For many European nations, Napoleon was not simply a military threat, but an ideological one: destabilizing the institution of monarchy. While Clausewitz’s saying “war is politics through other means” is always true, how much more “political” were these conflicts than other wars?
Additionally, did the political strife of the era affect military strategy? From Napoleon’s own changes to the army to the arrest of the Pope to the bold strategies of Nelson, combatant nations seemed to make some drastic tactical decisions during these conflicts. To what do we owe this? New military technology? Did commanders feel the political pressure themselves? I would be very interested to see if/how generals and admirals considered politics in their wartime decisions.
Lastly, did these conflicts leave a lasting impact in how nations conduct war or is it too much of a stretch to draw a line of causality between then and now?
The French Revolution was the main catalyst for all these changes in warfare and Napoleon was a product of that revolution that recognized and utilized those changes to the best of its ability. The following is a summary of the explanation from Professor Andrew Wilson of the US Naval War College lectures of history of strategy.
In Lecture 8, The Napoleonic Revolution in War, he started with the battle of Jena-Auerstaedt and described the vast difference between the army headed by the generals of Frederick the Great and the army headed the generals of Napoleon and the impacts it made on Clausitwitz. Fundementally, the French army is an army of the nation while the Prussian army is of the old regime.
Prior to the French Revolution, warfare is mainly the affairs of the aristocrats. Armies are small relative to their population. Conscriptions usually affected the unproductive members of society like criminals or vagrants and fleshed out with foreign mercernaries and the nation' s small standing army. To prevent desertions, armies marched slowly in mass formations. Battles are often indecisive. Frederick the Great being a rare case, but he only change a few things.
With the French Revolution, its government nationalized the war effort as the responsibility of the citizens and issued the Levée en Masse. This enabled them to come up with massive numbers of soldiers to combat other nation. "The Committee of Public Safety nationionalized and centrally coordinated arm manufacture, provisioning and supply". With the new national army fighting for France desertions became less of an issue, and they can break to the divisions and corps sytem, Napoleon later used famously. This meant the French army were "suddenly lighter, faster and more flexible than their enemies. " Also, they were infused and led by "ambitious and audacious new blood in its officer corps".
In David Chandler "The Campaigns of Napoleon" and Alan Palmer " Bernadotte: Napoleon' s Marshal and Sweden King", one thing is mentioned in the of the French Revolutionary Army is that the commander-in-chiefs are at risk of being beheading for failures or because they are nobles in the old regime and suspecting of undermining the revoltion. Many became emigres and the ones that stayed, do not want to rock the boats. Several decisions are made to keep in favor with the politician in Paris.
The younger officers because more risk-tolerant as they were facing deaths anyways (initially, the French conscripts were being less trained than the Austrian armies and lose more engagements ) came up with strategies and innovations to help them survive. Many of those strategies/innovations were gathered by the French government and spread out to the rest of the armies. Also, they rose through the ranks fast. Napoleon, rose in the Battle of Toulone, by being its unofficial commander while his commanding officer prefer to led the young guys sort it out.
The French government also cannot pay the mass conscriptions, and stated "the war must pay for war" meaning that soldiers had to feed themselves on the marches. When Napoleon in Italy, he promised his soldiers the wealths of Italian artworks. He bought political favors and newspaper press to glorify his exploits. Combining with his victories, he symbolized the trinity in Clausiwitz came up with.
The Trinity of Clausiwitz is that war is composed of hostile feelings from emotions, the cretivity of navigating chances and the reasoning skills of politics. Napoleon is a true politician that can generate great supports from the mass. In controlling the press, he able to turn his victories into glories into his power. He rose through the ranks by attaching himself to politicians and led soldiers to victory by raising their morale. Many of his adminstration policy synchronized greatly with his army. Tech schools were built and awards were giving out to technological innovations. When he became emperor, he do not need to abide by any politician, and able to command the army in anyway he want unlike his enemies (i.e. Archduke Charles who had to work under political pressure trying to force him to making terrible decisions). This made him the greatest general of that age.
Top generals or good ones understood politics as well as wars. Many of the marshals are not simple soldiers. Davout is a great spymaster. Suchet and Bernadotte are beloved administrators. Bernadotte established connections with networks of merchants that allowed him ears and mouths over what happenings in Europe that ended up with him ruling as kings. Archduke Charles made sure to keep informed of news and developments in the imperial court and diplomacy. Kutuzov were placed the top Russian commander because he knew Russian characteristics better than more tactically qualified candidates.
The success of Napoleon and the French armies forced the rest of Europe to change. However, as skills as Napoleon was in wars, he was terrible in keeping the peace. According to Owen Connelly, Austria repeated declaration of wars against the French was motivated by the loss in the treaty of Campo Fomio. According to John Gill, in 1805 only the Austrian government want war, in 1809 all of Austrian want war. Prussia and Russia went about it the same ways. So did Spain and England. They all made the wars the affairs of the nations and successfully reformed their armies. Theories regarding diplomacy and political economy grew in this era due to the impact of Napoleon' s continental blockade.
Some said Napoleonic wars are the first total wars in which a nation mobilized all its resource to destroy its enemy in the veins of the world wars. Clausiwitz ended up in a teaching position of Prussian war colleges and influence the merging of politics and wars. He respond to the opinions that politicians should stay out of military affairs by saying that wars started because of politicians. That is Napeleonic wars in a nutshells. The changes in politics created the changes in wars.
Sources:
Owen Connely, "Blundering to Glory"
David Chandler, "The Campaigns of Napoleon"
Andrew R Wilson, "Masters of War: History' Greatest Strategy Thinkers"
Alan Palmer, "Bernadotte: Napoleon' s Marshal and Sweden King"
John Gill, "1809: Thunder on the Danube"