle Ages. I don't mean that just in terms of acceptability or tolerance, but the fundamentals of what it looked like and how it was discussed. When trying to study LGBT history there is the constant problem that the way in which societies have thought about sexuality and gender is constantly changing, and when we go back several hundred years they can be barely recognisable to our modern eyes. Human nature does not change much - there have always been homosexuals and there always will be - but the way societies describe that changes a lot. This creates a problem where historians would really like to understand how these things worked in the past, but the language and concepts people used back then are so different to our own that it can be hard to even identify at all. Similarly, it can be easy to see homosexuality where there was none due to differences in language.

A glaring example of this is a passage on the formation of an alliance between Duke Richard of Aquitaine (the future Richard the Lionheart) and King Philip II of France:

"Richard, Duke of Aquitaine, son of the King of England, remained with Philip, the King of France, who so honoured him for so long that they ate every day at the same table and from the same dish, and at night their beds did not separate them. And the King of France loved him as his own soul; and they loved each other so much that the King of England was absolutely astonished at the vehement love between them and marvelled at what it could mean."

Some historians in the early 20th century thought this indicated that Richard and Philip were lovers. And reading the language of the passage, it's hard not to see this kind of language as romantic. We don't say stuff like "loved him as his own soul" about people who are just friends. Thing is, as C. Stephen Jaeger demonstrated in his book Ennobling Love: In Search of a Lost Sensibility, people in the Middle Ages absolutely wrote that about people who were just friends. As John Gillingham points out in his excellent biography of Richard I, there was nothing unusual about this passage at the time, even though it's a bit romantic to us. We change our language when speaking to a close friend verses a lover. Medieval people tended not to. Although there are some regional dialects that still do that (in some parts of England it's common to refer to others as 'my lover' or 'my love' despite no romantic or sexual connection), most of us make a point of differentiating and that makes us predisposed to misreading a medieval author's intent. Furthermore, there are euphemisms that we use that meant different things. For example, "sleep with" implies sex to us, but in the Middle Ages it was a euphemism for splitting a room. When this passage describes how "their beds did not separate them" the author doesn't mean they fucked, he means they stayed up at night chatting. These things make it very difficult to even identify homosexuality in the Middle Ages, let alone do much scholarship about it.

So let's look at St. Anselm's letters.

St. Anselm was the Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093-1109, most well known for his formation of the ontological argument for the existence of God, but in his own day he was well known for his difficult relationship with the English monarchy and his struggles in trying to encourage moral and political reform in England. He served alongside two English kings, the arch-hedonist William "Rufus" II and the moral puritan Henry I, and was exiled by both of them as neither liked the idea of an independent and strong minded archbishop competing for influence over English barons. He was a prolific writer and a famous man; a popular biography was written about him when he was still alive and a large collection of his letters have been preserved, many of them covering private topics. Even with this wealth of evidence, we're not 100% sure of what to make of his attitude to love and sexuality and historians remain divided on whether it is reasonable to think of Anselm as homosexual.

This is a typical letter of Anselm's, in this case one written to the queen encouraging her to protect the church and look after orphans of war:

"To his reverend lady Matilda, glorious queen of England: Anselm, archbishop, sending his faithful prayers with faithful service and the blessing of God and his own, as far as he can. I give great thanks for the generosity I received from you, but even greater thanks for your holy love for me which I have experienced. Since I am not able to accomplish this through the service of my body, I desire incessantly to pay through the affection of my heart. For however much I may feel your bodily absence, the presence of your faithful love can never be taken from my mind. Wherefore I fervently pray, and by praying I desire, that God himself may repay you in my stead for what I am unable to do myself and that as far as he knows it to be expedient he may bring his love for you and yours for him to perfection. With as much affection as I can, and as far as I dare to presume on your Highness, I beg, beseech, entreat and faithfully advise that your piety should strive for the peace and tranquillity of the churches in England..."

