Hi!

Unfortunately, Russell’s History of Western Philosophy is somewhat notorious among historians of philosophy. The book is extremely readable and at times is very perceptive; the stuff on Leibniz, for example, is excellent. Elsewhere, however, it is pretty abysmal from the standpoint of historical accuracy, interpretative charity, and even philosophical insight. The sections of Aquinas and Nietzsche, for example, are sometimes used as paradigm cases of “bad” history of philosophy; one of the professors that I worked for as a graduate TA years back used Russell's treatment of Nietzsche in the History in exactly this way in introductory courses, as an example of what not to do.

First, the good. Russell, of course, is one of the foremost philosophers of the 20th century. For example, his On Denoting is still one of the most commonly taught philosophy papers in Anglo-American analytic philosophy, and his work in logic is obviously seminal. But, of course, to be a great philosopher is not necessarily to be a great historian of philosophy, anymore than to be a great mathematician is to be a great historian of mathematics. We can see this general point quite vividly in some contemporary philosophers whose work is clearly not historically informed beyond a superficial level. Jonathan Bennett, an eminent philosopher and historian of philosophy, observes in his Learning from Six Philosophers (p. 3) that the work of David Lewis, who ranks with Russell in terms of philosophical importance if not name recognition among non-philosophers, is “not visibly influenced by any knowledge of the history of philosophy.” This characterization of Lewis is apt in broad strokes; true, Lewis sometimes alludes to someone like St. Anselm or David Hume (as he does in Anselm and Actuality and Causation, respectively), but most often these allusions are little more than framing devices or ways of situating a contemporary discussion in its broad context. Lewis would probably have been the first to admit that he was no expert on philosophical history, even though he was, like Russell, undeniably one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century.

Now, Russell is not quite so extreme a case as Lewis. In fact, Russell did much work of great importance in the history of philosophy! It is just that this important work is not his History of Western Philosophy but rather his earlier and more narrowly focused work, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, which remains an important and influential work in Leibniz scholarship today. So, Russell did have some historical expertise to offer. The problem is that, in other historical eras, Russell seems to be almost a novice. In a prominent review that aptly sums up the reception of Russell’s History among historians of philosophy, George Boas wrote that the most consistent error is that Russell veers wildly and without comment between “history and polemic”; that is, his discussion of Aquinas is not so much a discussion of the seminal medieval Aristotelian philosopher as it is a polemic against it. In general, Russell is most accurate and most useful when he is sympathetic to a thinker, and is sometimes very little use at all when he is hostile, as he is, for example, to the medieval Christians, the idealists, and Neitzsche. This is not, of course, to say that good history of philosophy cannot engage philosophically with (and criticize) the views put forward by historical figures. Quite the opposite is the case! Even if one’s interests are purely antiquarian (and they almost never are among practicing historians of philosophy), the philosophical merits of various interpretations are obviously relevant to what the most accurate reading of a text is. However, Russell at times seems less interested in coming to grips with a philosophical position than he is in telling you why he is hostile to that position.

Another criticism that we are only recently beginning to appreciate is the degree to which Russell’s work largely ignores the contributions of female thinkers and philosophical work on issues of gender and race. There is very little discussion of slavery, for example, despite the lively discussion of the subject among many prominent early moderns. To stick with the same period, more recent early modern scholarship has devoted an increasing amount of energy to recovering and evaluating the philosophical work done by women like Margaret Cavendish (the first woman to attend a meeting of the Royal Society in London), Emilie Du Chatelet (whose work on natural philosophy exercised great influence), and Mary Shepherd (who gives an intriguing attempt to rescue the tradition of British empiricism from the idealism of Berkeley and the skepticism of Hume). In this, of course, Russell’s History is a product of its time, but these defects are only becoming more and more jarring as the decades pass and historians of philosophy continue striving towards a more accurate understanding of our philosophical past.

If you want some much better general histories, the standard recommendations are those of Anthony Kenny (A New History of Western Philosophy) and the old, incredibly long work of Copleston (A History of Philosophy). Neither of these works are perfect by any means, but both with serve you a heck of a lot better than Russell. I’ll also flag the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy which has articles on basically any historical topic you could dream up, although it isn’t exactly a paradigm of accessible clarity, being aimed largely at folks in the profession. Still, the bibliographies will be helpful at finding other sources, typically including some introductory texts.