The Ottomans are an interesting case, in that the period that you're interested in—say, roughly 1500-1700 CE—saw some very important changes in the form of private landholding (tl;dr, in the context of your question, the period saw the increasing privatization of land under large landowners). These changes, I should stress, were by no means specific to the Ottoman economy—but it's the Ottomans I'm most qualified to speak about, so that's what I'll do.

Private land ownership in the early sixteenth-century Ottoman Balkans and Anatolia can be broadly divided into a few types. Two of these categories date back to early Islamic landholding law: öşrī land was conquered from non-Muslim populations and immediately distributed to Muslims or left in the hands of indigenous converts, while haracī land remained in the hands of indigenous landholders who had not converted to Islam and therefore were liable to pay extra tax. In theory, most of the remaining land was "public" (memleket or miri), meaning that its usufruct was administered by the treasury. This public land could, in turn, be effectively privatized in a few ways. Here, let's talk about three of them: grant, permanent lease, and reclamation.

Land—or at least, the usufruct to the land's rents, which amounted to roughly the same thing—was often granted to soldiers and other beneficiaries to maintain the Ottoman army. These grants, called timars, were similar to European fiefs, but by the sixteenth century had become rather centralized: they weren't hereditary, and in fact remained conditional even during the life of the original grantee. (But the equation of the timariot system to feudalism was very common in older historical writing, and you'll still occasionally see references to the troops supported by it as "feudal cavalry." Of course, feudalism itself is its own can of worms...) This centralization meant that while the timar holder was entitled to rents from the land for the period of the grant, they did not have the ability to use it entirely as they wished: they could not, for example, alienate plots of arable land from the farmers who leased and actually worked it.

Farmers with permanent leases and tenancy on miri land effectively owned the land they worked on, albeit with some stipulations. Importantly, the land's status was supposedly inalterable: the farmer could not divide the land or sell it into private ownership. Each farming household worked one çift (plot), paid rent in cash to the treasury (or a timar holder), and that was that.

So, in the early sixteenth century, this was the situation in much of the empire: the timar holders could enjoy rents from land but didn't have the right to evict farmers, while the farmers could continue to farm "their" land but ultimately paid rent to either the treasury or a timar holder. The exception to this generally centralized, tenant-protective rule was reclaimed land: miri land specifically designated as wasteland (mevat) could be and was built up into large plantation-like landholdings that relied on slave or sharecropper labor. (Ownership of such land was established through the completion of major infrastructural projects, such as the creation of canal networks for irrigation, and a special document granting official permission to privatize the land.)

Because miri land could be transferred to private ownership but (usually) not vice-versa, the passage of time saw the increasing alienation of public lands. Some land was designated as mevat and reclaimed in accordance with the laws described above; some was alienated as part of theoretically permanent charitable foundations, or vakıfs (waqfs) where the rules for public land ownership didn't apply; and, especially from the seventeenth century on, some was leased out on much laxer terms than would have been usual in the period of extreme centralization. (Was this the case because the worsening state of the Ottoman treasury forced the government's hand? Because increased demand among European trade partners made the shift more potentially profitable than it would have been previously? Because of a gradual and general trend in the very fabric of Ottoman society towards a more capitalistic economy? Here, as elsewhere, interpretation is a matter of debate.)

While sixteenth-century timars were, as a rule, granted and revoked at the pleasure of the sultan, these new grants stipulated a lifetime duration for the bearer—eventually allowing for the possibility of inheritance as well. This development is known as the malikane system: a class of hereditary large landowners, a sort of Ottoman "landed gentry," which possessed the capital to expand their holdings through further reclamation and long-term leases.

Traditionally, this "crisis" of the timar—that is, its gradual transformation into a long-term lease that could be purchased from the government by those with sufficient funds—has been seen as a symptom of the decline of the Ottoman state beginning with the reign of Selim II (1566-1574). More recent historiography (which generally seeks to discredit the "decline paradigm" altogether) casts the change not as a crisis of land ownership, but a transformation: from semi-fief to long-term investment, to a market economy and the "Second Ottoman Empire."

FURTHER READING:

Halil İnalcık, "The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftliks: State, Landlords, and Tenants," in Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East, ed. Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (SUNY Press, 1991), 17-34, is a useful if dated overview of the formation of large landholdings in Ottoman Anatolia and the Balkans;

Gilles Veinstein, "On the Çiftlik Debate," in Landholding and Commercial Agriculture, 35-53, covers the historiographic debate over the cause and significance of the formation of these large landholdings;

Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 14-45;

on Egypt and the Levant, which I didn't cover in this overview, see:

Kenneth M. Cuno, “Was the Land of Ottoman Syria Miri or Milk? An Examination of Juridical Differences within the Hanafi School,” Studia Islamica, no. 81 (1995): 121–52 [JSTOR link].

Martha Mundy, “Ownership or Office? A Debate in Islamıc Hanafite Jurisprudence over the Nature of the Military ‘Fief’, from the Mamluks to the Ottomans,” in Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things, ed. Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 142-165.