"Holy love" is the theme of a lot of Anselm's letters, and evidently he was an emotionally intense man. He took the "love thy neighbour" portion of Christianity to heart more than anyone else in his day and he writes like this to everyone no matter their relationship. Whatever we may say about his sexuality, there's no doubting that the form of love that Anselm practised most and cherished most dearly was a love for humanity itself. This has often been used to explain the romantic appearance of many of Anselm's letters. In her article Saint Anselm and His Students Writing About Love: A Theological Foundation for the Rise of Romantic Love in Europe, Sally Vaughn argues that it's not really reasonable to describe Anselm as gay because he wrote like this to everyone, but still acknowledges (as the title gives away) that there's some seriously romantic sounding language in there. Her argument is that this kind of monastic, all encompassing love and the way it was written about was the precursor to the courtly love of the Middle Ages, which in turn has formed the basis of our own modern ideas of what romance looks like. Therefore, goes the theory, Anselm reads as romantic and erotic to us because his writing was the foundation of modern romantic language but would not have been considered romantic in its own time.

Generally speaking, that's fair. It's the problem I pointed out at the start, it's just that Vaughn sees Anselm and passionate monastic writers like him as inadvertently responsible for that problem. But it doesn't mean that we can dismiss all romantic language in Anselm's letters as holy love, because there are some letters where that love appears to be less than holy, such as this one to a certain Gilbert in 1077/8, early in Anselm's career:

"Brother Anselm to Dom Gilbert, brother, friend, beloved lover... Even if you sent every scent of perfume, every glitter of metal, every precious gem, every texture of cloth, still it could not make up to my soul for this separation unless it returned the separated other half. The anguish of my heart just thinking about this bears witness, as do the tears dimming my eyes and wetting my face and the fingers writing this. You recognized, as I do now, my love for you, but I did not. Our separation from each other has shown me how much I loved you; a man does not in fact have knowledge of good and evil unless he has experienced both. Not having experienced your absence, I did not realize how sweet it was to be with you and how bitter to be without you. But you have gained from our very separation the company of someone else, whom you love no less – or even more – than me; while I have lost you, and there is no one to take your place. You are thus enjoying your consolation, while nothing is left to me but heartbreak.

In the recently posted question, was Genghis Khan’s Mongolia actually safe to travel?, it was also considered if and why other Empires and states could did not also have a reputation for allowing safe long-distance travel.

Part of my post-graduate research plans involve the fourteenth century pilgrimage account of Symon Semeonis, who left Ireland in 1322 to head for Jerusalem. He arrived in Alexandria in October, 1323, and the by far the largest portion of the surviving text is the description of Egypt – unfortunately the text regarding Jerusalem abruptly ends in the only manuscript we have. Whilst it made the usual Christian associations that pilgrimage accounts often did (discussing holy bananas and making biblical connections with the Pyramids and the Nile), it rather uniquely devoted much time to genuinely recording the customs and practices of Egypt and its Mamluk society.

What is the relevance of this text here? In the sole manuscript it survives in (Cambridge MS 407), there are two other texts - a copy of William of Rubruck’s famous account of his journey to the Mongols (1220-1293), as well as Odoric of Pordenone’s trip to China (1286-1331). On the basis of the manuscript’s collation alone, I think it would be fruitful to consider these experiences of travel in a comparative light, especially as they all involve the experience of Franciscan friars venturing off far into the East. So, with regard to the above question, I think we can definitely answer the question whether the relative safety afforded to travellers, merchants, and pilgrims in the vast territories of Mongolia (a time often described as the Pax Mongolica). Authors like Francesco di Balduccio attested to the safety of the roads stretching from China to Constantinople, but the Mongol realm was not the only one which received praise for both actual safety, as well as the perceived efforts to ensure it.

