At the outset, I'd slightly dispute the assumption of the question.

From a Whig perspective, it was traditional to regard the 1688 revolution as 'Glorious', because it was a (mostly) peaceful coup, backed by a (mostly) unopposed invasion, which led to a (mostly) acceptable and moderate constitutional settlement.

But let's zoom out a bit. The British-Imperial-Hannoverian state, like most states, was forged in conflict. The Glorious Revolution is really just a mid-point in more than a century of conflict, arguably extending from the accession of Charles I in 1625 to the end of the Jacobite Wars in 1746. This conflict had multiple dimensions: between Crown and Parliament, England and Scotland, Anglicans and Dissenters, Town and Country, gentry and artisans, folks looking to the French and folks looking to the Dutch. Sometimes it was actual shooting civil war; at other times it was tense, bitter, polarised, mistrustful political conflict that stopped short of warfare, but involved a certain amount of 'lawfare' (weaponising law as an instrument of partisan oppression, as notoriously exemplified by Judge Jeffreys, the infamous 'hanging judge').

During that period, the countries that eventually became the United Kingdom went through various regime types: personal rule monarchy, a decapitated parliamentary regime, a republic (after Pride's purge and the execution of Charles I), a theocracy (the Barebone's Parliament), a sham republic (the Protectorate), military rule (the 'Rule of the Major Generals'), and a restored monarchy; it had different borders and boundaries - at some times England and Scotland were recognised as separate states, at others, they were united in one. It experienced, in addition to civil wars, various revolutions, counter-revolutions, coups and invasions.

The Glorious Revolution did not bring an end to this. If anything, it sparked a series of wars, uprisings, attempted revolutions, and attempted (and sometimes, partially successful) invasions that continued for another half century. The events of 1690/91 in Ireland planted the seeds for further conflict. In Scotland, there were attempted 'risings' (with varying degrees of French support) in 1708, 1715 and of course in 1746. The '46 rising revealed the fragility of the Hanoverian regime: in Scotland, the Stuarts were (briefly) restored and the Union of 1707 was (briefly) rescinded. Eventually it was defeated militarily, and the Hanoverian state then took out its revenge through the brutal 'Pacification of the Highlands'.

How could the Hanoverian state do that? Well, despite what I said above about the Glorious Revolution not ending conflict, it did allow what constitution-makers call a 'sufficient consensus' to emerge amongst many of the key groups who had previously been at war with one another. The Glorious Revolution (and the state-building that happens immediately afterwards, including the Bill of Rights Act, the Toleration Act, the Act of Settlement and the Treaty of Union) united Crown and Parliament, Lords and Commons, City/Money and Country/Land, Anglicans and Dissenters, around a settlement in which they all had a stake. This enabled a relatively effective state to be formed, which could wage war, pursue trade and imperial expansion and levy taxes (with which to wage war). The internal consensus was sufficiently tight and sufficiently broad, that those outside of it (Catholics, the working class and peasants, Ireland, Jacobites) could for the most part be repressed, quite successfully, by force.

Having eliminated its enemies militarily by the end of the Jacobite wars, the British state was then remarkably stable during the period from, say, 1750 to 2000 - a quarter of a millennium without regime change. Interestingly, this stability coincided with the period of regime instability in continental Europe: Spain and France spent most of the 19th and 20th centuries cycling through regimes.

There are lots of explanations for this. We could look at the role of Empire in 'exporting' dissent ('democracy' was often further advanced in the colonies than at home). I'm going to focus on the constitutional angle. It's not the only angle. It's just the one I've studied.

The first was the ability of the British elite, to a greater extent than other elites elsewhere, to compromise with, and co-opt, rising classes during the 19th and 20th centuries. Those who were left outside the settlement reached at the Glorious Revolution could gradually be brought within that settlement - on terms acceptable to the established insiders - before they became revolutionary or destabilising. Thus Catholic Emancipation in 1829 and the Great Reform Act in 1832 expanded the range of those who had a stake in the system - but, crucially, without fundamentally changing that system. There was no revolutionary rupture, because the system descended from the Glorious Revolution could 'absorb' and 'evolve' rather than snap.

Secondly, part of that evolution was the gradual emergence, in the century or so after the end of the Jacobite wars, of the 'conventions' of the constitution. The powers of the Crown were not diminished. The monarchy was not abolished. Instead, it gradually let its powers slip - in unwritten, but more or less institutionally respected ways - from the hands of the monarch into the hands of a Prime Minister leading a parliamentary majority. By the 1860s, J S Mill and Walter Bagehot could argue that the Queen was largely, if not entirely, a ceremonial figurehead, and that the state was in effect, if not in theory, something like a bourgeois republic. In the 1880s, A. V. Dicey could set out the conventions of the constitution in quite precise ways, as 'rules' which, though unwritten, had to be followed by Queen and Prime Minister alike.

So, the reason that Great Britain did not have 'revolutions, coups or civil wars' in the 250 years after 1750 was not because it resisted 'regime change', but rather because it managed that regime change; the elite was able to channel it, to expand to accommodate social changes, without catastrophic rupture. This continued well into the 20th century, with the curtailment of the powers of the House of Lords (1911), the achievement of universal suffrage (1928), and the acceptance of the Labour Party by the establishment as a legitimate party that could be allowed to hold office, and to pursue its domestic agenda, provided that it did not upset the apple-cart constitutionally.

Some selected further reading (the question covers a broad span of time, from the late 17th to end of 20th century, so I've tried to select texts that do likewise):

Linda Colley (2009) 'Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837)

Walter Bagehot (1873) (2nd ed) 'The English Constitution).

W. E. Bulmer (2020) 'Westminster and the World'

A. V. Dicey (1915) (8th ed) 'An introduction to the study of the law of the constitution'.

David Edgerton (2019) 'Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth Century History'

Norman Gash (1979) 'Aristocracy and People: Britain 1815-1865'.