It's my understanding, from a college US history class a few years ago, that the US was incredibly racist. So much so that we considered the Japanese to be less than human, and placing Japanese Americans in camps was a popular move, which seemed like common sense to the (white) people of the time. Given my understanding of the zeitgeist of that time, it doesn't fit well that the US would have cared about the cultural significance of any Japanese city.
According to other users in that thread, Henry Stimson was the US secretary of war at the time, and it was his decision to remove Kyoto from the list. I'm curious how he justified this decision, and what his reasoning was for making the decision. Was there any common thought, at the time, that an enemy's culture would matter to the US? One user suggested that it was simply because he had taken his honeymoon there. I'm hoping for a less speculative answer, if possible, or at least an answer from someone who is familiar with US history around WW2.
Also, if I've based my understanding on a false premise, or made a poor assumption, I'm happy to be corrected, but I trust this sub to provide a healthy explanation if that's the case.
(PS I love you guys and I've been lurking here for years from my other account, but I think this is my first time posting here, so please let me know if I messed up the rules. I can also add the link for the AMA if anyone is curious about the thread, but I wasn't clear after I checked the rules if that was allowed.)
If you're asking, was this usual practice — no. It was decidedly not. There were no other Japanese targets spared, to my knowledge, on this rationale. (It is also worth noting that Stimson's own rationale changed depending on who he was talking to — it is clear that this was not something built up out of pure logic and reason, but something Stimson felt he had to do, and he adapted logic and reason to this purpose.) It was highly anomalous and Stimson had to fight very hard for it; even after his initial announcement that he was the "kingpin" on this question, Groves and the military challenged his authority on this and kept pushing for keeping Kyoto on the list, at least as a backup. They did extensive planning on the military value of Kyoto (which they did not do for Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki) with the aim of having bureaucratic "ammunition" for pursuing it as a target. The Secretary of War, it should be noted, did not have any real authority when it came to tactical operations during the war, and was not involved in other targeting questions (and could not stop the firebombing of cities, as he attempted to); the modern office of the Secretary of Defense, who is much more involved in such things, did not really evolve those functions until the McNamara era.
This is why Stimson had to go to Truman directly to get the authority for this, to make sure Kyoto was spared. This is, it should be noted, the only "decision" about the atomic bombings Truman was actually very personally involved in — he agreed with Stimson that Hiroshima, and not Kyoto, should be the target of the atomic bomb, and Stimson used that agreement to finally shut down Groves definitively (which is exactly when Nagasaki was added to the target list as a replacement "back up" target near the new primary targets of Hiroshima and Kokura). The arguments that Stimson used were that Kyoto was essentially a civilian target and Hiroshima was a military one (a questionable distinction; both had military aspects, both had civilian aspects), and that it would be important for the postwar governance of Japan by the United States to not unduly alienate them.
It is my own theory (which I have published) that Truman was confused by this conversation as to the nature of Hiroshima as a target, and did not realize it was a city with a military base in it, as opposed to a "purely" military target, as he would at times refer to it prior to seeing damage assessments. You can read my paper if you want some insight into the consequences of that misconception, as well as the evidence for my argument.
In any event, the decision to take Kyoto off of the target list was not business as usual. In fact, it was so anomalous — the only time, as Groves put it, that the Secretary of War "interfered" with such matters — that I think it deserves a lot more attention and study than it has been given... hence my article on it! :-)
Always more that can be said, but this section of our FAQ may be of interest.
I would love some input on OP’s premise that racism was the primary factor in “dehumanizing” the Japanese during WW2. I believed that dehumanizing your enemy in war was, and is, common and pre-dates any current concept of racism.
Also, didn’t both Japan and Germany do the same with us? Or was that different in some way?
Would love to know more.