Greetings! This is a rather broad question, and one which might benefit from some further historiographical definition. The so-called ‘Concert of Europe’ has been scrutinised by historians for quite some time now, and most would be inclined to disagree with Kissinger’s opinion that the Concert System kept the peace in Europe in the century following Napoleon’s defeat. Instead, the ‘Concert of Europe’ is more commonly associated with the period 1815-1848, after which it was not as strong (or, if you’ll excuse the pun, concerted) as it was envisioned to be during the Congress of Vienna. Putting that aside, let’s turn to the question at hand. Whilst the July Crisis dwarfs any of the events about to be discussed in scale and consequences, it is worth noting that these developments in the 19th century contributed in one way or another to creating the geopolitical environment in which the catastrophe of 1914 occurred. Let’s begin.

Note: This analysis will focus on events which followed the ‘Springtime of Nations’ in 1848, as my research on pre-1850s geopolitics remains insufficient to comment confidently on them. One might also discern a clear focus towards the British perceptions of the Concert of Europe; another symptom of my research focuses.

The Orchestra Falters: Crimea and The Eastern Question

In the ‘long-nineteenth century’, to borrow Eric Hobsbawm’s oft-used phrase, the major continental conflict between the great powers was the Crimean War (1853-1856), though we should be clear on several things here. Of the ‘great powers’ at the time, four were involved in the diplomatic lead-up to the war (Britain, Austria, France, and Russia), and of those four only three would actually take part in the hostilities (Britain and France sided with the Ottomans against Russia). Further, the conflict was not quite ‘continental’ per se, with the majority of the fighting taking place in and around the Crimean peninsula. However, the Crimean War does stand out as a turning point of sorts in the Concert System which had, to some degree, helped keep the peace in Europe until 1853. One of the major limitations of the system was that it relied heavily upon the goodwill of the member states, and after the collapse of the physical Congresses which constituted the system in the 1840s, there were no thorough (or indeed, formal) procedures and structures to keep the system in order. Historians have argued whether the Crimean War was a cause of the decline of the Concert system or a consequence of it, but the critical takeaway for us in the Crimean War is that it revealed the glaring flaws in a system that revolved around the consensual diplomacy and pragmatic sensibilities of its member states; when those foundations began to shift in the middle of the century, the system began to falter.

But was the Crimean War a continental crisis in the same vein as the July Crisis was a half-century later? To be certain, the question of the ‘failing’ Ottoman Empire was seen to be a major geopolitical quandary by most of the great powers; but they each viewed the problem with differing lenses and interests. The British government feared that the breakup of the Empire would cause a vacuum in the ‘Near East’, which Russia would no doubt seek to capitalise on; threatening the empire’s Mediterranean interests and (following the opening of the Suez Canal) the so-called ‘imperial lifeline’ to the Raj. The French had their own designs for North Africa, and also opposed Russian influence dominating the region. The Austrians, due to their shared border with Russia, feared that the collapse of the Ottomans would bring the Bear closer to her Balkan provinces. Understandably, the Russians grew somewhat frustrated by how hostile its fellow great powers were towards her expansionist aims, all the while Paris and London were adding new parts of the world to their ever-growing empires. In a note from Russian historian Mikhail Pogodin to Tsar Nicholas I, this frustration was elaborated on:

‘France takes Algeria from Turkey, and almost every year England annexes another Indian principality: none of this disturbs the balance of power; but when Russia occupies Moldavia and Wallachia, albeit only temporarily, that disturbs the balance of power. France occupies Rome and stays there several years during peacetime: that is nothing; but Russia only thinks of occupying Constantinople, and the peace of Europe is threatened. The English declare war on the Chinese, who have, it seems, offended them: no one has the right to intervene; but Russia is obliged to ask Europe for permission if it quarrels with its neighbor. England threatens Greece to support the false claims of a miserable Jew and burns its fleet: that is a lawful action; but Russia demands a treaty to protect millions of Christians, and that is deemed to strengthen its position in the East at the expense of the balance of power. We can expect nothing from the West but blind hatred and malice... (comment in the margin by Nicholas I: ‘This is the whole point’).’

This was the defining characteristic of inter-European relations in the 19th century: crisis after crisis popped up as a part of the overarching geopolitical landscape. In most cases, these crises were confined to bilateral disagreement and tensions over a certain region or territory, but in some instances (such as the Crimean War), they drew in the concerns of the other great powers who were also active in the area. While the Eastern Question was one of the larger matters of the age, the so-called ‘Great Game’ between Britain and Russia in Central Asia also led to several wars between the European empires and local power-holders (including no less than three Anglo-Afghan Wars, countless skirmishes by Russian troops, and various annexations by both powers). Now, we ought to note here that the term ‘Great Game’ has fallen out of popular usage in academia, as historians have thoroughly shown that the fears of Russian encroachment on India were not quite as valid as the contemporary British politicians and public believed them to be. For more on this geopolitical hotspot, see this earlier AskHistorians post.

Part 1 of 2