/u/Kikoso-OG has addressed the overall question that was posed concerning how the Mongols had established the necessary authority to ensure safe passage for travellers; this is a note note to add to their answer regarding other empires and their claim to being able to provide safe passage to pilgrims and general travellers alike. The short answer is that other states most certainly can be seen to have provided for the safe passage of travellers and pilgrims, but as Kikoso has mentioned, it was a tall order to be able to provide for such domestic control over the roads and a unique set of circumstances allowed for this in the Mongol realm, and that is before considering potential prejudices and bureaucratic difficulties one may encounter.

The Mamluk Sultanate during the Baḥrī dynasty (13th-14th centuries) saw a number of privileges and services being offered to travellers, including pilgrims from the west. Popular interpretations of the Crusades have often centred around military themes, and unfortunately this has overshadowed the rich history of cultural contact and exchange between the Christian and Muslim worlds. Persecution against Franciscan pilgrims did occur, and in Symon’s text, a vivid description is given of his interrogation at the port of Alexandria where port officials spat on his holy books. However, in the 13th and 14th centuries, Sultans issued a special type of document, the firman which granted special rights to mendicants such as the Franciscans to go about their work, including making visits to Christian prisoners. A special type of building known as the Fondaci (derived from other Arabic structures such as the fanadiq and the khan emerged as a place for foreign merchants, typically Christian, to reside in and to have their goods assessed by Mamluk port officials.

Symon gives us an insight into how these structures also served as way-stations along the desert to provide safety from bandits, evidently showing that the Sultan (who was Al-Nasir Muhammad (1285-1341) at the time of his trip) interested in providing for the safe passage of travellers:

We may remark that in the desert, at the end of each day's journey there is found a walled enclosure which is called fondaco, in which all travellers may rest in safety and find water for their animals without paying any fee. The Sultan has provided this for the safety and protection of travellers because of the Bedouins and Arabs mentioned above, who infest the desert and lie in ambush for travellers as a lion in his den for his prey.

Despite his hostility to the Islamic faith, he gives substantial detail and praise for the Sultan’s authority, and the immense effort he has put into providing for travellers (Christian and Muslim alike) and for their protection against bandits in the desert. After his partner Hugo the Illuminator died, Symon sought to leave Egypt and recorded that he received the assistance of dragomans which helped them in their journey, which were typically interpreters and guides. Symon was seeking safe and toll-free passage for the last leg of his trip to reach Jerusalem, and local Genoese nobles intervened and these dragomans were able to secure from the Sultan special passports adorned with the Sultan’s “special sign’. Like sheep among wolves, they departed into the desert, and though feeling quite uncomfortable with the customs of those whom he travelled along with, and wishing he was sleeping on a French bed, he indeed made it to Jerusalem, he espouses a strong admiration for what is evidently the Sultan’s interest in offering of institutional support and upkeep of merchant stops shows that there were certainly other states present which had reputations, at least in the contemporary sources, for providing safe passage. Indeed, the only major obstacle in Symon’s trip appeared to be in France, where an ongoing war forced a diversion in his route.

In short, the text illustrates both hard and soft policies which made the experience of travel both possible, and safe, for Christians such as the Franciscan friars. Hard policies include:

• use of dragomans (interpreters/guides)
• upkeep of fondaci (which included chapels) and waystations throughout the desert to defend against bandits/highway robberies
• extensive populations of camels and donkeys

Soft policies include:

