Ray Takeyh an historian has recently released a book titled The Last Shah: America, Iran, and the Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty.
In the book and an ensuing article here he makes some rather astonishing claims, contrary to popular understanding. My question is, what do historians make of them?
He says:
But what happens if everything we have been told about the coup is wrong? What happens if the establishment consensus that has so penetrated our imagination is false? Because it is.
To begin with: Mossadeq had not been democratically elected. And far from being a paragon of democratic virtue, he was not beyond using unconstitutional and illegal methods to sustain his power. Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had sincerely sought to craft a fair compromise between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company whose assets Mossadeq had nationalized.
And most important, the coup itself was very much an Iranian initiative.
What has been the reception of historians to Dr Takeyh and his book?
There does not appear to be much academic reaction to the book at all from what I can tell.
I cannot speak to the book, however I will comment that the article you link to does show worrying issues beyond opening with several paragraphs outlining political axes the author has to grind.
For instance the author correctly, states that Mossedegh was not popularly elected in 1951, but was rather appointed by the Shah.
What the author fails to mention, however, was that this is the same process by which, for instance, the British Prime Minister is appointed by the Crown. As with Britain, the Parliament of Iran voted 79-12 for Mossedegh as Prime Minister, following the 1950 election. This was despite widespread election fraud, and followed substantial protests where these issues were brought to light by, among others, Mossedegh.
It is one thing to attempt to demystify the circumstances of Mossedegh's democratic mystique - which was far from clean. As the author points out, in 1953, Mossedegh terminated voting early in order to prevent opposition candidates from being seated; this was, correctly, seen as... dirty move. But the above is critical information!
Another main argument that the author pursues - that opposition to Mossedegh originated largely within Iran - can be argued as correct also. Several politicians did voice reservations about Mossedegh to US authorities.
The author however fails to mention that Britain had previously established significant influence within the Iranian government, royal courts and maintained significant direct influence over players within it. The AIOC - Anglo-Persian Oil Company - had itself own powerful relations with political and business leaders within Iran. Nor does he mention that the CIA itself hand-selected and spent vast sums getting candidates elected with the express purpose of undermining Mossedegh's government.
This is not to underplay the extent to which the British blockade - via the Suez - isolated Iran and devastated it's economy; turning many court, business and political leaders against Mossedegh. This was absolutely a British reaction to Mossedegh and his policies, particularly the nationalization scheme. Nor were Mossedegh's reactions to these developments always optimal. Many otherwise sympathetic figures, no doubt, genuinely believed Mossedegh was overplaying his hand vis-a-vis the foreign powers that had maintained a hold on Iran's internal politics and was driving Iran to ruin.
These are very significant oversights by any author pretending to any sort of academic or scholarly legitimacy; damning even. Serious historians absolutely *must* situate these claims within the context of the period and pressures that the key actors faced. Nor is this an exhaustive list I've presented here.
The author has bonafide credentials and expertise in the subject matter. He should absolutely know better than to be making these sorts of errors.
In the spirit of contextualizing what we are dealing with here then, it should be noted while Takeyh does have appropriate credentials: he is not an independent academic, but rather a US Council of Foreign Relations member and former US Department of Foreign Affairs official. It would not be unfair to situate Takeyh and his writing within the context of his role attempting to advance particular interests of the United States vis-a-vis Iran.
That does not mean that his arguments or evidence are invalid, but rather, one should approach this subject matter with greater caution and skepticism than one might approach a more dispassionate observer who has less at stake ideologically, politically and professionally in the particular findings of their own work.
I would suggest that the author's work might best be approached as being interesting, the original book may even present innovative research, but may have to be viewed as a very incomplete picture of events, given the number of glaring omissions in the work.
Contrasting the author's work above with, for instance, a similar work approached from the Iranian perspective would make for a very interesting juxtaposition.