Pretty much no serious historians today are teleological, which is to say, moving in some particular direction, to some particular end. This is what Hegel believed and what neo-Hegelians (like Fukuyama) believe. Fukuyama's argument was, pace Hegel, history has a direction, and that direction is towards liberal capitalist democracy, more or less. ("Liberal" here is with a small L, not meaning a particular political alignment — in Fukuyama's 1989 view both what we in the US would call "liberal" and "conservative" are "liberal" by this definition, as opposed to "illiberal" ideologies like Communism, Fascism, theocracy, etc.)

Fukuyama's end-of-the-Cold-War pronouncements have been essentially laughed out of the room since 2001 or so. Instead of smooth sailing, we find a world constantly in upheaval and with many illiberal alternative contenders (tribalism, fundamentalism, nationalism, oligarchy, etc.) for what kind of ideological makeup nations in the world ought to have. (It is not even clear to me if the modern GOP platform would count as "liberal" by Fukuyama's criteria — much of it is explicitly illiberal by the standards of the 1980s.) Fukuyama's argument was never really based in the study of history, though — it is a political-philosophical argument. Fukuyama is not a historian, but a political philosopher/political scientist. That is fine and dandy, but it is a very different thing than the study of history that historians do.

While history does have many trends and reoccurring themes, it is also immensely complex and chaotic, the product of billions of independent sentient entities, and there is no reason to suspect it has some kind of "law" that reflects its possible directions. It has proven thus far pretty impossible to predict in any meaningful or significant way, and it is always clear in retrospect that the people who make such pronouncements and declare such laws are really just acting as mirrors of their own times and ideologies. There's nothing wrong with that per se, but historians don't take this effort very seriously.

In the 19th century, there was essentially a schism between the type of approach to study history that Hegel did and that of Ranke. Hegel was about looking for grand laws and grand philosophy of history that would use history to talk about the future. Ranke was about descriptive accounts based on archival sources that only tries to talk about the past. Among historians, Ranke won, and we historians are all essentially Rankeans now (for Hegelians, again, look to political science and political philosophy). This does not mean that we do not believe in structural causes, environmental influences, or other things that are beyond individual human agency. But it does mean that we tend to view the search for "laws of history" as the kind of thing perpetuated only by non-historians for purposes other than the understanding of the past on its own terms.