• issuing of firman documents (letters of authority from the Sultan to allow for those such as the Fransican friars to conduct their work)
• development of cordial relations with Christian states. For example, Al-Nasir Muhammad of the Mamluks developed good relations with the Aragonese King James II (1267-1327). Catalonia indeed owned a fondaco in Alexandria. The effect of this on safe travel is evident, as Symon relates that Genoese “notables” intervened to support his acquisition of official documents from the Sultan to advance.
• relative degree of tolerance towards Christianity. Certainly, in the context of the Crusades, there was animosity, but tolerance was certainly present. At the time of Symon’s visit, a number of churches and chapels were open. This included those of the Syriac Coptic Church which Symon noted continued to perform mass bilingually. Indeed, the legal administration of the Mamluks had rejected calls from scholars such as Najm al-Din Ibn al-Rif to shutdown Christian churches. Records surviving in the Monastery of Saint Catherine on Mount Sinai give us details about tax emptions and protections given to the monastery by various Mamluk authorities, including Sultans. One of these includes one issued by al-Nasir Muhammad to support the monastery against bandits. Though on a number of instances Franciscans were killed in the prior decades, and that the Syriac church had been persecuted, the conditions were not at all entirely prohibitive to pilgrims, especially if they could secure the right connections, and even monasteries had received protective privileges.
• with regard to state authority as discussed in the original question regarding the Mongols, the reign of al-Nasir Muhammad, as discussed by Symon, appears to have been one characterised by strong, but not total authority. Mamluk Egypt had a well-developed postal network (which included carrier pigeons) which allowed the Sultan to be kept informed; Symon describes the Sultan’s vast armed forces and urban fortifications; and of course, in the aforementioned provision of protections, be they the firman documents or fondaci, fanadiq or khans, the Sultan is actively involved in their upkeep.
• Mamluk is derived from an Arabic word to mean something that is “owned”; In this more specific context, the Mamluks were the warrior slaves of Abbasids, who were typically trafficked as young non-Muslim boys from a variety of countries (often Turkic cultures). With the Mamluk revolt against the Abbasids in 1258, they assumed control establishing military rule. Hence, there was not only a diverse population existing in cities such as Alexandria, but you also had a degree of cultural fluidity within the ruling and professional classes. Indeed, a number of dragomans were enslaved Christians, As Symon records.

In response to a question asked by u/George_S_Patton_III regarding Mughal foreign relations

To understand the history of Mughal foreign relations with neighbouring states in Iran and Central Asia, we must go back to the founder of the Mughal dynasty and his immediate successor, since it was the experiences of these men, with both the aforementioned states that truly shaped the outlook and policy of later Mughals upto Aurangzeb.

HISTORY OF MUGHAL FOREIGN RELATIONS

ZAHIR-UD-DIN MUHAMMED "BABUR"

Zahir-ud-din Mohammed Babur, was the eldest of Umar Sheikh Mirza, who was governor of Ferghana, which is a region in eastern Uzbekistan. Babur was by lineage the great-great grandson of Timur. Babur's early military career was full of frustrations. Born in 1483, he had assumed the throne of his father at age 12, in the year 1494. He conquered Samarkand two years later, only to lose Fergana soon after. In his attempts to reconquer Fergana, he lost control of Samarkand. In 1501, his attempt to recapture both the regions failed when Muhammad Shaybani Khan the founder of the Shaybanid dynasty, defeated him. He conquered Kabul, in 1504, after having being driven away from his patrimony and homeland. He formed an alliance with the Safavid Shah Ismail I, to take parts of Turkestan as well as Samarkand itself only to lose them again to the Shaybanids.

Therefore, the Uzbeks had been natural enemies of the Mughals, having exiled Babur from his homeland from Samarqand. Meanwhile, since their early days, the Mughals had also found ready allies in the Safavids, who were more than glad to accept Mughal help against the Uzbek threat. The story of Babur's conquest into India is already told, our next concern is the career and reign of his son Humayun, whose experiences further cemented the Mughal outlook towards the Safavid state.

NASIR-UD-DIN MUḤAMMAD "HUMAYUN"

In 1530, Humayun assumed the throne from his father at age 22, and for the next 10 years his reign was filled with mixed military successes and an overall inability to contest with the remnants of the Afghan power present in the subcontinent. Finally in 1540, at the Battle of Kannauj, Humayun was defeated by the leader of the resurgent Afghan power, Sher Khan, later titled, Sher Shah Suri. Sher Khan's victory left Humayun a Prince with no kingdom. His own brothers turned against him and he was left to wander but with his close family, and loyal followers. Being chased out from the regions of the Upper Ganga Valley, Humayun could not seek shelter in the court of his brother Kamran who ruled over Kandahar and Kabul, since he had taken that part of the Empire following its division upon the death of their father. His brothers even attempted to have him killed. It was during this period, that this inexperienced and isolated Timurid Prince showed the strength of his character. By sheer will and fortitude and physical rigour, Humayun escaped absolute destruction and sought refuge at the court of the Safavid Shah Tahmasp I, marching with a mere 40 men, his wife and her closest companions.

