To speak first about the Battle of Tukaroi, it must be said that this particalur incident and it's description in Wikipedia betray our reading of primary sources and we find scant references to forces so stupendously large sent to invade Bengal, in the works of historians who have worked extensively on this subject. The number of 400,000 therefore is in all likelihood an incredibly bloated figure, taking the stereotype of a Mughal Army being one which was followed by thousands of camp followers to an extremity.

Proceeding now, to address a larger point to be made here, we come to the issue of Mughal logistics. Despite their undeserved reputation as the force which brought gunpowder weaponry into India ( gunpowder and it's usage for rockets, as well as it's usage for cannons, was known at least from the late 14th-early 15th century onwards : see Nature of Gunpowder Artillery in India during the Sixteenth Century: A Reappraisal of the Impact of European Gunnery by Iqtidar Alam Khan, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Apr., 1999, Third Series, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Apr., 1999), pp. 27-34 ), the Mughals were very much attached to their steppe roots, and therefore, the Mughal army was a cavalry heavy force. During their period of consolidation, the Mughal Emperor Akbar, made efforts to ensure that several elements such as musket armed infantry and artillery, which had until then been adhoc additions to his armed forces, were better integrated into the overall administrative and military organisation and structure. The product of his reign was that, Akbar maintained 12,000 matchlockmen, according to the the Ain-i-Akbari, which were distributed in the various forts of import of the Empire. In the later reigns of his successors, the number of matchlock armed infantry in the Mughal army increased. In the reign of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, these numbers were comfortably around 40,000. Speaking of the artillery however, we must say that this branch of service remained stagnant and backward, until the reigns of Jahangir, and Aurangzeb, when we hear of more respectable numbers, and even here, the efficiency of this service remains questionable. What the Mughal artillery service was particularly geared towards, was the usage of heavy bombards against fortresses and during sieges. Using these on the battlefield was a limited feature indeed until the reign of Shah Jahan. This might seem like an anomaly, however, looking at the record of their service, the artificers of the Mughals, were primarily concerned with bombards, and not so much the field artillery which only becomes more regularly present on battlefields after the reign of Jahangir.

Therefore, to more accurately paint a picture of the Mughal army on the march and to then evaluate and elaborate on it's logistical systems, a more complete example might be selected from a campaign during the mid to late 17th century, when we might see the various arms of services represented on the battlefield in decent numbers, and when the logistical consideration regarding each of these might be more profoundly conceptualised.

Let me elaborate a little further, so that we may understand the elements that we will be dealing with. A Mughal army of the 17th century, may be understood or disaggregated under the following heads to understand the elements that constitute this military force :

1. The Mansabdari Cavalry : This, is the most numerous element of any Mughal force. The Mansabdars are the entirety of the Mughal beaurocracy and military establishment, as well as it's nobility. Drawn from among the many martial ethnic groups and military castes of the Empire, and from outside of it's borders, the Mansabdars were organised into ranks. These ranks were again of two types : Zat and Sawar. The former indicated the personal rank of a Mansabdar. It determined his annual salary on paper which was usually only paid for 3, 4, 6 or 8 months. The latter was a rank which determined the number of horsemen that the Mansabdar was obligated to maintain under his command and pay. The Mansabdar was paid a salary usually not in cash, but rather in the form of a land grant called a jagir, which was based on the estimated (jama) revenue from that piece of territory. The revenue drawn from this region was used by the officer to pay himself and his men. The average cavalryman would be paid between Rs. 20 - Rs. 25 per mensem. The Ahadis, a class of gentlemen troopers, usually attached to the Emperor's person, were usually counted among these cavalrymen, although they retained a distinct character.

2. The Banduqchi : While in the Mughal conception, infantry consisted of matchlock musketeers, water carriers, servants and message runners, we concern ourself with the fighting force of this branch of service. So according to, Ain-i-akbari Vol. 1 by Blochmann, H., p 252.

Common Banduqchis are divided into 5 classes, and each class into 3 subdivisions. First class, 250, 240, and 230 dams Second class , 220, 210, 200 dams. Third class , 100, 180, and 170 dams. Fourth class , 160, 150, and 140 dams. Fifth class, 130, 120, and 110 dams.

Since, 1 rupee = 40 dams ( in the Ain ) , , the lowest class and rank of a matchlock bearer made around Rs. 2-3 while the highest made around Rs. 6-7.

3. Artillery : This branch of service as noted before, was more prominent on the battlefield in the later decades of the 17th century. It consisted of heavy and light artillery, but the name should not be a definitive indication for readers. The heavy artillery included large ordnance and bombards, but also camel mounted shaturnaals or zamburaks. The light artillery in the reign of Aurangzeb, consisted if the "Artillery of the Stirrup", a branch or the artillery more along European standards and a clear result of European interaction, drawn by horses and meant for the field, instead of sieges.

[ Sources :

Roy, Kaushik. Military Manpower, Armies and Warfare in South Asia (2013), p. 65

Gommans, Jos. Mughal Warfare, Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Empire, 1500-1700 (2002), p. 154-156

Aziz, Abdul. The Mansabdari System And The Mughal Army (1945), pp. 234

Irvine, William. The Army of the Indian Moghuls : Its Organisation and Administration (1903) p. 103, 105 ]

A Mughal Army On Campaign :

Having thus established a description of the elements that a Mughal force would be dealing with, we move on to looking at one example or illustration which might allow us to understand the reality of Mughal logistics, more clearly. Before we do so, some words are necessitated to make more transparent the structure and systems with which the logistical necessities of a Mughal force were satiated. At the outset of a campaign, among the many officers who occupy a postion of importance, was the Mir Manzil, who was responsible for identifying and tracing the major cities, major towns, the routes for travel, the available resources and data on the geography, and assess how many days of marching, how many kos per march, and how many stops, where the camps would be made, the sizes of the camps, etc would accomplish the required movement. He traveled before the actual army and dispensed an invaluable service. The name of the officer translates to "The Lord of Stages". The Mir Mazil however was more or less concerned with the Imperial household, and those dependants, servants and soldiers attached to it. The remainder of mansabdars , soldiers and troopers, supplied their necessities themselves. The accoutrements of transport, it's means, such as elephants, camels, horses, ponies and bullocks, carts, porters etc. were officially provided only for the Imperial tents, the common soldier had to provide their own means and accoutrements as required. Each soldier had the shelter of a tent, even if it was only of a cotton cloth, raised on two sticks.

The Imperial kitchen fed a select number of guards, matchlockmen and officers. A charity kitchen by the name of Langarkhana was maintained at the Emperor's expense. Similarly, chiefs, mansabdars etc, distributed cooked food for those especially attached to their person. Outside of these circles each man provided for himself, buying his daily requirements from banjaras (travelling merchants and traders who accompanied armies to sell them supplies as required) and the military market. Simialry, men were responsible for gathering their own fodder and foraging.

As for uniform, there was usually no uniform for the vast majority of the army, except for the red turban worn by each soldier and man under the Emperor's employ. However, each ethnic group in the army dressed in a distinct fashion, the differences of which would be discernible to an experienced and educated eye. Rajputs, Purbiyas, Persians, Hindustani Muslims etc. So on and so forth. Even these, would be arranged in a similar fashion as stated above, either by the soldiers themselves or by the officers for men attached to his person.

Maintenance of equipment was expected to be the soldier's responsibility, if the equipment, provided for out of his own pocket wasn't upto the standard when troops were inspected before war, they would likewise be punished. Now, we move on to use an illustration to understand better the logistics of a Mughal army in the 17th century.