I know of one instance in which flaming petrol as a defence of a blockaded colony was not just considered, but planned for and eventually used, albeit very poorly. This was during the 1942 invasion of the British colony of Singapore by the Japanese.

By February 1 1942, The Japanese had eliminated Allied resistance in Malaya after a incredibly quick campaign of about 55 days. Units from Britain, India, Australia and other parts of the Empire that hadn’t surrendered or been killed had withdrawn across the narrow Johor Strait to Singapore, where Malaya Command planned to make a final stand. With the only bridge across the strait demolished during the retreat, the idea was to turn Singapore into a fortress and make the Japanese pay dearly as they struggled across the water.

Singapore’s northern coast had two lines of natural defences. The first was the aforementioned Johor Strait, where invaders in canvas-sided boats would be extremely vulnerable. The second was a belt of mangrove swamp which dominated the coast. Both of these watery obstacles lent themselves to petrol traps, which the Japanese feared the British would prepare and trigger.

This was indeed on the cards. Brigadier Ivan Simson, the Chief Engineer in Malaya, worked out a detailed plan for well concealed and strongly entrenched company positions that could dominate landing points. Simson intended that these areas would also be blocked by all manner of booby traps, including pools of flaming petrol in the water. In this, it seems he was inspired by the techniques that had been prepared for the coastal defence of the UK.

However, when the attack came on the night of February 8, Singapore’s defence was still in shambles. The Japanese attacked Singapore’s northwest in force and rapidly overwhelmed the defenders.

On February 9 the Japanese made another crossing in the northwest, this time to Kranji. This area contained petrol storage tanks, and the defenders had orders to destroy them if they had to retreat. When the time to retreat came, however, the engineer platoon wiring the petrol tanks lost their equipment to a direct hit.

Around 0400H on February 10, one Lt. Watchorn of 2/12 Field Company of the Royal Australian Engineers took the initiative to drain the tanks into the mangrove swamp. He then ignited the stream of petrol, setting off a horrific (to the Japanese, anyway) firestorm. The waters carried the flaming petrol right into the left flank of the attacking Japanese, incinerating at least one company of Guards. Corporal Tsuchikane, caught in the inferno, later described it as ‘a picture of hell - Abikyokan - Buddhism’s worst of all hells.’

So dramatic was the flaming petrol that some Japanese Guardsmen reported that the attack was being destroyed. Nishimura Takuma, their commander, panicked and demanded that Yamashita Tomoyuki, the overall commander of the invasion, call off the attack. Yamashita ignored him and ordered his forces to press the attack. As it turned out, the defenders had simply used the inferno to cover a desperate retreat. By the time the sun rose, the Japanese had secured the coast.

As dramatic as the petrol trap had been in the moment, it made no difference to the eventual outcome. That’s not to say that petrol traps in general are not useful, or that flaming petrol wouldn't have made any difference to the defence of the UK. There was simply too much wrong with the defence of Singapore for it to have made a difference in this particular instance.

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Farrell B. (2005). The Defence and Fall of Singapore (2015 edition). Monsoon Books.