The decision to invade the Philippines was made after a high-level conference held over the course of four days in Honolulu in July 1944 that included President Franklin Roosevelt, General Douglas MacArthur, and Admiral Chester Nimitz. It was not a forgone conclusion that the United States would invade the Philippines; alternatives were seriously considered. The most realistic other option would have been to bypass the Philippines and instead invade the island of Formosa (now known as Taiwan) late in 1944 or early 1945 instead. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and Nimitz favored the route through Formosa rather than the Philippines, but MacArthur argued forcefully for an invasion of the Philippines. Roosevelt ultimately opted for an invasion of the Philippines and Nimitz acquiesced. The Honolulu conference and the decision to invade the Philippines remains a fascinating case study in the interaction between the political and strategic levels of war, civ-mil relations, and interservice rivalry during the war.

First, let's examine the situation as it was in July 1944. MacArthur's and the Army (along with a large contingent of Australians) had slogged through brutal terrain in the New Guinea campaign but opted to bypass the Japanese fortress of Rabaul on New Britain. A force led by Marines had secured Guadalcanal in late 1942, then worked through the Solomon Islands into 1943. Marine landings occurred in the Gilbert Islands in 1943 (Tarawa, most notably), the Marshall Islands later in 1943, and had invaded the Marianas Islands (Saipan, Tinian, Guam) just a few weeks before the Honolulu conference. The Marianas campaign also included the Battle of the Philippine Sea, sometimes called the "Marianas Turkey Shoot." The naval combat during the invasions of the Marianas had wiped out the last of Japan's aircraft carrier striking power; the Japanese fleet would never be able to meet the U.S. Navy on equal terms again (including at Leyte Gulf). There had essentially been two separate campaigns in the Pacific; one led by the Navy and Marines, and one led by the Army. The two campaigns were nearing a point where they would converge. It was already decided that the United States would capture Mindinao, the large island at the south of the Philippine archipelago. The next steps after that were still undetermined.

Second, we should realize that the decisionmakers involved do not have knowledge that we have now. The atomic bomb was not tested until summer of 1945 and was still a top-secret project known only to a few in summer 1944; even MacArthur and Nimitz would not have known about its existence. The Soviets had launched a massive offensive against the Germans on the Eastern Front in Europe. The Allies had succeeded in their Normandy landings but the breakout in France had not yet been realized; the war in Europe was far from over. It would have still been expected that the war in the Pacific would drag on until 1946 at least and that an invasion of the Japanese home islands was the most likely way the war would end. Before the invasion, it was expected that long-range bombers would carry out massive raids on the Japanese home islands. That had begun in summer 1944 with bases in China, but that effort was scaled back and abandoned after the capture of the Marianas Islands. The Marianas were closer to Japan, allowing bombers to hit more targets, and offered an easier supply route than the U.S. had with bases in India and China.

The Joint Chiefs had been working on long-term strategic war plans with an eye toward an invasion of mainland Japan. In their eyes, the best way to prepare for an invasion of Japan would be to invade Formosa, then invade a portion of mainland China to capture a port. This would allow supplies to flow inland to the Chinese nationalists and provide an area from which to launch an invasion of Kyushu. The planned invasion of Formosa was named "Operation Causeway."

This plan certainly would have called on Army forces and MacArthur would have played a large role, but it would have placed the Navy and the Marine Corps in the driver's seat. The Navy and Marines had executed the campaign through the Central Pacific, and a move on Formosa would continue that thrust. Formosa also would have been out of reach of land-based aircraft (ie, the Army Air Corps), putting the American aircraft carriers at the forefront of the attack.

MacArthur made the case to invade the Philippines, beginning with a landing on Leyte. His strategy was to capture the Philippines, then Okinawa, and then launch an invasion of Japan. He made several points to support this argument. An invasion of the Philippines could be supported more easily by land-based aircraft in addition to aircraft carriers, providing more protection for the invasion. MacArthur also charged that the invasions in the Central Pacific had come with higher casualties, and Formosa would be more of the same. Supply lines would be shorter to the Philippines than Formosa. The Philippine islands included a number of beaches suitable for invasion that could not all be guarded by the Japanese, while Formosa's likely landing spots were all known and defensible. There were American POWs, including civilians, in the Philippines that should be liberated. The Philippines had also been an American territory before the war, and beyond his desire for personal redemption, the United States had a responsibility to liberate the people there. Besides, bypassing the Philippines would leave hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops and thousands of aircraft behind the American advance on Formosa. An attack on Formosa would not fully sever Japan's connection to the Dutch East Indies, and the threat from Luzon might mean that the Philippines might need to be invaded anyway.

These were all strong points, but MacArthur could hardly be considered an honest broker. Beyond his public pledge, his personality certainly played a role. His narcissism was legendary. His desire for public adoration can hardly be described (Why is he wearing a leather jacket in Hawaii in July for staged photos?). Interservice rivalry had been a problem throughout the war, but MacArthur had long considered the Navy to be rivals rather than teammates. Less well known is MacArthur's political motivations. MacArthur had not openly sought the Republican nomination for President in 1944, but allowed himself to be put forward as a candidate. According to some historians, he desired the nomination even if he did not publicly push for it. The idea of a sitting General running for President during wartime is a perilous thought that violates the American norm of civilian control of the military. While Roosevelt is remembered as a popular President, the 1944 election was the closest he had. Republicans were critical of wartime strategy and the casualties suffered, and Roosevelt may have been aware that a bloody invasion shortly before the presidential election would harm his chances at re-election. Here is Franklin Roosevelt, discussing war plans with his top commanders, one of whom had been a candidate to run against him for President just a couple of months before. It's an incredible scenario.

It gets worse. Decades later, after MacArthur had passed away, a historian found that Philippine President Manuel Quezon had awarded him a $500,000 bonus in early 1942 for his service in the Philippines. It would be several million dollars today. It seems sensationalist and unfair to suggest that this had an effect on MacArthur's thinking, but we will never know. MacArthur never even mentioned this payment in his memoirs or elsewhere. According to Ian Toll in "Twilight of the Gods," Quezon offered a sum to Dwight Eisenhower (who had also served in the Philippines before the war), but he declined.

MacArthur also misreported the number of Japanese troops stationed in the Philippines. American intelligence in Washington reported about 175,000 troops were there; MacArthur said he believed only about 100,000 were there. This would have played a part in his assessment for how difficult it would be to capture the Philippines (and played into concerns about casualties being suffered). Intentional or not, MacArthur was wrong. There were more than 250,000 Japanese defenders on the island when the Americans landed.

Nimitz made his case for Operation Causeway after MacArthur, but conceded that it was possible that Luzon would have to be invaded anyway. Admiral Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the American Fleet, advocated for attacking Formosa or even a direct attack on Japan, but was not present in Honolulu. Some other naval commanders (including Bull Halsey) favored the Philippine approach. Roosevelt did not make his decision on the spot, but everyone involved seemed to walk away from the meeting confident that the invasion of the Philippines would be going forward. Debate continued for several weeks, but it became more apparent that the United States would invade the Philippines first. The final decision was made in early October.

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