Here the Safavid Shah urged Humayun to convert to Shia Islam. A difficult choice for the Mughal Prince n but one he made nonetheless to acquire the aid he needed, albeit his acceptance was merely an outward facade. Once the Shah was satisfied with this display of Shi'ism, he agreed to underwrite the Prince's attempt to regain power. At the head of fresh troops, Humayun retook Kandahar (1545) and following the break up of the Sur Empire, he retook Delhi.

Although he didn't live to enjoy his gains, his son Akbar who was born during this period of seemingly imminent destruction would remember the lessons learned and his foreign policy shaped Mughal history for the next century.

With the history and experiences, that shaped Mughal foreign policy behind us, we must look at the reign of Akbar, under whose rule, this policy was formulated and took definite shape.

JALAL-UD-DIN MUHAMMED "AKBAR"

Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad "Akbar" was born in Amarkot in the Rajputana in 1542. He was crowned in 1556 at Kalanaur, in the Punjab. By 1567, he had assumed control of the Empire from his Regent Bairam Khan and had crushed rebellious nobles to assume full control and authority over the helm of affairs. By 1576, Akbar had taken Rajasthan, Gujurat, Bihar and Bengal. And by 1592, he had expanded into Kashmir, Lahore, Sindh, Orissa and Kabul and Baluchistan. In the process, Akbar had crushed Afghan power in North India and he had established cordial relations with many Rajput kingdoms, through a policy of political and religious outreach as well as display of overwhelming military force. Akbar had used the lessons learned in his childhood well, and with the exception of a single incident during the siege and storming of Chittor in 1568, he had treated his Hindu subjects, rivals, spouses and vassals with respect and consideration and was tolerant of their religious views and beliefs.

Therefore, by the early 1590s, the Mughal Empire under Akbar bordered two of the three great Empires of the period apart from itself. The Uzbeks in Central Asia, who were natural enemies of the Mughals having been responsible for forcing Babur from his homeland. The Safavids, who had been allies and friends of the Mughals since the days of Babur and shared a mutual goal in the containment of the Uzbek threat. While the Mughals didn't border the Ottoman territories, the effects and influence of Ottoman power was undeniable. However, cordial relations between the two states never manifested. Firstly, owing to the fact that the Mughal did not have a strong enough navy to establish communication and military alliance with the Ottomans. Secondly, the Mughals weren't willing to submit to the claim of superiority made by the Turkish Sultans who considered themselves successors of the Caliph.

He later acquired Kandahar in 1595, through subterfuge. While it may seem that this conquest would have soured Mughal-Safavid relations, the importance of Kandahar for the Mughals was far greater than that for the Safavids. First of all, Kandahar was historically a dominion of the Timurid princes, being ruled by Babur's cousins who were rulers of Herat until the Uzbeks ousted them. Second of all, Kandahar was crucial for promoting and controlling trade in the region and maintaining control over Southern Afghanistan and the Baloch tribes. Lastly, Kandahar and its formidable fort was the final piece in the "Scientific Defensive Line" that Akbar wished to set up in order to defend the Khyber pass from Uzbek threats, since there were little to no natural defences beyond the Khyber. Plus, both the Mughals and the Safavids wanted to stem the Uzbek threat and the Safavids were weary of a tripartite Sunni Alliance against a Shia state surrounded on the west by the Ottomans, on the North East by the Uzbeks and on the east by the Mughals (an idea often proposed by Uzbek envoys to the Mughal court, but always strictly refuted and disregarded by Akbar). Therefore, Mughal and Safavid relations remained cordial both as a result of historic connections and practicality.

