Full credit is owed to Mikhail Sinitsyn, whose book has the most comprehensive analysis of this topic. Where possible, I try to cite original documents.

Broad background first for everyone not familiar with the topic. In spring 1944 the Stavka, officers of the General Staff, and Front commanders and military councils were preparing for a summer offensive in Belarus which would become known as Operation Bagration. 1st Belorussian Front occupied the southern-southeastern face of the “Belarussian balcony” which had formed as a result of the successful Soviet offensives in Ukraine (And unsuccessful ones in Belarus) in the winter and spring of 1944. David Glantz’s Battle for Belorussia is the most comprehensive book the leadup to Bagration.

The Front’s 48th Army had seized a bridgehead across the Dnieper south of the city of Zhlobin following the Gomel’-Rechitsa Operation in November 1943. In the Rogachev-Zhlobin Operation that following February, 3rd Army had also seized a bridgehead north of Zhlobin. Meanwhile, the Front’s left wing had advanced into the swamps along the Pripyat’ River and occupied a front running southwest, opposite the town of Parichi.

In his memoirs, Rokossovsky claims that while planning his component of Operation Bagration he and his Front’s military council decided on using two main thrusts to break through the German 9th Army’s defenses instead of a single or concentric attack. One thrust would attack from 3rd Army’s bridgehead toward Bobruisk before continuing on to Minsk while the other composed would attack through the Parichi area toward Slutsk.

When Rokossovsky presented his plan to Stalin and the General Staff, he reports that this incident occurred (1):

Finally, the offensive plan was worked out at Headquarters on May 22 and 23. Our thoughts about the offensive of the troops of the left wing of the front in the Lublin direction were approved, but the decision for two strikes on the right wing was criticized. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and his deputies insisted on delivering one main blow - from the bridgehead on the Dnieper (Rogachev region), which was held by the 3rd Army. Twice I was asked to go into the next room in order to think over the offer of the Stavka. After each such “thinking”, I had to defend my decision with renewed vigor. Making sure that I firmly insisted on our point of view, Stalin approved the plan of operation in the form we presented it.

“The perseverance of the front commander,” he said, “proves that the organization of the offensive has been carefully thought out. And this is a reliable guarantee of success.”

A.V. Isaev is a well-known Russian military historian. In his 2014 book Операция "Багратион". "Сталинский блицкриг" в Белоруссии he uses several documents as well as Zhukov’s memoirs to argue that Rokossovsky was incorrect. The General Staff had already decided on two main blows in its discussions with the Front commander prior to the May 22-23 meeting and Rokossovsky was exaggerating the event in his memoirs. A plan similar to Rokossovsky’s had been approved by Stalin on May 20, prior to his arrival in Moscow to present his case! (2) As Zhukov says in his memoirs (3):

On May 22, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in my presence, received A.M. Vasilevskiy, A.I. Antonov, K.K. , and on 23 May I.Kh. Bagramyan and I.D. Chernyakhovsky. The front commanders, informed by the General Staff about the upcoming operations, arrived at Headquarters with drafts of action plans for the troop …

The version that exists in some military circles about "two main blows" in the Belorussian direction by the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front, which KK Rokossovsky allegedly insisted on before the Supreme Commander, is groundless. Both of these strikes, planned by the front, were previously approved by J.V. Stalin on May 20 according to the General Staff plan, that is, before the arrival of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front at Headquarters.

It is not out of place to note here that Soviet military theory has never provided for the delivery of two main strikes by one front, and if both strikes were equal in strength and significance, then they were usually called "powerful strikes." I emphasize this in order to avoid confusion in operational-strategic terminology.

Further, Isaev argues that documents going back to March 1944 show that it was the Front commander himself who had argued for a single main attack from the 3rd Army’s bridgehead, with only auxiliary attacks in the Parichi area. Not only was Rokossovsky wrong, but he had also reversed which parties had supported what. Perhaps, Isaev argues, Rokossovsky had been asked to reconsider his single blow plan and in fact ended up agreeing with the General Staff’s plan! (4)

What’s the truth? Well, we have two versions of what occurred:

1: Rokossovsky’s, where he and the Front’s military council had developed the concept of operations for two blows, faced resistance from Stalin and the General Staff, but ultimately convinced them of the idea.

2: Zhukov’s, where the General Staff developed the plan in collaboration with Rokossovsky and Stalin had approved it before he arrived in Moscow to discuss the operation.

To add to the confusion, we have a third account of this incident from commander of the 1st Baltic Front Bagramyan: (5)

And on May 22, together with General D.S. Leonov, I was summoned to Moscow again. We were invited to the General Staff to get acquainted with the concept and plan of the upcoming offensive operation for a report to Stalin.

Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front K.K.Rokossovsky was already in the office of A.I. Antonov. This meeting made both of us very pleased, with great excitement and mutual inquiries about front-line affairs.

When we got down to business, General A. I. Antonov announced that we were to take turns to discuss with G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky, who are ready to receive us, all questions related to the participation of the troops of each front in the planned operation…

The next day, May 23, a limited meeting was held at Headquarters. In addition to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin there were G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, A.I. Antonov, K.K.Rokossovsky, and D.S. Leonov…

The last speaker was K. K. Rokossovsky. I remember well that contrary to the proposal of the General Staff - to inflict a powerful blow by the front forces in only one sector of the breakthrough - Konstantin Konstantinovich quite reasonably decided to create two shock groups, which were to break through the enemy's defenses in two sectors in order to encircle and defeat the main grouping with a subsequent offensive deep into the enemy’s defenses. This proposal of the commander was resolutely supported by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevskiy, and it was approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin.

It seems to me that the Supreme Commander showed special sympathy for General of the Army K. K. Rokossovsky. S.K. Timoshenko once told me that I.V. Stalin compared Konstantin Konstantinovich with F.E. Dzerzhinsky. “They’re the same,” he said, “honest, intelligent, kind, humane, only Felix was a little firmer and stricter.”

3: Bagramyan’s version, where Rokossovsky disagreed with the General Staff and Stalin, but his proposal was accepted without dispute.

There are a couple more versions to discuss, but I want to step back first and take a look at the planning process which led us to this meeting before discussing it further.

Sources:

(1) – K.K. Rokossovsky, Солдатский долг page 252.

(2) – A.V. Isaev, Операция "Багратион". "Сталинский блицкриг" в Белоруссии, pages 164-173.

(3) – G.K. Zhukov, Воспоминания и размышления, page 222.

(4) – Isaev, 171-172.

(5) – Bagramyan, Так шли мы к победе, page 301.