Greetings! What a fairly large question before us, and one which is a pathway to so many questions on why what happened after the Archduke’s assassination actually happened. That of course, is a fair bit of the foundation behind First World War origins historiography, but we get ahead of ourselves. Whilst a basic rundown of the timeline of the so-called “July Crisis” can be found in this Monday Methods post (along with a larger discussion on the historiographical approaches towards the topic), this response will focus more so on the “stages” of the July Crisis and how the assassination turned into a diplomatic crisis, and then to war. Let’s begin with the two nations who were directly involved (or so it would appear) in the assassination.

Initiation: Vienna and Belgrade

“We are still capable of resolve! We do not want to or ought to be a sick man. Better to be destroyed quickly.”

Count Alexander Hoyos, chef de cabinet of the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry, shortly after hearing of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

When the Archduke was assassinated in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, the Austro-Hungarian leadership - with almost no exception - saw an opportunity to remove the “Serb problem” as it had become known in the past decade. The Common Ministerial Council, the governing body of the Dual Monarchy, convened at critical stages during these early days of the crisis to decide on their next approach. At their meeting immediately after the assassination, some urged immediate action against Serbia, which was a plain push for war. These included Austrian Minister-President Karl von Stürgkh, War Minister Alexander von Krobatin, Common Finance Minister Leon Bilinski, and Chief of the General Staff Conrad von Hotzendorf. The latter announced that this murder, even without substantial proof to implicate Serbia’s official involvement, was:

“Serbia’s declaration of war on Austria-Hungary [and that] the only possible response to it is war.”

On 30 June, Foreign Minister Berchtold met with Emperor Franz Joseph to ascertain his view on the matter. Both agreed that the Austro-Hungarian government ought to wait for further news from the judicial investigation into the assassination, to consult with Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Tisza, and (perhaps most critically), to seek German support on the matter. Tisza presents a particularly interesting person to study during these early days of the July Crisis, as it was he who vehemently opposed any immediate aggression against Serbia. Historians now believe that may have been more so a result of his fear that the resulting annexation of Serbia would only complicate the nationalities problem in Hungary, as opposed to any genuine wish to avoid war with Belgrade.

Ordinarily, the state funeral of the Archduke and his wife Countess Sophie would have been attended by all the monarchs of Europe, at which point it would be appropriate for Berchtold and the Emperor to discuss with their German counterparts how to respond to the murder. However, due to Franz Joseph’s old age and frail condition, this state funeral was cancelled. As a result, the Ministerial Council had to secure German backing through private channels. A special mission was dispatched to Germany on the night of 4 July*, with Count Alexander Hoyos carrying a signed letter from the Emperor to Kaiser Wilhelm II, as well as an edited version of the Matscheko Memorandum, which stressed the need to eliminate the Serbian threat. The Hoyos Mission, as it is sometimes called, arrived in Berlin on the morning of 5 July, and thus began Germany’s involvement proper in the July Crisis.

What of Serbia then? Belgrade interestingly observed all the correct diplomatic procedures when the news came of the Archduke’s death. All celebrations for the national anniversary of the Serbian people, known as Vidovdan, were curtailed and official letters of mourning from the nation poured into Vienna. Serbia’s Prime Minister Nikola Pasic sent a circular to all Serbian embassies, asserting that the Sarajevo assassination was heavily frowned upon by the Belgrade government, and hinted that “anarchistic elements” may have been responsible for the assassination.

For the next three weeks, Belgrade waited patiently for an Austro-Hungarian response. They knew full well that their diplomatic condolences meant little to Vienna, and that the Dual Monarchy would inevitably demand revenge for the death of their heir apparent. In the meantime, Pasic sent out official requests to the other great powers, requesting their support in mediating between Belgrade and Vienna. To Russia however, the Serbian government also sent a formal request for military support should the Austro-Hungarians take such measures. These requests were denied by the Russian government, which was still seeking to find out more about the assassination.

Part 1 of 3