For the next 2 decades, the Mughals and Safavids exchanged gifts, sent envoys to one another's courts and there was even an imaginary depiction of the Mughal Emperor Jahangir embracing the Safavid Shah Abbas I as they stand over the globe. Until 1622, when the Safavid Shah Abbas I, without any sign or warning sent a letter to Jahangir announcing his wish to have Kandahar back. And took it by siege before the Mughals could mobilise their armies.

Later in 1638, Shah Jahan acquired Kandahar, owing to a defective commander of the region who handed it over to him, and the fact that the Safavids were going through interval disturbance and instability.

Once again the Safavids took back Kandahar in 1648, and Mughal attempts to recapture it failed from here on out. By 1653, all attempts to retake the fort were abandoned by the Mughals. It's strategic importance had lessened. The Uzbeks weren't seen as a threat anymore. Shah Jahan's Balkh campaign commanded by Aurangzeb had shown that the Mughals could project string military force in Central Asia and that the Uzbeks were hopelessly outgunned against the Mughal power. Meanwhile, the Safavids weakened as well, and wouldn't pose a threat to the Mughals in the future.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, Mughal foreign relations and policy was a result of historical perspective and practicality and pragmatism. Alliances were maintained out of good will and practicality. A secular policy was followed and the Sunni-Shia divide was never allowed to inform foreign policy. The Uzbeks always were and remained the natural enemy of the Mughal until after Shah Jahan's Balkh Campaign when their weakness was made obvious and they were disregarded as a threat. The Safavids were historical allies and friends. And until the issue of Kandahar, Mughal-Safavid relation were cordial.

SOURCES

" Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals (1206–1526) Part 2" by Satish Chandra

"Akbarnama" by Abu'l-Fazl ibn Mubarak, Henry Beveridge (Trans.)

"History and Culture of the Indian People Volume VII : The Mughal Empire" by R.C Majumdar

In response to a question asked by u/-LaithCross- where they ask

When and how did the British take control of the Mughal Empire

The thing to keep in mind is that the British really didn't have to contend with a pan India or pan North Indian Mughal Empire. Rather, they fought wars mostly against those states that had been created by governors who partitioned the Provinces under their jurisdiction from the Mughal Empire and acknowledged nominal Mughal suzerainty, those states that emerged as a result of Mughal Decline such as the Sikhs, the Rohilla Afghans and the Marathas, and those states who gained their autonomy as a result of the decline of the Mughal Empire such as the Rajputs.

By 1707, upon the death of Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire was in dire need of stability, progressive policies and reforms. The Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in his long reign, had not only alienated and fought wars against staunch allies like the Rajputs, he had also owing his bigotry, and conservative attitude towards policy making and court and society, created enemies out of potential allies and assets such as the Sikhs, the Marathas, the Jats etc. He had reimposed the jizyah, a tax levied in Muslim states on non-Muslims, something which only further strained the realitionship between the majority population of the subcontinent and the Mughal dynasty. He had also failed to check the rising crisis of Jagirdari or Mansabdari, a system by which each Mughal noble was a Mansabdar, and held a rank, which itself was composed of two parts zat and sawar. The former indicating status and pay, the latter indicating the number of horsemen to be kept under arms by the noble at all times. Now as is implies, every Mughal official, be it in the army or civil services was a Mansabdar, hence he had a rank and a stipulated pay. Ofcourse, paying such huge amounts of salaries posed a problem, the solution to which was, officials would be designated a certain land, whose stipulated revenue would cover the salary of the mansabdar and the expenses of his troops. What might be obvious is that land is a limited, finite resource and the number of Mansabdars kept growing, both as a result of the ways against the Jats and Rajputs and Sikhs, but also because of Aurangzeb's disastrous Deccan wars, which in the end were an immense drain on the manpower and resources of the Empire.

