While the 1962 Coup in Burma (Myanmar) contributed to civil unrest, it did not lead to a protracted civil war of the type seen in Korea and Vietnam, which resulted in the military involvement of US and its allies. After the coup, Burma chose a path of aggressive isolationism from global and regional affairs. This was in contrast to the participation of the competing communist superpowers welcomed by Korea and Vietnam, which challenged US foreign policy.

The US involvement in Korea led to the development of a US national strategy of containment with regards to communism, which in turn contributed to their involvement in Vietnam. Burma was considered a ‘domino’ in this strategy, however the coup did not lead to conditions which required its implementation .

The results of the coup also partly contradicted communist ideology, with regards to the concepts of Internationalism and the Fusion on Nations, as Burma did not contribute to the broader regional struggle in Vietnam and Malaya, or engage more broadly with China and Russia. China had interests in Burma prior to the Coup and maintained friendly relations, however tensions during the 1966 Cultural Revolution, saw ties between the two diminish significantly.

Burma’s isolationism was influenced by the after effects of British colonial annexation and the political results of coalition warfare during WW2, which saw competing foreign interests fighting for their survival in Burma. The tumultuous time managing insurgencies after independence from Britain, and dealing with post-revolutionary China, saw Burma choose not to ally with the nascent SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation) or greatly expand relations with China or Russia.

With the growing build up in Vietnam, Burma become more recalcitrant with foreign powers and the Chinese Cultural Revolution saw enough turmoil within Burma to dissolve diplomatic ties with China. This led to acquiescent neutrality with China, however Burma remained distinctly non-aligned. Burmese nationalism was used to control dissident activity and foreign influence. The state was willing to implement domestic repression and withstand economic turmoil, in order to maintain its autonomy. Diplomatically, Burma effectively disappeared.

The initial phase of Direct Military Rule developed into a Constitutional Dictatorship (or Indirect Military Rule), in the mid 1970’s. The state maintained limited ties with China for economic support, and also sought educational assistance from Russia. However, the extractive foreign investment approach conducted by China eventually saw the regime shift to limited engagement with the democratic powers.

Around this time, the Constitutional Dictatorship began accepting Official Development Assistance from the US, Japan and West Germany. The US Cold War ideological conflict, combined with the global Counter Narcotics campaign, partly drove US interests in the region.

Burma proves an interesting case with regards to the foreign policies of both the democratic and communist superpowers, as the coup did not lead to their expected or feared outcomes, yet these outcomes still challenge their ideological values. The sanctions we see imposed on Burma today are indicative of this.

The US did not intervene militarily in Burma after the 1962 coup, as the state became politically isolationist. Internal conflict did not develop into large scale civil war supported by the communist superpowers and as a result, the US did not apply a strategy of containment.

Sources:

Burma: A Strategic Perspective – Marvin Ott

Myanmar under the Military Rule 1962-1988 - Konsam Shakila Devi

China in Burma’s Foreign Policy - Ralph Pettman

Decisively Avoiding Defeat: Strategy, the Operational Artist, and Limited War - Matthew W. Bandi

Authoritarianism as a driver of U.S foreign policy: the cases of Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea -Rang Lee

Burma on the Brink: Complications for U.S. Policy in Burma - Edward W. Rogers

Was the Domino Theory Wrong? Communist Internationalism and the Vietnam War – Donald L Langridge

Burma: Strategic Backwater Or Strategic Fulcrum

U.S. Choices In The Bay Of Bengal – Paul A Heinhold

The Ties That Bind: The Domino Theory In American Foreign Policy,

1947 – 1968 – Sara Anne Stratton