Uniforms for British line infantry were often provided by the regimental colonel (often an honorary and administrative position in this period, battle command was usually devolved to the Lieutenant Colonel) with funds reimbursed by government and the difference being profited by the colonel. So, if the colonel could source and ship replacement coats and expect to be reimbursed at a profit, then the regiment would receive a new issue. For instance, when General Howe received the colonelship of the 23rd Fusiliers, he promptly engaged in an argument with the widow of the previous colonel over who should pay for the issued coats to the regiment in 1776, not to avoid it but because the person who paid could expect a large lump sum in profits.[1] However, the expectation of reimbursement from a parsimonious government, and the shipping costs across the Atlantic, chances of spoilage, and even the Colonel’s awareness of the need for coats (many being separated from their regiment by many thousands of miles across the Atlantic Ocean) made this a rare occurrence (although a profitable one if the Colonel was well connected enough to expect prompt and fulsome repayment).

Soldiers of the period, out of necessity, were used to ‘make do and mend’ when it came to uniforms, but in the American Revolution this was often sanctioned by senior officers. Generals such as Howe and Burgoyne believed that the tactics required of the army in the climate of North America required adaptions to the campaign dress including, but not limited to, cutting down the coat to a lighter, shorter jacket, one-piece trousers or even overalls, and cutting down of headgear. This, in combination with the wear-and-tear of campaign life meant that many British soldiers by 1781 would have looked substantially different from those parading in 1776.[2] Reinforcements from Britain and from the German states noted clear differences in the appearance of British soldiers in North America to their own heavily uniformed appearance after only a year of two of the war. One Hessian wrote to the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel that British soldiers were ‘clothed according to the hot climate, with very short and light coats, and long linen trousers down to the shoes’ [3]

What uniforms did make it through to the army, and some of these appear to have been sent by the British government rather than regimental colonels, were often redistributed according to local officer’s priorities. In Charleston, South Carolina, the officer in charge a Lt Col. Balfour prioritized new uniforms being sent to his own regiment first, but this was still perhaps 4 years after their initial supply.[4] It is worth noting that Balfour may have prioritized his regiment (from whom he was on detached service) from reports on their morale and health. Issued with the new coats, sickness amongst the regiment dropped noticeably in comparison to other regiments. [5]

The British soldier could not simply discard his uniform coat and wear a locally sourced jacket, wilful destruction of the ‘King’s Property’ was a punishable offence, instead forcing a soldier to repair his old jacket with local materials and patches. This would have given the soldiers a less than uniform appearance but parade requirements and the pressure of NCOs (who could be stripped of their rank if the men under their charge did not meet appearance standards), meant that ‘best efforts’ were made. Even patched with locally red-dyed (or close) material, the soldier would still have been identifiably a ‘redcoat’.

So it was entirely possible that a British soldier, after several years’ service in North America, at least in some regiments, were still nominally equipped with his initial coat although a very tired, patched, adapted, and oft-repaired one.

1. The National Archives, Kew Gardens, WO 4/95 & WO 4/96

2. Urban, M., Fusilier: Eight Years with the Redcoats in America (Faber and Faber, 2007) and Bond, D., Continental vs Redcoat (Osprey, 2014)

3. Anon. ‘Letter of a Hessian Officer to the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel’, Militair-Wochenblatt, 18 (1833)

4. Calvert, H., Journal and Correspondence of General Sir Harry Calvert (London. 1853)

5. Calvert, Journal and Correspondence and Urban, Fusiliers, pp. 221-222

Further reading:

Bowler, A., Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783 (Princeton UP, reprint 2015)