The 'militia' is a misnomer when applied to the Home Army, as the latter was essentially armed forces of the Polish Underground State. It began as the Union of Armed Struggle (pol. Związek Walki Zbrojnej) that was created as the military organization formed of the remnants of the Polish Armed Forces, subordinate to the Polish Government in Exile in Paris and later in London and tasked with the clandestine operation in occupied Poland and the organization of the general uprising and assistance in the liberation of Poland by Allied forces (understood as Polish army supported by England and France, as the massive involvement of USSR and USA has not been expected in late 1939).

Home Army, or rather the Union for Armed Struggle, as a constituent part of the Polish Armed Forces has been initially financed by the Municipal Treasury of Warsaw ceded by the mayor, Stefan Starzyński and from the available funds of the treasury of the Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence. After the evacuation to London, Home Army was financed by the Polish Ministry of Treasury that has transferred roughly 10 million zlotys (USD 100.000) through the courier network. Western Allies supported Home Army financially. Special Operations Executive, closely operating with Home Army, has been crediting the organization during the Operation Big Scheme, eventually transferring an equivalent of roughly USD 3 million, while between January 1944 and March 1945, MI6 has also been assigning USD 150.000 monthly for the operations of Polish resistance. Having joined the war, USA also financed Polish resistance, transferring increasing donations in the following years that amounted to USD 2.5 mln in 1942, USD 4 mln in 1943 and USD 11 mln in 1944 (with roughly 10% of the money being transferred as a gold bullion). Early British money transfers were quite inefficient, as they have been organized by Samson Mikciński, owner of a travel agency and an official in the Chile consulate before the war, who was appropriating substantial parts of the money. After the complaints of the Home Army HQ, he reduced his fees significantly, but they still amounted to 15-20% of the transferred amounts, although at least part of it was justified by the organizational expenditures (travel, falsified documents etc.). To make matters worse, large part of the initial transfers were issued in the 500-zlotys notes that started to be withdrawn from the market by German authorities, and needed to be exchanged at a substantial loss. Air drops were also prone to waste due to enemy interference, but it is generally estimated to be 5-7% on average throughout the entire war).

Between 1940 and 1942, resistance members were also using the official money source in General Governorate, as a group of the employees working in the mint controlled then by the German authorities clandestinely produced or appropriated roughly 20 mln zlotys (USD 200.000) and substantial amount of food and goods stamps or documents. In early 1943, Polish intelligence was able to procure high-quality diapositives of the notes, as well as the samples of the watermarks and subsequently deliver them to England, allowing SOE to produce counterfeit money (this method allowed to make 50 million zlotys throughout the war). Of note was also the Operation Highlander carried out by the Home Army in August 1943 that allowed the seizure of the armoured car transferring the funds of Polish Bank transporting over 100 million zlotys (more than 1 million USD).

Equipment has been often procured in various ways necessitated by the specific of the operations in the occupied country and clandestine character of the Home Army. Part of the weapons, ammunition, explosives and similar equipment has been hidden during the retreat after the Polish Campaign in September/October of 1939. Some equipment was appropriated from German warehouses and transport during the raids, some has been also assigned from local reserves of the British Army by Special Operations Executive that was transferring it to the Quartermaster Unit of the Home Army via air drops (since 1943 SOE was also sending German equipment seized from surrendering troops in Northern Africa and Italy).

Last but not least it needs to be pointed out that many members of the Home Army, especially those working in the capacity of various instructions or specialists often had a normal day jobs that allowed them sustenance and better-paid people were using part of their private salaries to support their immediate part of the organization .

Was the funding and transports effective? This is very hard to answer objectively, as the secret character of the Home Army made the transfer and usage of funds much more complex and indirect that the funding of an openly operating armies with well-maintained and efficient supply lines. The means assigned by the Great Britain were pretty scarce as in total they amounted to less than a single daily war effort expenditure. The amount of supplies was also very small, not exceeding 700 tons (in comparison to over 10.000 tons assigned For french Resistance and over 70.000 tons given to Yugoslavian partisans over a similar time period) despite the size of the Home Army alone, not counting other Polish resistance movements. All in all, these means were very meager and in the initial period, they have been transferred in a really inefficient way, forcing the Home Army to limit their activities. Later, especially after 1942, financing increase, but it still was partially backed by the private funds and contributions of the members and their families. In general, all the sources of the financing allowed only limited activities against the occupying forces, especially in the period between 1939 and early 1943.

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Baliszewski, D. et al. (Eds.), Dokumenty i materiały archiwum Polski Podziemnej 1939-1956 [Documents and other materials from the archives of the Underground Poland 1939-1956] , vol. 3., Warsaw 1995.

Bieniecki, K., Lotnicze wsparcie Armii Krajowej [Aerial support for the Home Army], Krakow 1994.

Karski, J., Tajne państwo. Opowieść o polskim podziemiu [Secret State. The Tale of the Polish Underground], Krakow 2014.

Rutkowski, G., Środki pieniężne przerzucone drogą lotniczą dla Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego [Aerial finance transfers for the Polish Underground State], in: Dzieje Najnowsze [Modern Times], vol. 50(2), 2018.