Russia is having a lot of logistical difficulties in its invasion of Ukraine. Did the Soviet Union have the same problems supplying and feeding troops during its war in Afghanistan?

Soviet Union had logistical issues when it came to supplying their troops (Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan, built up mostly around 40th Army which was recreated in 1979 for this exact purpose) but not in sense of what we are seeing in Ukraine. The biggest issue for Soviets was getting supplies through as they relied on underdeveloped road network rather than lack of supplies as such. Similarly because pipelines were vulnerable to attacks POL had to be transported by road as well thus increasing the need for transport. Mujahedeen preferred attacking these transports over harder targets like bases and units in the field for reasons such as vulnerability, increasing pressure and cost for Soviets and occasional loot/spoils of war. Terrain, frequent choke points and few options when transporting supplies increased the vulnerability of these convoys as they had to use certain routes that could be scouted or mined by insurgents in advance. Similarly soft targets such as trucks and fuel trucks were vulnerable to even small arms fire, let alone mines or missiles/rockets, making attacks easier then engaging armoured vehicles. Usual tactic was to engage only part of the convoy with maximum force, increasing effectiveness of even smaller group and potentially overwhelming protection of that specific part of the convoy.

This in turn made protection of main road crucial, both in form of permanent security posts and protection of transport convoys themselves. Soviet methods on achieving this were refined throughout the war due to after action reports and "lessons learned" with various tactics and methods used from increasing armed protection in from of AFVs to including self propelled 23mm anti aircraft artillery which due to high rate of fire and high gun elevation was able to engage enemy situated higher the convoy than AFVs with their limited gun elevation. Various mixes and tactics were tested, from deploying helicopter borne units on crucial sections of the route which were then withdrawn, to drilling crews of both trucks and escorts in responding to ambush and quick recovery of vehicles that could be fixed.

While increasing protection did have an effect in reducing losses it in turn tied down significant portion of Soviet forces, thus reducing already insufficient size of maneuver units available for offensive operations and "carrying the fight to the enemy". As Soviets didn't trust Afghan army to do this job properly it was on them to provide security.

So Soviet issue was not lack of supplies but rather getting them through. Of course you can't really compare the two wars as Afghanistan was counter insurgency war with significantly lower tempo of operations aimed at insurgents with limited arsenal while war in Ukraine is higher tempo, combined arms operation that requires significantly more supplies not just due to bigger size, and is of course facing conventional enemy military.

The Soviet-Afghan War, How a Superpower Fought and lost, Russian General staff, translated by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, University Press of Kansas, 2002

The Bear Went Over the Mountain, Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, Lester W. Grau, Frank Cass, 1998

The Other Side of the Mountain, Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, USMC Studies and Analysis Division, 1998