Counterfactuals like this are always tricky, but the answer is probably that there might have been relatively little difference from what actually happened.

For starters, the U.S. Navy eight aged battleships moored at Pearl Harbor on the morning of the attack, but not all were sunk. Arizona was a total loss and couldn't even be salvaged. Oklahoma was sunk, but in an effort to open up her anchorage and salvage some materials. California, West Virginia, and Nevada were clearly knocked out by the attack but the Navy determined relatively early that they could eventually be refloated, modernized, and returned to action. Nevada was back in action in 1943, while California and West Virginia participated in operations in 1944. All three likely could have been returned to service earlier if absolutely necessary, but their repairs and modernizations were considered lower priorities than other jobs for shipyards. By the time they were patched up enough to depart Hawaii in early or mid-1942, it was clear that they would not play a large role in the imminent stages of the war.

That leaves Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Tennessee. All three absorbed relatively light damage from the attack and would have generally been suitable for some type of combat (not at 100% strength, but able to fight) with repairs that could be done in Hawaii. Pennsylvania was ready within a week. Maryland and Tennessee were ready within two weeks. Tennessee was moored between West Virginia and Ford Island, and was stuck when West Virginia and Arizona sank and blocked it in. Still, all three sailed for the West Coast under their own power by December 20.

Beyond that, the Navy did have several other older battleships (Texas, New York, Wyoming, Arkansas, New Mexico, Mississippi, Idaho, Colorado) in service elsewhere after Pearl Harbor. Yet none of these 11 battleships played any appreciable role in the fleet-on-fleet combat of 1942 and 1943. Some participated in Atlantic convoy operations, or bombarded North Africa for Operation Torch, or played a minor role in amphibious operations in the Aleutians or invasions of the Gilberts in late 1943 (such as Tarawa), but that's hardly different than the role that West Virginia and California played when they returned to action in 1944.

That's important to understand because you need to realize that the Navy still had most of its older battle line ready for action (11 of 16) in 1942 if it decided to use it against the Japanese Navy. But it didn't do that.

Some war plans in the 1920s and 1930s did expect the American fleet, led by its battleships, to sail across the Pacific and engage the Japanese fleet in a large-scale naval action. Perhaps the most common scenario involved the Japanese blockading or invading the Philippines, and the U.S. Navy sallying across the Pacific Ocean to break the blockade and relieve defenders at the Philippines. But by 1938 or 1939, it was understood that this would be impossible. It would be far more likely that the United States would have to build up its strength in safer waters and eventually seize a series of islands while moving across the Pacific. There was also an increased emphasis on the role of aircraft and aircraft carriers, though it became even more apparent in 1941 and 1942 that carriers would form the backbone of fleet combat in the Pacific. This answer I wrote to another question explains why the role of the aircraft carrier was a bit of a moving target for naval planners at the time.

The Navy didn't scrap its Pacific strategy after Pearl Harbor, because it had already realized that a strategy centered on sailing the fleet thousands of miles to engage in a gunnery duel with the Japanese was unlikely to be successful. Prewar plans were indeed altered after the attack and in the early days of the war, but not fundamentally changed by the loss of battleships at Pearl Harbor.