I would recommend reading this answer for more details on the fall of the Mughal Empire

Therefore, when he died he left the Empire in a perilous situation. What the Empire required at this point was an Emperor with foresight like that of Akbar. A gradual shift back to his polices, and his ingenious insight into and interest into military matters which alone could restore the Empire to its former glory. Sadly, Aurangzeb's successors weren't upto the task. These puppet Emperors were pawns in the hands of those nobles who was powerful and influential enough to guarantee the Emperors their position. Between 1707 and 1718, no stable Emperor remained on the Throne, with multiple assassinations and crownings. Finally by 1722, the Empire had begun fragmenting, with the Nizam of Hyderabad carving out an autonomous region, the Nawab of Bengal and Awadh followed suit. Constant wars against the rejuvenated and young Maratha kingdom, whose armies were now led by a "Heavenly Born General" in Peshwa Bajirao Ballal, the Marathas began taking territory in the north. By 1760, they had become protectors of the Mughal Throne and were the largest political power in the subcontinent, bordered by powers such as Awadh, Bengal, Hyderabad, Mysore, Sikhs, Afghan Durrani etc.

It was largely these states against whom the British contented for control over the subcontinent.

Sources :

"A History of Medieval India" by Satish Chandra

"From Sultanate to Mughals Vol I and II" by Satish Chandra.

Edit : This answer might also be helpful for u/Duwang_Mn

In response to a question asked by u/TheDesolateZone which was What were some of the tactics used by the military of the Mughal Empire

THE MUGHAL WAY OF WAR

DOCTRINE

The Mughals, since the days of Babur, had integrated many military traditions to create a way of war which suited their material and mental dispositions. Being children of Central Asia and descendants or Timur and Chinggis Khan, they were well versed in the Central Asian way of war. Of using light cavalry armed with composite bows as thin screening forces to determine the enemies' location, then to lure enemies into traps by feigning attacks and retreats, and eventually isolating enemy units that had been foolish enough to persue these feigns and destroying them in detail, using overwhelming horse archers in conjunction with specialised heavy cavalry.

Yet, when Babur arrived in India, he had not simply been the product of a Central Asian way of war. During his stay in Kabul, and his interactions with the Safavids and Ottomans he had learned of the usage of cannons and muskets in war, in conjunction with cavalry and the wagon fort. The system worked by assuming a tactical defensive. The army would create a fort of wagons linked together by chains and mounted with cannons and infantry armed with muskets, while more infantry armed with muskets and bows stood between these wagons, and the remainder of the infantry stood behind these missile troops for shock purposes. Another reason for the development of such a tactic was the fact that Babur was well aware of the danger that horse archers posed to infantry. The wagon, and the firepower and protection they afforded to the Army, made sure that a screening and harassing force of horse archers would be dissuaded from charging upto the front lines in the centre and trying to thin the lines.

The cavalry was used to secure the flanks and rear and to maintain a tactical reserve. It was during this period that Babur acquired his cannons and his muskets which would win him Panipat and Khanwa. Using his wagon fort, he rendered the frontal charges of his enemies meaningless, and his superior firepower made the elephants of his enemies cower in fear. It was clear, that this tactical system offered the best of defensive and offensive opportunities in the battlefields of North India.

Hence, the doctrine that evolved as a result of acquiring new implements, using them in his army and adopting to a more combined arms approach rather than simply cavalry, was as follows : The Mughal commander (usually the Emperor) would sieze the strategic and operational offensive, using his light Central Asian cavalry to scout ahead into enemy territory, making sure engagements took place on enemy terrain, and picked out a suitable venue for the battle, preferably one which allowed him to anchor his flank to a natural barrier such as a lake, a river or thick forest or hills. Once selected the light cavalry screening force would cover the advance of the main force which would make arrangements so the ground would be used to sieze the tactical defensive and the forces would be arranged into the wagon fort formation with the cavalry prepared to execute the tulugma or encirclement maneuvers. This made a frontal approach by any enemy suicidal, exposing him to tremendous firepower from guns, cannons and arrows. An enemy attempting to flank, would be forced to contend with light cavalry armed with composite bows, supported in the rear with heavy cavalry, meaning the light cavalry would evade the attackers and make way for heavy cavalry, which would destroy the cavalry of the enemy with support from horse archers encircling them.

