In brief, happenings just before the Rwandan Genocide created a deep hesitancy in Washington who would have traditionally played a key role in any intervention. From this, any form of non-US led action was poorly funded and lacking in resources.

The infamous "Black Hawk Down" episode in Somalia was the image that swept across the world of UN failure when it intervened in other nations' affairs. The backdrop to this was UN Secretary-General's, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, belief that in the right circumstances international intervention should supersede national sovereignty if peace was the result. This was a highly ambitious and untested mantra in the new post-Cold War era and one the UN simply did not have the resources for.

Riding on a high after their victory in the first Gulf War, however, the US saw Boutros' vision as a useful tool in their "new world order". Without going into the intricacies of the Somali War, Resolution 837 allowed UN troops, spearheaded by America, to disarm militia groups and essentially wage war against them. A key target was the leader of the rebel United Somali Congress (USC), Mohamed Farrah Aideed. Using helicopters elite US Rangers swept into the USC stronghold in Mogadishu to snatch up Aideed within the hour. Now immortalised in film, this turned into a 15 hour slugfest with America's elite soldiers either killed or limping back to safety. With humungous public anger, President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of American forces which essentially deprived Boutros of his biggest backer causing other supporting countries to lose interest.

Why is Somalia so relevant? The public humiliation of America's best caused the White House to drastically rethink its approach to supporting intervention across the world. In late 1993, Clinton announced a stringent stress test to assess any intervention as something that would remedy a threat to US national security. In tow, it required well-defined scope and timescales to try and avoid a repeat of Mogadishu. This left the UN as nothing more than a bystander, just as the mass slaughter in Rwanda showed no sign of stopping.

The UN machinery for intervention in Rwanda had already started to come to life during the Somali intervention. Initially led by the Canadians, a request for 4500 troops were put in but the US, burned by what had just happened in Mogadishu, reduced this to around 2000. Most importantly, the mandate to act was severely watered down to nothing more than protecting Kigali, the capital city. The draft agreement initially spoke about nationwide disarmament and controlling the murderous gangs but all these clauses were eventually deleted.

Although receiving 400 elite Belgian paratroopers fresh from Somalia, Roméo Dallaire, the officer in charge of the operation, was dismayed to find most of the contingent were poorly equipped and trained Bangladeshi troops. On top of this, UN hesitancy had left zero infrastructure for intelligence collecting of equipment leaving Dallaire "blind and deaf in the field". It is pertinent to note that a Hutu paramilitary called the Interahamwe had more equipment and relatively better training centres than the Bangladeshi troops under Dallaire's command- the UN military arm was embarassingly underequiped and under resourced.

A lot of this critique so far points the finger at America whose hesitancty certainly drained the life out of any conhesive UN action. However Secretary-General Boutros had certain vested interests with the Hutu faction in Rwanda than further complicated the mix and blunted the international effort. As a deputy foreign minister in his native Egypt, he had strong ties with the Hutu elites in the country and specifcally chose a man called Jacques Booh-Booh of Cammeron as his envoy there. Booh-Booh was openly pro-Hutu and regularly downplayed or challenged Dallaire's demands, thoughts, and reports which hampered any possible change in policy to be more interventionist.

Both the political perspectives and agendas of Boutros and two US adminstrations carved out a drastic lack of action when it came to Rwanda which had a huge impact on the feasability of intervention on the ground. With little political will, mirred by both hesitancy and bias, the UN forces on the ground had little chance of creating a successful and realistic intervention to prevent such huge loss of life.

Sources:

Meredith M, The State of Africa (London 2013)

Melvern L, Conspriacy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (New York 2004)