An earlier answer of mine covers the broader issue of NVA equipment.

With regards to NVA small arms and other infantry weapons, most of them were in category III. The Bundeswehr saw no need for NVA small arms. A good many of them ended up as a form of military aid sold at bargain basement prices to other countries. Within Europe, Hungary and Finland received a fairly large consignment of AK-74s and AK-47s respectively. The Finnish AK-47 consignment approached 100000 rifles. The largest recipient of former GDR stocks of small arms was Turkey which received 300000 AK-47s and close to 5000 RPG-7s. Greece received a sizable amount of RPG-18s as well as Bundeswehr equipment that was now redundant in the post-1990 draw down of conventional military forces.

The profit margin of these weapons sales was relatively slim, which was par for the course for the liquidation of GDR assets. But there were wider criticisms for the post-Cold War use of arms as a form of foreign aid. In the case of Greece and Turkey, there were accusations that it fueled a regional arms race. Additionally, NVA stocks sold at firesale prices helped build connections between the German arms industry and potential clients. The German government sold small craft warships to Indonesia and while the ships were cheap, German firms offered to modernize Indonesian naval yards for a much higher price. Additionally, and in a move that would not be out of place in Lord of War, the export company "left" launchers for modern AA missiles on some of these ostensibly demilitarized vessels.

The Turkish small arms sales has also raised some alarms that these AK-47s cycled into Kurdish militias operating in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. The provenance is naturally hard to establish, but Turkey did receive large stocks of a weapon its conventional forces did not use. This all begged the question whom exactly did the Germans think were going to be the users of these AK-47s when they made the sale. And there is the overall moral question of using weaponry as form of public aid, especially since the unified Germany made a very public show of its commitment to rejecting war and militarism.

Again, the profit margins reported for this aid was quite thin. But exporting weapons was arguably cheaper than destroying them. Immediate destruction of NVA small arms would have necessitated not only expanding the facilities that could destroy such weapons, but also pay for the facilities that could safely store them before disposal. Quick sales abroad seemed an expedient solution to this dilemma.