There are two answers to the question, both of them variations of "yes."

There are books that take the characterization the broad shape or structure of scientific and technological developments as their subject. The most famous of these is the most famous book in the history of science: Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Kuhn basically says, "here's how theory change works in scientific communities." It was not the first such book (Ludwig Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, 1935, was a big influence on Kuhn, and many of Kuhn's concerns came out of debates about the nature of science that began in the philosophy of science in the early 20th century), and not the last (there are many authors who were influenced by Kuhn, and sought different ways to either add to or contradict him). In general, this kind of approach is considered a little out of date today, because it tries to take a huge number of possible practices and create a general "rule" for them, and if you look anything more than superficially you find that there just aren't that many "rules" that apply across space and time. (Indeed, the idea that there isn't any "rule" at all to science is subject of another work in this genre, Paul Feyerabend's Against Method, 1975.) So instead a lot of the work since the 1970s or so has been about looking at specific cases and coming up with methodologies that might give some insight into how various aspects of science/technology work at a given point in time, without the pretense that you'll find some perfect solution. And in general, my sense is that a lot of this work got taken up by sociologists and anthropologists around this time, and less by historians and philosophers, as used to be the case (Kuhn was always a historian-philosopher mix, Fleck is more of a philosopher than a historian, Feyerabend was a philosopher; this strand of the philosophy of science seems rather extinct at the moment, however, as philosophers of science tend to be more influenced by analytical philosophy than the kind of historically-inflected stuff of the 1930s-1970s).

The other category of a more qualified "yes" is that there are many, many works today in the history of science and technology that are, in their own way, trying to show trends and patterns and develop conclusions based on them. They just tend not to try to generalize for all science and technology anymore. So Paul Edwards' The Closed World (1996) is about how the ideological and political context of Cold War American affected the history of computer development. That's definitely a "pattern based" approach — looking at many case studies to elucidate a broader argument about context — but the scope is much more limited (Cold War American computing). This is the more common approach these days, because it does not require one to try to make as vast claims as someone like Kuhn was prone to do (Kuhn wanted a "theory" that would describe physics, biology, and psychology equally well, across all time and space... that's the kind of thing historians tend to find unlikely to be how the world works these days, because different fields of inquiry have really different contexts and motivations and methods and limitations, and different time periods and locations approach all of these things differently).

Anyway, if you want to see a bit of what this kind of stuff is like, Kuhn is a good place to start. He is, I would emphasize, not the only place to end. When I teach my Introduction to Science and Technology Studies course, I always start with Kuhn, because he's approachable and he does a good job of making the stakes of such an endeavor clear. But I always move beyond Kuhn very quickly, to emphasize that there isn't one accepted "answer" to how to think about this at all, and indeed most historians of science are not actually "Kuhnians." (Famously, Kuhn himself claimed not to be a Kuhnian, whatever that means...)