Washington's shortcomings as a strategist and tactician regularly get re-discovered, and his triggering of the Seven Years' War usually starts the list of them, followed by his placing Ft Necessity in a valley, where it was pathetically vulnerable to fire from the surrounding hills. This obscures the fact that the French and English colonial ventures were bound to collide at some point, very likely in the vicinity of what's now Pittsburgh because that was a key disputed area.

De-bunking the notion of Washington as the tall, strong, all-wise, calm leader of the army also is regularly done. His dependence on green militias at the Battle of Long Island , putting them against professional soldiers, created a disaster. And Washington's extensive correspondence clearly shows an ambitious man, sensitive to complaints or even reports of complaints from other officers. The so-called Conway "Cabal" or affair was only a series of misunderstandings based on poor communications, but Washington's petty reactions- and the over-reactions of his staff officers on his behalf- created grudges and hard feelings at a time , right around the bad winter at Valley Forge, when prospects were bad and Continental morale low.

And it is also true that Washington won few battles. Mostly, he avoided them. In pitched battle, with the troops he had, he likely would have been defeated. Long Island was a very good lesson that he tried not to repeat: he would not risk his army. But that was the right thing to do. Despite its military superiority, the British army was not big enough to occupy the entire country. Being able to just pose a constant threat against it, and being able to take advantage of a chance opportunity ( like at Trenton) was an effective thing for the Continental Army to do- until Yorktown provided the major opportunity to actually inflict a decisive defeat.

Washington's political side is actually under-appreciated. As I said, his letters show an ambitious, touchy man: reserved, but remembering slights. But those many letters also show he knew the importance of constant communication with his civilian bosses, how to soothe them, appeal to them, show confidence and command, because they were a fractious bunch. In both the French and Indian War and the Revolutionary War he had to extract supplies and materiel from a loose confederation of governors, or Congressional delegates willing to question every penny of expense, who would show little appreciation for any hard work, hard service, or merit. You could say that Washington's great experience keeping a half-starved, ragged army in the field in the French and Indian War served him very well when he had to do the same thing 20 years later.

So, really, considering the job he was given, Washington was pretty good. I mean, he did lead his army to victory, in the end.

The short answer is yes, he was a phenomenal leader, unless you restrict the criteria to a win/loss ratio or sophisticated tactics. I've written extensively about Washington's particular talents as a leader and his political appointment to the Continental Army.

To slightly elaborate: Washington's value was less in winning battles and more in keeping the army together and cohesive, and keeping public support on the side of the rebellion. It can't really be estimated how much of an impact he, personally, had on the outcome, but I have a hard time believing any of the other leaders in contention at the time of his choosing could have been nearly as effective as he proved to be.

With regards to the question of tactical proficiency, it should be understood that as a Virginian aristocrat, Washington had an upbringing that emphasized military schooling, and much of Washington's early career was in paramilitary operations like surveying and leadership of the militia. All that said, the rebellion was made up of amateurs primarily, and on the whole the level of proficiency and experience was variable across the theaters of the war. Even if Washington had been a military genius of the highest order, his available options during a battle were limited by the degree to which his men were willing and able to perform the maneuvers required. At the beginning of the war Washington had a hard time convincing riflemen to stop wasting their powder showing off their marksmanship skills, let alone performing a set-piece battle of delicate maneuver in the face of British bayonets. That factor is not, in my opinion, taken into account enough when discussing the War of Independence and Washington's talents.

In short, war is much more complicated than what happens on battlefields, and it is mark of Washington's leadership ability that he was able to sustain as many defeats as he did and still keep the continental army viable as a fighting force for eight years.