I believe the blame apportioned to local guides is rather more a reflection of the total reliance armies had on them throughout history more than anything. This reliance, and therefore the opportunity to be betrayed by local guides was very real. Certainly, betrayal (or even incompetence) by a local guide could have been catastrophic before the advent of detailed, accurate, and cheap maps – which was extremely recent in the field of military history.

Even when local maps were detailed and accurate, many military commanders limited their publication to keep the knowledge to themselves. The Duke of Alva kept a map of Franche-Comte in 1567 from being published for at least a decade in other to secure this line of communication for Spain.[1] Only after 1780 were parts of the European road network surveyed to an extent that useful maps of known regions could be made for military purposes and even then the countries involved marked such maps as secret for decades.[2]

Local commanders as late as the 17th and 18th centuries were instead often reliant on more route descriptions than maps. “Follow this road to X town, then onto town Y, cross the river there and continue onto Z”. The ‘maps’ most regimental and even army commanders had previously were more like itinerary guides with a loose line of march from the top of the page to the bottom, with sketches and names of the landmarks they would reach along that route. These landmarks were used as guides to the journey’s itineraries and often, confusingly, showed multiple routes to destinations in the event of one route or another being impassable. Furthermore, these local route itineraries were really only useful in well-known and travelled areas.

This route guide from the late 16th century, https://ibb.co/F77G0Dj for forces marching to the Netherlands to reinforce the Spanish Army of Flanders, is aligned to north, showing the rivers and hills that need crossing, and the locations where bridges and be found. See the wavy lines for rivers, and the crossings marked by the drawings of bridges and their associated towns or villages. There is no road shown (although they would have been there) just sketches outlining possible routes. Despite the ‘Spanish Road’ to the Netherlands being in their own territory, well used for the purposes of military transport (arguably its primary purpose) the officers of Imperial Spain had no detailed maps of this region. Now in this case, this could be mitigated by veteran subordinate officers with the regiments, advising their commanders on the routes they had taken before. [3]

However, in most other cases this is where the ‘local guide’ comes in. Most people in history had only a loose knowledge about regions outside of their own local one. Yes, they would know in detail of their local area, but finding people able to guide large numbers of soldiers extensive distances with information held largely in their memory was a rare and difficult task. In fact even in well-known and secure locations a guide, or ‘conductor’ was only of use for two to three days before being replaced by another, each man being superseded by someone more knowledgeable about the area being progressed through.[3] Most ‘guides’ of an area would themselves be local and perhaps averse to helping a foreign force of soldiers move through their territory, not out of any national loyalty, but because logistics and supply of many armies throughout history relied heavily on impacting on the local civilians.

Most commanders moving in hostile or unfamiliar terrain would be using pickets and cavalry to patrol their line of march wherever possible, but small groups of cavalry operating in unfamiliar terrain would be themselves vulnerable to betrayal and ambush, in addition to getting lost themselves. Each of these would need some form of guidance, perhaps even locals themselves, again further stretching their vulnerability.

All this has been to highlight the dependency military commanders had on local guides or one sort or another for centuries, even in ‘friendly’ areas, and with this dependency came an increased vulnerability to deception, real or imagined. I think rather than racism to locals, it is probably more that defeated or struggled commanders seized on an excuse easily understood by their contemporaries – that of the betrayal by someone they relied so heavily upon. In some cases this could have been to cover for the commander’s failings, in others it may well have been a genuine apportioned blame. Without details on the individual cases it is difficult to say for certain.

1. Febvre, L., Philippe II et la Franche-Comte (Paris, 1970), p.114

2. Vann, J.A. ‘Mapping under the Austrian Habsburgs’ in Buisseret (ed.) Monarchs, ministers and maps (Chicago, 1992)

3. Parker, G., The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars (Cambridge, 2004), p.73

Further Reading

Hale, J., 'Warfare and Cartography, ca. 1450 to ca. 1640', Woodward (ed.) The History of Cartography, volume III: Cartography in the European Renaissance (Chicago, 2007)