The topic of Warsaw Uprising, especially its viability and the resulting outcome is still a hot issue, both among historians and general population, especially in Poland, mainly due to the fact that it is basically impossible to address it without focusing on the politics during the Second World War that directly influenced the Cold War era and are still visible in the modern times.

Nevertheless, the notion that the Warsaw Uprising has been 'left to die' stems largely from the general policies of USSR during the Second World War and their reception by Poles. In his memoirs, Winston Churchill wrote that Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Polish Prime Minister who met him on 2nd October, shortly before the surrender of the insurgents, said that 'Poland was treated worse than the Hitler's former allies, such as Italy, Romania or Finland' and although Churchill seemed to genuinely sympathize with Poland, Great Britain could have not done much and was too weak politically to exert any serious pressure on USSR. It should be noted that the issue of the potential support for the Uprising is largely limited to the actions taken by the USSR, as the Western Allies have a very limited ability to intervene, as after mere two months after the Operation 'Overlord', Western forces were still engaged in Western and Southern Europe, far from the Polish borders, so it could have helped only through aerial transports that were of limited use, given that the planes had to cover long distances over enemy territory and the supply drops over the restricted urban territory are generally prone to higher attrition than those made over open terrain. Thus, there was pretty little that the British or American forces could have done. And this is reflected in general attitude towards Western Allies in Polish popular imagination - they did what they could, and paid a substantial price for it (they are usually called out for their lack of will to antagonize Stalin during Yalta conference though). The brunt of the criticism is usually directed towards the stance of USSR or, more specifically, Josef Stalin himself.

In the period following the war, an official position of the USSR, repeated by the authorities of the satellite states was that the Red Army was unable to support the Uprising, because the Operation Bagration, having started on 22nd of July, stalled after few weeks of an intensive campaign and needed to be replenished with supplies, what was difficult due to stretched supply lines. This however, was challenged by the documents declassified later. According to the official reports, 2nd Guards Tank Army was moved to the front only a week before the Uprising started and was supplied from Volhynia, roughly 200 miles east, so its supply state was far better than that of the 8th Guard Army and 69th Army that fought on the crucial Warka-Magnushev line in the early August (leading to the Soviet-Polish victory in a tank battle near Studzianki, 25 miles south of Warsaw, on the western bank of Vistula). In general, 1st Belarussian Front consisted of 75 divisions against 22 that Germans could have mustered in the area. German reports openly stated that the situation was 'abysmal' and many units began the withdrawal from Warsaw, considering the loss of the city to be inevitable. Plans presented to the Soviet High Command by Marshalls Georgy Zhukov and Konstantin Rokossovsky in early August proposed the concentration of the forces around Warsaw through August and the push towards the city that was to be captured in the first days of September at the latest. This suggests that they considered quick liberation of Warsaw perfectly possible.

In the early weeks of the Uprising, Stalin represented openly hostile attitude towards Polish insurgents, especially those who did not support the communists. NKVD units present in area were ordered to stop and disarm any Home Army units that would try to support the insurgents within the city. Command of the 1st Belorussian front did not respond to the Polish attempts to maintain communication lines, and the couriers sent to Soviet command to inform them about the situation and negotiate cooperation were arrested by NKVD. In addition, Stalin openly declared lack of interest in rendering help, stating that the Uprising was not consulted with the Soviet High Command and thus the latter will not alter its military plans because of 'irresponsible actions of Polish insurgents'. In his missive sent on 22nd August he even called the Uprising leaders 'common criminals who started this sorry affair in an attempt to seize the power', even though the reality was completely opposite - Home Army acted in a direct cooperation with the legal Polish government and it were the Soviet-backed Communists (People Army, Polish Communist Party, Polish Committee of National Liberation) who tried to seize the power in the post-war Poland. It is sometimes pointed out that such behaviour was consistent with Stalin's stance during Holodomor, when the famine in Ukraine crippled the area, reducing the chances of the successful support for the Ukrainian separatists.

On the other hand, on 10th September Stalin allowed Western Allies to use airfields in the Soviet-controlled territory and four days later Soviet air force began air drops over Warsaw. The interpretation of these decisions vary. They are generally not considered a serious attempt to help the Uprising due to the limited scope, are interpreted as an attempt to hasten the operation driven by the rumours that the insurgents might make an agreement with Germans, or, in a more anti-Soviet interpretation, to make an impression that the liberation will happen soon, to keep the insurgents fighting and bleed the resistance out. In general, they are not interpreted as the sign of a genuine good will, as Aleksander Mniszek, employee of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs who contacted the Soviet Embassy in London few days later was informed that Soviet Government no longer maintains diplomatic relationships with the Polish Government in Exile. According to e.g. Nikolai Ivanov, the fording of Vistula was a a maneuver meant for propaganda purposes, as it included only a small force from the 1st Polish Army with little fording equipment and no river-crossing experience, thus dooming the operation from the start.

Some historians suggest that the attitudes towards the Warsaw Uprising were one of the first events heralding the Cold War, as they marked potential conflict issues that could endangered the agreements made during the Tehran Conference. The tensions between the USSR-backed communists and the forces supporting the legal government in exile were strong and USA with Great Britain did not want to endanger their agreements with USSR by forcing the Polish interests too intensively. If that meant abandonment of Poland or even the entire Central Europe, it was the outcome Western Allies could have accepted if that meant unwavering support of the USSR in the war with Germany.

So, to sum it up, the idea that the Allies decided to leave the Uprising to die out is not without merit. It is worth noting that due to the very poor supply of the partisans and the no-holds-barred approach of Germans who were ready to level the entire city (even only to deny it to the enemy), the chances of success were very slim if any. And although the destruction of the city and elimination of the substantial number of local inhabitants certainly benefited Soviet politicians, we cannot say for sure that they directly stalled the operation or simply were not interested in altering their plans to accommodate the Uprising, what, given the large scale of operation, was not a small feat. Nevertheless, Stalin was personally openly hostile to the Uprising and the operations of the Home Army in Warsaw area.

Ciechanowski, J., The Warsaw Rising of 1944, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Dallas, G., 1945: The War That Never Ended. Yale University Press, 2006.

Ivanov, N., Powstanie Warszawskie widziane z Moskwy [Warsaw Uprising as seen from Moscow], Znak, Cracow 2010.