I was talking to a friend at the time of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He told me that the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were tough decisions, but the right ones as they resulted in Japan's unconditional surrender, because the other bombings also killed, burned, destroyed.... and any chance of the war continuing must be eliminated. Japan did not surrender and this could inspire other countries to prolong the war. In the end, thanks to the bombs, Japan came out as a victim and spared its emperor.
Is there any historiography that contradicts this version?
Well, there's a lot to unpack here. First, they weren't "tough decisions" — no one involved on the US side found the use of the atomic bombs "tough" in the way that people like to portray it today, and they wasn't really a "decision to use the atomic bomb" like this question frames it. See this post for some discussion of that.
Second, it isn't clear that the atomic bombs were what caused Japan's unconditional surrender. See this post for a discussion of the historiography that challenges this and its reception amongst historians.
Overall, while this is a common framing for thinking about the atomic bombings, it is not one that most serious historians of the topic would say was a good historical understanding of what was going on at the time and its complexities.