So, this is one of the most controversial and often misrepresented aspects of both Argentinian history as well as the immediate postwar period in general. During and after the end of the Second World War, there were a number of German and broadly Axis officers and collaborators who fled Europe for locales all over the world. Argentina was one of these destinations, either as a stop on the way to a final destination as in the case of Josef Mengele, or as the final destination itself like with Adolf Eichmann. Answering the question of why many chose Argentina is tricky because there is no one single answer. What affected these fugitives' choice mainly (but not always) came down to the preexisting German community in Argentina and active recruitment by powerful Argentinian figures.
In the immediate postwar period, approximately 30,000 to 40,000 Germans immigrated to Argentina. Europe's war-torn state certainly served as a push factor, while a preexisting German community active in the country was indubitably one of the primary pull factors in their immigration. Even before war broke out in 1939, the German community of Argentina totaled close to a quarter million people, having formed extensive connections with domestic industry, trade, and academia, making later newcomers very comfortable upon arrival. There were also thousands of Poles, Yugoslavs, and Czechs who immigrated. One of the other factors that pulled European immigrants in general to Argentina was that it was one of the richest nations in the world at the time. This was especially true of Argentina's agricultural sector, which had supplied countries like Britain with meats and grains for decades. While the United States placed diplomatic pressure on Argentina in response to the latter's strict wartime neutrality policy, the British government at times cautioned Roosevelt and his State Department to lay off Argentina. This was because Argentina's neutrality allowed shipments of goods to cross the Atlantic, unmolested by the German Navy, to deliver much needed supplies during the German bombing campaigns across Britain.
There were, indeed, factions in Argentinian society that actively worked towards bringing Axis officers and collaborators to the country. While writers like Uki Goñi tend to place the blame directly on whoever was at the top, which in Argentina's case from 1946 to 1955 was President Juan Perón, one of the most overlooked actors in the immigration of Axis fugitives was the Church. Probably one of the most active individuals in this regard was Antonio Caggiano, the Bishop of Rosario and future Archbishop of Buenos Aires. Caggiano's main goal, like that of many others, in setting up these escape routes was so that Argentina and other countries could have access to a “reserve of anticommunist experts” from Europe to prepare for a future confrontation with the Soviets. This mentality, of seeing the Soviet Union and the spread of communism as the most imminent threat, was consistent with what has been written about official church policy under Pope Pius XII during the Second World War. But while anticommunism has been cited as a potent force that played a part in these officials’ escape from Europe, there were also the pragmatic, technical motives that accompanied the ideological ones. During this time, Argentina was following a global trend of recruiting scientists and engineers from the former Axis as a way to support new research and development. While Perón was not directly involved in the extraction of these Axis collaborators, he did freely admit in his memoirs that he had some knowledge of this process, citing his own motives involving technological development: “What better bargain could Argentina have made than to bring these scientists and technicians here? All we paid for was their plane tickets, whereas Germany had invested millions of marks in their training.”
In this regard, the involved parties in Argentina who aided Axis collaborators in their escape were, knowingly or not, mirroring the state policy of the United States in their efforts to extract Axis technical experts. This effort undertaken by the United States, dubbed Project Paperclip, was, according to scholars like John Gimbel (1990), “but one aspect of a larger postwar program designed to exploit German scientific and technical know-how for the benefit of the military and industrial establishments in the United States.” While both the United States and Argentina were involved in the same efforts to bring Axis technical experts to work for their respective scientific programs, Argentina tends to be demonized in the popular imagination regarding their acceptance of such individuals. But what is the difference exactly between the United States aiding in the escape of scientists with ties to the Nazi Party like Wernher von Braun, and groups of Argentinians making it possible for technical experts like Kurt Tank or Hans Ulrich Rudel to find work as consultants to aircraft manufacturing plants in Córdoba? This is not to excuse or justify the actions of either countries, but it is important to highlight this difference in perception.
One of the main reasons why Argentina was and still is seen as a hub for Axis escapees in the popular imagination is because of the US media as well as certain alarmists in the US diplomatic corps. Print media immediately following the end of the war in Europe gives the impression that thousands upon thousands of Axis collaborators made use of these escape routes. Furthermore, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs was Spruille Braden, who had served as ambassador to Argentina for a short period of time. Braden was one of the most active members of the US diplomatic corps in his attempts to draw attention to Axis fugitives fleeing to South America. He took an active role in Argentinian politics, taking part in the campaign against Juan Perón's presidential run in 1946. He is best known for the publication of the Blue Book, whose full title was Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation. However, the book's publication was not preceded by any consultations with any regional governments, and has been considered a work of speculation. The Blue Book is a short tract detailing allegations that Argentina's neutrality had been purposefully implemented to aid the Axis powers, that Argentina's government had attempted to create a fascist bloc in South America by destabilizing neighboring countries, and that the grand architect of this scheme was Juan Perón. The Blue Book ended up doing nearly irreparable damage to US-Argentinian relations in turning the country's electorate against the United States. Juan Perón quickly took advantage of this, and used Braden's interference in Argentina's domestic affairs to portray himself as fighting against American imperialism.
European immigrants flooded to Argentina following the war, and a number of officers and collaborators were indeed among them. While the more conspiratorial works regarding Argentina as an Axis hub paints the picture of collaborators arriving by the thousands, the actual number of war criminals who settled in Argentina was, most likely, far lower. That is not to say that the number of those who escaped was insignificant. The estimates of some writers have fallen comically short, with Fermín Chávez, likely out of partisan historical revisionism, asserting that Eichmann was “the sole war criminal who was here”. It is estimated that of all the immigrants, about 50 to 180 were actual criminals or Axis collaborators. The Germans were not alone, however, as among the thousands of Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs, and French immigrants, many of them had collaborated with the fascist governments there, and were considered valuable anticommunist assets in the new setting of the nascent Cold War. Many Italian fascists, like Mussolini’s son Vittorio and high-level party officials, also relocated to Argentina. Among them was General Mario Roatta, who led Italian volunteers to aid the Francoists during the Spanish Civil War.
If you want to read more about the subject, here are some sources that you can review:
Raanan Rein, Argentine Jews or Jewish Argentines?: Essays on Ethnicity, Identity, andDiaspora. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishing, 2010.
Torcuato Luca de Tena, Yo Juan Domingo Perón: relato autobiográfico. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1976.
Eugenio P. Rom, Así hablaba Juan Perón. Buenos Aires: A. Peña Lillo, 1980.
John Gimbel, “Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy, and the Cold War.” Diplomatic History 14, no. 3 (1990): 343-65.
Holger Meding, “Refugio seguro. La emigración alemana de la postguerra al Río de la Plata.” In El genocidio ante la historia y la naturaleza humana, eds. Beatriz Gurevich and Carlos Escudé, 249-61. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1994.
Ignacio Klich, “The Nazis in Argentina: Deconstructing Some Myths.” Patterns of Prejudice 29, no. 4 (1995): 53-66.
David Rock, Argentina, 1516 - 1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987.