In 1945, was consideration ever given to demonstrating the power of an atomic weapon to Japan, and then offering them the chance to surrender, without one actually being dropped on a city?

by VivianStansteel
restricteddata

Yes, briefly. Essentially, a group of scientists at the University of Chicago who had worked on the bomb project made a suggestion of a "demonstration" in the summer of 1945, as an alternative to using the weapon on a city first. The members of the Franck Committee made this particular plea in June 1945:

…the way in which nuclear weapons, now secretly developed in this country, will first be revealed to the world appears of great, perhaps fateful importance. … It will be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon, as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement….

From this point of view a demonstration of the new weapon may best be made before the eyes of representatives of all United Nations, on the desert or a barren island. The best possible atmosphere for the achievement of an international agreement could be achieved if America would be able to say to the world, “You see what weapon we had but did not use. We are ready to renounce its use in the future and to join other nations in working out adequate supervision of the use of this nuclear weapon.”

Their efforts did get filtered up to the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, who requested that a small panel of top-level scientists evaluate it. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Ernest Lawrence, and Arthur Compton considered it as part of a larger set of things they were asked to think about (like the future of atomic research).

The Panel recommended thus:

You have asked us to comment on the initial use of the new weapon. This use, in our opinion, should be such as to promote a satisfactory adjustment of our international relations. At the same time, we recognize our obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war. ...

(2) The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this specific weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.

And that more or less killed the issue. The idea was never presented to President Truman (he was not very involved in the nuclear planning process).

I have written on this at much longer length, with the documents all included, here. It is also of interest that at least one member of the committee, potentially Lawrence (though some have alleged it might have been Fermi), wavered on this point. I have written about this a bit here.