In one discord that I have with some mates there is a notable "hate" from "amateur" historians towards cultures considered in pop culture as notable warrior cultures (such as Sparta, Japan or the "Vikings"). As this last groups is quite popular nowadays, they tend a lot to post articles stating how poor where the vikings in combat compared to their European counterparts, stating that where only good fighters against civilian population. Still, I'm a bit reluctant to this idea, as for me it makes sense that a bunch of warmonger raiders should be militarily superior to non professional armies, also, they seemed quite effective, giving that they were close to conquering England, they formed the Varangian guard, the Kievan Russ, and that the Normans seemed to be excellent combat wise.
So, in summary my question is, according to sources. Do you expect a force formed by vikings to be superior or inferior in field battle to a similar size army formed by either saxons, hispanic muslims, franks, germans, italians, etc...? I know is extremely hard to predict the result of a battle without taking into accounts factors such as composition (ratio of men at arms/levies), generalship and a lot more factors but, still, if it is possible to guess, given what we know about tactics, strategy, equipment combat experience and etc... What would be your answer to the title of this post.
Thanks to anyone that shares knowledge and sources to this question.
Vikings avoided battles as much as they could, especially with the Franks due to their superior cavalry and weaponry. Instead they excelled in amphibious warfare. Danes did their best to achieve wealth through regular raiding without having to fight costly battles. They operated in small, independent war bands. They targeted soft targets, such as churches, abbeys and trading centres. They also struck towns when festivals and holidays were being celebrated for greater haul of treasure. For example, Danes raided Tours three days before the feast of Saint Martin in 853. They also took political and ecclesiastical hostages and held them for ransom. This was all made possible by the use of narrow longships that were perfect for both sea and river voyages so were able to penetrate deeply into the Frankish interior. For example, a viking fleet rowed 210 miles up the Garonne river to Toulouse in 844.
Therefore, the reason for their success was that viking bands were fast, adaptable and cleverly opportunistic. They were able to attack where they knew the rewards were great and the defenses weak. They knew when to fight and when to escape, when to approach by ship and when to ride overland, when to accept tribute and when to plunder. Several groups of vikings could band together quickly when needed and go their separate ways when this served them better. Indeed, a warrior band could even take employment with a European ruler to stave off another viking band or to fight his other enemies, even his own family members: “To Sigfrid and Gorm and their accomplices he [Charles the Fat in 882] gave several thousand pounds of silver and gold which he had seized from the treasury of St-Stephen at Metz and from the resting-places of other saints, and he gave them permission to stay so that they could go on ravaging a part of his cousin’s kingdom as they had before.”
One example of viking defeat against the Franks is oddly the one that ended in setting up Normandy: the Siege of Chartres (911). Here the vikings significantly outnumbered the Franks, but were defeated with notable loses. However, Charles the simple, King of West Francia, was looking for more permanent solution to the viking problem, so he offered Rollo and his companions land centred on Rouen in return for serving as a buffer against future viking raids up the river. Rollo and his companions gladly accepted, being cleverly opportunistic as usual. The viking rus themselves were badly defeated by the Byzantines in the battle of Arcadiopolis and battle of dorostopol.
And if we’re focusing on 11th century Normans, it has to be said that they were more likely French than viking by then, especially in Hastings.
It is also interesting to note that few of the participating nobles in the Battle of Hastings were from the Cotentin Peninsula. Moreover, and none were reported to have supplied ships.This would suggest a clear demarcation between Lower Normandy and the Cotentin Peninsula. In part, this demarcation could reflect continued resentment of William’s rule within this region, insofar as the revolt of 1047 discussed earlier was in fact led by a prominent Cotentin lord. Still another trend which is of interest is the relationship between the nobles’ and knights’ origins and the relative density of early Viking settlement in the duchy. According to a map of settlement names, there was a high density of Viking settlers in the Cotentin Peninsula and the Pays de Caux region. It is in precisely these regions where fewer Norman combatants originated, as opposed to the Bessin region around Bayeux which had far fewer Viking settlement names and thus fewer descendants of viking settlers. Therefore, the Normans who fought at the Battle of Hastings were more likely to have possessed French than Viking/Nordic ancestry.
Of course, this is not to say that vikings were bad warriors. I don’t think anyone claims that, but they were not superior militarily to their enemies.
Sources:
Medieval Maritime Warfare, Charles D.Stanton
Viking tactics in West Francia, William E. Welsh
Conversion of Scandinavia, Anders Winroth
The Geographic origin of the Norman conquerors of England, Christopher MacDonald Hewitt