The answer is, issues from national pride to "s***-stirring" absolutely did get in the way of pan-Pact cooperation, even within countries as they were then constituted. Not everyone had the same long or short term goals.

You mention quite specifically the Czechoslovakian entities - for instance, the Slovaks would, at times, actively withhold intel even within their own "country network" so the predominantly Czech driven leadership would not get all the glory in Praha for intelligence developed via assets and networks further to the east which were Slovak territory and Slovak managed.

The Czech attitude to the Slovaks, if you ask a Slovak, is up there with how Aussies view Kiwis - dumb farmers. It's a culture thing. So on top of that... the Czechs and the Slovaks were not exactly enamoured with the Soviets.

Interjurisdictional p***ing contests are as real today as they were in that era... An agency withholding key pieces of a mosaic from another, either to prevent the other agency getting the "win" towards which both agencies are meant to be collaboratively working, or to prevent anything being deduced about their collection methods or sources, was and continues to be one of the main problems with fragmented regional intelligence capability. "Target development", "source handling", and on and on, are all distinct disciplines within the HUMINT space alone.

The objective generally is to limit with whosoever you share your intel as much as possible where you go it.

If I tell you, my ally, I've developed information in respect of (activity) via a HUMINT source previously known to be reliable which I've been able to corroborate via SIGINT sources... that may be the most I'll tell you. In law enforcement, the standard is to say much less in an affidavit - "acting on the basis of information received" is a standard throw away line.

I'm not telling you our agent is Mr X of Country Q with access to Y level information who has been in Z department for a protracted period and who we have cultivated for years through a combination of exploiting the disillusion Officer K noted at a function he was at with Mr X in a passing remark, and his need to maintain a mistress for which Officer L slides him some cash every few months in return for a goody bag of raw intel, and we've been able to cross check Mr X's goody bag information because we've been able to compromise country W's cipher machine because Officer M was able to work some magic in the ceiling one night, and Diplomat U has said the same thing as the contents of the good bag from Mr X on the W encrypted comms channels in a parallel set of developments, separate from Mr X completely. By not mentioning Mr X, his level Y access, or that it is held in Z department, and his work for Country Q, my country's Officers K, L or M's efforts, Diplomat U or country W's compromised comms - or even Country Q or Country W at all - I have prevented you, dear ally, from accidentally (through a mole somewhere in your own apparatus) or intentionally (because it might suit you or your party or whoever is in politically one day) blowing away any or all of my assets or resources.

How keen do you think an intelligence agency orchestrating all of that kind of thing over the course of MANY years is to say "Oh yeah, here you go Soviets, I guess all this is yours now, want to take my wife out while you're at it"? What if my source (like Mr X above, with whom rapport and tradecraft techniques have been developed over years via Officer L's good looks and winning smile) refuses to switch handlers? It's not like the source can be readily traded across handlers openly like a sports player moving teams, either.

Agencies/departments/operators in this space always think they are the best and everyone else with and against whom they work are morally, technologically or otherwise inferior, and therefore not to be trusted... because that's what they are trained/indoctrinated to think.

Consider the profile of a person tasked with handling and analyzing strategically sensitive information gathered in clandestine fashion - intensely loyal and likely already drawn from within the military structure even before intel indoctrination, intelligent, and considerable cash having been spent by the home team in weaponizing and honing their intellect. The "I work Intel and am therefore the best and can trust noone with anything" mindset is very real. Coming under the Soviet umbrella didn't magically wash away those attitudes and mindsets overnight for operators and organizations which ended up there.

In countries with decentralized systems of pooling raw intelligence input as opposed to sharing of properly packaged intelligence product, people keep some secrets to themselves. They may pretend they don't. But such is the nature of intelligence collection - some of an agency's methods necessarily must remain mysterious even to the closest of allies. That's again very true today and was true in the Pact as well

Countries did not then in the Pact and do not now openly tell allied countries about intelligence sources. Compartmentalization. Loose lips sink ships, etc.

A really solid example which you will not find mentioned on Wiki... The Aussies were receiving lots of high level raw intel from UK and US post WWII and there was definitely a source within domestic intelligence in Australia (they believed it was one of a handful of Canberra based people but couldn't prove which one, so they were retired or stripped each of clearance and sat them in cubicles... until retirementt) leaking to the Soviets... and the Soviets outplayed them on that one. I believe the reason the Aussies never caught their mole was because the Soviets convinced them via a few compromised channels that they were only looking for one leak, not the several/mosaic flow they probably actually had.

The report on this which dealt with specifics was due to be declassified in the last couple of years. I will bet if I look into it, it hasn't been.

Edit - as predicted, I had a look and the Cook Report of '94 remains classified, and likely will for a long time (I understand it was quite specific in its findings about "points of failure" and the problems around those specific "points of failure' have long been removed from the equation all these years on) but domestic intelligence in Australia did publicly concede a few years ago they were successfully penetrated by Soviet operatives. Source here https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/oct/26/asio-finally-admits-it-was-infiltrated-by-soviet-spies-in-the-70s-and-80s/

How interested do you think Czechoslovak agencies were in penetrating the Australian domestic intelligence apparatus as backdoor access to allied intel? Not very, off their own bat at least. But if there was some resource which by happenstance the Czechoslovak agencies could cultivate in Australia? Oh yeah, the Soviets are gonna be needing that contact... they'll take it from here.

Collection and analysis is a push and pull game of resource and priority of tasking, combined with collection efforts actually obtaining raw input relevant to (take your pick) for analysis... so yeah, it doesn't always work today... and it definitely didn't work brilliantly when multiple countries found themselves shoehorned under the Soviet umbrella.

Different countries... Different levels of training, professionalism, recruit pools and recruitment methods... everyone played the game a bit differently.

Some states within the Pact did different work and kept different records. Have a look into who was involved with the "Ricin umbrella gun" incidents (very well thought out weapons, ammunition itself would have been great if it were not blown by the operative [one of the biggest clues about who might have been involved was the fact the ammunition itself would necessarily have required state sponsorship or support], delivery system, and selection of chemical agents, which might well have killed the targets with the mechanisms used having gone undetected as planned... all undone by poor deployment... not the first time, won't be the last time, the "aerosolised highly specific opioid analgesic with a time delay as it works it's way through bodily exceetions" appliance one state I won't name favored not long ago is another example of this sort of well thought out bit of kit being employed in a suboptimal manner), for instance, and how these were initially blown by defectors and later corroborated by reference to Soviet era archival records being made accessible after the regime change.

Hope this has been helpful!

Sources - Edit - Sorry, I've had to cut quite a bit out in terms of setting out how I know what here. That said, I have not said anything in this post which could not be known by reference to inductive or mosaic reasoning and analysis techniques applied to open source materials.

What I can say directly is -

1. I've got university qualifications in a few things and one field is intelligence (not a minor in it while I took communications or something as a major - I studied intelligence and two other related areas as a specific, primary, combined discipline, at a university somewhere with a dedicated centre for these topics)... so all of this is of interest to me.

2. In a different life, I used to go to the kinds of functions where business people were pitching heavy military equipment (not a few crates of AKs for some training contract... think aircraft) to government buyers between fundraising for charity, cocktails, and canapes.