This is a HUGE question, and one whose answer would take me a long while lay out even with the smallest of case studies. You have basically highlighted a deeply under-studied, often completely ignored, element of early modern military history both in academia and in popular military history. If I could recommend you my own research, I would, but it is still currently under review and so I can only give you a brief framing of the topic and then recommend some further reading and some primary sources in the references which you might find useful.

First off, when discussing early modern militaries, it is worth bearing in mind that the word ‘logistics’ postdates the period, with the word itself emerging during the development of military science as a field of theoretical analysis during the early nineteenth century. One of the first such writers was Antoine-Henri Jomini writing about the Napoleonic French Army staff and their efforts. [1] Military officers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not separate the transport and infrastructure for the movement of supplies (what we might term logistics) from the supplies themselves (we might use the term materiel). Instead they tended to incorporate procurement, transportation, distribution, and the materiel themselves by the same all-encompassing word - “supply”. This was used to cover all the requirements of a campaigning army including pay, food, ammunition and to be “in supply” was to have access to whatever the officer needed. So it is not that early modern officers did not consider logistics, merely they had a different terminology to describe it. This is almost certainly related to the much closer and interconnected nature between military and civilian of the period - contemporary officers and armies drew their supplies from local civilians where they campaigned in a variety of complex systems, with a relationship that was far more transactional and restrictive in reality than what modern audiences might imagine - focused as we are on the concept of marauding armies stripping the civilians of their food and clothing. Simply put, because there was no "official" military system to supply armies, there does not appear to have been extensive need to define the it. It was too interwoven with civilian society for that.

Furthermore, there was no dedicated specially trained support arm of the army to support the frontline troops, instead the field commanders of all levels (company, regiment, army) were expected to engage in the necessities of keeping their troops “in supply” as part of their overall duties. So not only was it interwoven with civilian society, but across the army as well. There were individual officers who might have a theoretical responsibility for certain items in some armies e.g. the commissary-general in charge of food – but they would function more as a liaison with the regimental officers, and have very little to no military staff of their own. Ultimate responsibility fell to the overall army commander as a commanding general ‘ought to be careful before he taketh the Field with his Army, that he provide for the punctual supplying of his Army’.[2]

As for how these officers learned their duties and responsibilities – this would be either ‘on the job’ as part of an officers education while on active service, or supplemented by military manuals of the period. For instance Francis Markham, an English officer who saw military service in the Low Countries (modern Belgium and Netherlands), France, Ireland, and other conflicts throughout Europe wrote his Five Decades of Epistles of War in 1622 which outlined the responsibilities and duties of officers at every level of command. [3] Sir James Turner, A Scottish professional soldier and veteran of both The Thirty Year’s War and the British Civil Wars wrote his treatise on warfare, Pallas Armata, in the 1670s which described the structure of a, then, modern army so that his readers could learn “all that belongs to a compleat Soulder” with a focus on the basic roles, and duties of officers. [4]

As for your other question – regarding further reading – this is trickier as even today both academic and popular military history is curiously silent on serious works on logistics (a point I found in my own research utterly baffling but moving on), however I will recommend the following two works:

Van Creveld, M., Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein the Patton, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 2004)

Parker, G., The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 2006)

Of the two, van Creveld is an overall look at implications of the study of logistics in military history, although rather thin in the period you are interested it, simply as more sources for a detailed look at logistics exists for the 19th century and beyond. Parker, while focused primarily on the Military Revolution Debate, does cover a great deal on logistics and supply and how this contributed to the Military Revolution of the earlier period.

Hope they help!

1. Jomini, A-H, The Art of War

2. Monck, G., Observations upon Military & Political Affairs Written by the Most Honourable George, Duke of Albemarle (London, 1671)

3. Marham, F., Fiue Decades of Epistles of Warre (London, 1622)

4. Turner, J., Pallas Armata: Military Essayes of the Ancient Grecian, Roman, and Modern Art of War. Written in the Years 1670 and 1671 (London, 1683)