Cicero maintained that Caesar had always had an autocratic goal in mind, even from his first consulship in 59 BCE, which Cicero calls his regnum "kingship", and he elsewhere calls him rex "king" sneeringly (Suet. Jul. 9.2; Cic. Letters to Atticus 13.37; Letters to Friends 6.19; etc). But Cicero, despite being a first-hand witness and despite giving us an excellent primary source for the times via his letters, is not particularly reliable for this question, and all the other evidence suggests that Caesar was acting, at all times, ad hoc and with only as much advanced planning as would get him through the current crisis and on to the next. In fact, this is very much how his campaigns in Gaul played out, as well. There is zero indication that he had dreams of raising eleven legions and toppling Pompey's ruling bloc back in Rome back in autumn of 58 BCE when the Helvetii decided to do their thing. Reading his commentarii very much reads like a Roman commander bouncing from one problem to the next in a long succession of unpredictable events.

This is very much the same impression we get from the span of time from when he decided to cross the Rubicon in January of 49 to his assassination in 44 BCE. The "office" of dictatorship had always been an irregular and vague position, meant from the beginning to right the ship in times of crisis. The dictatorship is regularly characterized in Latin sources as rei gerendae causa ("for the purpose of sorting the business out") or, in Sulla's case, as rei publicae constituendae ("for the purpose of fixing/reconstituting the public business"). Caesar's first dictatorship, late in 49, was for only 11 days, and it was very much administrative in nature. The normal process of elections had been disrupted, and since both consuls for 49 had long since fled Italy, an administrative power stop-gap was required. His dictatorship facilitated the elections, including his own election as consul for 48, thereby solidifying his continued imperium in the eyes of "the law." He also ensured that governors were assigned for provinces and sent on their way, so that the machinery of the provincial government could continue. The elections were no doubt a little...irregular, and his own securing of the consulship for 48 was obviously not entirely above board, but the fact that he went to the trouble of ensuring something like a normal Republican process suggests that, in 49, he did not have the intention of overturning the whole system. It is difficult to say much more about his internal thoughts at this moment, besides the obvious: he had a war to win, with Pompeian forces looming in Spain and Pompey himself safely absconded to his powerful base in the eastern Mediterranean.

What happened after this is more unclear. He held the dictatorship several more times, and also consulships, and the differences between those two is not at all clear, nor are the timings. He was mostly away from Rome with his army, only making quick trips back to the capital and usually for administrative reasons. It is likely that the second dictatorship was from autumn of 48 (October), probably after word reached Rome that Caesar had prevailed against Pompey's forces in Greece at Pharsalus. Whether this appointment, initiated by his co-consul P. Servilius Isauricus, was due to fear, pandering, or expediency is unclear. We hear from Plutarch that this second dictatorship lasted a whole year, rather than the "regular" six months. It probably just lasted until he again returned to Rome, in autumn of 47 BCE, perhaps originally intended to ensure that his imperium (via the consulship) did not "expire" if the campaign should run long. We don't know. M. Antonius had been acting as his magister equitum, "Master of the horse" aka right-hand man, at various points during this year from autumn of 48 to autumn of 47, but things were not going well in the Capital. Only partial(?) elections had been held and there were essentially no top-level magistrates. The tribunes were viciously bickering and we get the impression that things were just not getting done at all levels (no surprise). There was civil unrest, and M. Antonius, without really the authority, appointed a city prefect. This was unprecedented and odd and suggests that there was a general lack of authority. I find it odd that Antonius did not seize the initiative here, based on his personality and later actions, but the sources aren't great.

When he returned late in 47, Caesar was still technically dictator, and he used this power to finally get some consuls for the year (two of his lackeys). He also held elections for 46, again arranging a consulship for himself and a co-consul M. Lepidus, of later infamy. But he seems to have "received" a third dictatorship in 46, possibly in the spring, and this one was said to be for a period of ten years. Some read this as a move towards autocracy, and it certainly looks that way, but others argue this was nothing more than an attempt to stabilize the political situation, especially the need to have regular elections at their proper time. In other words: an ad hoc solution to the problem of civil unrest and persisting chaos in the Republican governmental machinery. The continuity of some kind of authority was both desired and required, and Caesar's arrangement here in 46 was certainly used later as a blueprint for Octavian. In times of crisis and seemingly-constant civil war, continuity of authority was more comforting than menacing.

Despite the alleged 10-year term of dictator, we hear that he was again "receiving" the dictatorship in 45. It isn't clear, but this suggests that we aren't fully understanding things here. Caesar was elected (or had himself elected) as sole consul for 45, not unprecedented but also not in keeping with the time-honored tradition of having two consuls at a time. Again, we hear that the election of magistrates had not happened normally for 45 and things were in a mess. From there we get into the hazy events of early 44, where (apparently) it was proposed that Caesar's dictatorship be made perpetual. This was an obvious step too far.

So in short: we don't know what Caesar had in mind, but it is difficult to detect any sort of grand plan, and most of the events between 58 and 46 were much too unpredictable to argue otherwise convincingly. Most of the arrangements were in response to specific problems, particularly the constant failure of the government to elect new magistrates for the next year. Gardner writes: "[The autocratic appointments have], rather, the feel of an interim arrangement, a cessation, at least temporary, of destructive political competition, and enforceable by his own continuance as dictator, albeit far away, with a large army at his command. With major magistracies and provincial commands bestowed in advance on loyal supporters or former Pompeians, it afforded a breathing space, a chance for things to settle down and the situation to become clearer[.]" (in Griffin 2009).

There is a pretty clear blueprint here for how to stabilize a chaotic governmental situation via autocratic authority, but at the same time, Caesar's autocratic efforts between 49 and 45 were not particularly effective, and he spent most of that time with the army, far from Rome. Octavian perhaps learned this lesson best, and took care to remain near the Capital when his time came, while Antonius famously ranged far afield.