TECHNOLOGY AND WEAPONS :

I have already mentioned the kind of arms and armour used by cavarly of the period, both Rajputs and Central Asian cavalry as well as Afghan cavalry contingent were employed by the Mughals as mentioned in my post.

This section is to discuss the advancements the Mughals made in the field of firearms and the equipment of their infantry. According to Andrew de la Graza :

"Babur’s artillery was of two basic types. The kazan , or heavy cannon which fired stone balls of 25–30 pounds. These guns were carried on four-wheeled wagons pulled by horses with their barrels laid flat down the length of the cart. These big guns were especially useful against fortified positions. They eventually replaced Babur’s traditional siege train of catapults and trebuchets. Unfortunately the heavy artillery was very cumbersome to maneuver and aim. The gun barrel was fixed to the carriage, making elevation and firing at varying ranges extremely difficult. The smaller zarb zan were 3 to 4 pounders mounted on two- wheeled carriages with trails and limbers similar to the European style and were a more flexible option. These lighter cannons were still not nearly as mobile as the horse-drawn guns of a later era they could still be moved more easily during combat. Their smaller carts could also be tilted to adjust range and elevation. A third, less common type was the firingi , or ‘Frankish’ cannon, an even smaller breech-loading model. As the name implies, its design was probably based on a European light naval gun. The last and rarest class of artillery was the heavy siege gun, also referred to as kazan-i-bozorg , which fired projectiles of 100 pounds or more.

Later on during the reign of Akbar, the improvements went beyond gains in performance, durability and reliability. The new equipment was much more diverse, with specialized models for every need. This was especially true in the area of artillery. Babur’s army deployed four basic types of cannon. Akbar’s forces had over a dozen different models. The new weapons were concentrated at opposite ends of the spectrum. Akbar saw a need for smaller, easily portable guns – true field artillery. He experi- mented with bronze and wrought iron cannon that were light enough to be pulled by horses instead of teams of oxen. In the later Empire these guns would be known as the ‘artillery of the stirrup’."

Also, added to the Mughal arsenal were a number of small swivel guns, eventually leading to the development of the shaturnaal a type of swivel gun mounted on a camel, easily transported and highly mobile on the battlefield.

The muskets received an upgraded as well, after experiments with the Jezail produced a more proper musket or wall gun according to European terminology. Unlike Babur's brass barreled matchlocks, Akbar made sure his muskets were made of wrought iron or steel, using similar methods as in Europe, as an equivalent to the European standard. In some ways, these guns were superior to contemporary European guns, since Akbar had innovated upon these guns from the point of view of an Emperor but also an avid hunter, he placed a premium on accuracy The barrel walls of the standard issue musket were unusually thick in relation to the bore, and much of the weight was concentrated near the muzzle. This heavier weapon was unbalanced and difficult to aim offhand, but it became extremely stable when fired from a rest which was added to these guns as well. A thicker barrel did not overheat as rapidly during continued firing, delaying the resulting subtle distortion of the bore and loss of accuracy. These guns were exceptionally rugged, more so because most of them were made with high carbon steel. This strength meant that they could be safely fired with a much larger powder charge. That led to much higher muzzle velocities and a corresponding increase in range and accuracy. Further refinements to the basic infantry musket included a more reliable matchlock mechanism, slings, recoil pads and the addition of iron sights. Some models were also fitted with bipods.

Also, added to the Mughal arsenal were rockets. Instead of wood as in other Asian nations before them, South Asians and the Mughals themselves, used rockets made of metal, which would become shrapnel upon explosion, making it drastically more lethal. The first of their kind these would receive further improvement under the Mysore Sultans and later under the British reaching their final form as the Congreve rockets.

In response to a question asked by u/Lethal_Fetus where they asked

Why did the Mughals collapse so quickly

I think this answer shows the reasons behind Mughal collapse