Hitler explicitly framed Barbarossa as a war of both racial extermination (Vernichtungskrieg) between the Aryan "master race" and Jewish and Slavic "Untermenschen" and as a war of ideologies (Weltanschauungskrieg) between Nazism and Bolshevism. It's not really accurate to say racism or ideology was more important relative to one another, because they were viewed as one and the same in the Nazi conception of the war; Hitler believed that the political enemy, Communism, was a product of the racial enemy, the Jews and Slavs (this is often referred to as the "Judeo-Bolshevism" conspiracy theory).

However, there was also a more practical calculus behind the political/ideological dimension of the war. Hitler was aware of Stalin's purges and the impact that they had had on the Soviet Army (including the execution of some of the country's best military theoreticians, like Mikhail Tukhachevsky) and had seen the Red Army's poor performance in the Winter War against Finland. He saw these failures as evidence of the weakness of the Communist model and, combined with Germany's rapid successes in Poland and France, led him to believe that a similar quick knockout blow was possible during the invasion of the Soviet Union, obviating the concerns about Germany's ability to sustain a long and costly war against a much larger opponent. He was famously quoted as saying that "we have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down" and predicted that the Soviet Union would collapse within three months of a German invasion.

The orders that were given for the invasion of the Soviet Union demonstrate the unity of the Nazis' racial and political ideological goals. The Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia, issued on 19 May 1941, included the following:

1. Bolshevism is the lethal enemy of the National Socialist German people. Germany’s struggle is directed against this subversive ideology and its functionaries.

2. This struggle requires ruthless and energetic action against Bolshevik agitators, guerillas, saboteurs, and Jews, and the total elimination of all active or passive resistance.

3. The members of the Red Army—including prisoners—must be treated with the most extreme reserve and the greatest caution since one must anticipate devious methods of combat. The Asiatic soldiers of the Red Army in particular are inscrutable, unpredictable, devious, and brutish...

4. In the Soviet Union, the German soldier is not confronted with a unified population. The USSR is a state formation that combines many Slav, Caucasian, and Asiatic peoples held together by the violence of the Bolshevik rulers. Jewry is strongly represented in the USSR...

The Commissar Order, issued on 6 June 1941, ordered the immediate execution of all captured Soviet political commissars with the following justification:

1. In this war, mercy or consideration of international law is invalid. These are a danger to our safety and to the rapid pacification of the conquered territories.

2. The originators of barbaric, Asiatic methods of warfare are the political commissars... They are therefore, when captured in battle, to be shot as a matter of routine.

The latter order flagrantly flaunted international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, and foreshadowed the mass killing of Soviet POWs in Nazi captivity; of the 5.7 million Soviet prisoners captured by Germany, 3.3 million (almost 58%) died. In addition to the execution of political commissars, Jews, Communist Party members, and other "undesirables" among Soviet POWs in German camps were identified and executed by the Gestapo or SD (this process was known as Aussonderung, or "weeding out").

German propaganda produced for Wehrmacht personnel also explicitly connected Jews with Communism and political commissars in particular, portrayed them as dangerous, violent, subhuman elements, and emphasized the need to deal with them in a ruthless manner as a matter of both military security and racial ideology. Orders from German generals like Erich Hoepner and Walther von Brauchitsch stressed that this was a war against "Jewish Bolshevism" and a struggle for the survival of the "European" race against the "Russian Asiatic hordes". Again, the need to exterminate people deemed as racial inferiors and to eliminate their political ideology that was deemed the antithesis of Nazism were part of the same, unified goal.

I'm realizing that I've rambled a bit in this response, but hopefully this makes some sense. In Hitler's mind, defeating the racial enemy (Jews and Slavs) meant defeating the political enemy (Bolshevism) and vice versa. His confidence in a rapid victory was based on both his views of the supposed inferiority of the Communist ideology as well as the demonstrably poor recent performances of the Soviet armed forces and the structural weaknesses that had been created in the Red Army due to the purges in the 1930s. It was all synergistic: the belief in Jewish/Slavic racial inferiority reinforced the belief in the political/ideological inferiority of Communism, and the failures of the Communist system reinforced the belief in the racial inferiority of the Jews and Slavs he believed were behind it. A rapid German victory was a self-fulfilling prophecy in Hitler's mind, at least until it wasn't.

Sources:

Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-1945: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001)

Jürgen Förster, "The Wehrmacht and the War of Extermination against the Soviet Union," in The Nazi Holocaust, Part 3: The "Final Solution", ed. Michael Marrus (Meckler, 1989), pp. 494-520.

......, "The German Military's Image of Russia," in Russia: War, Peace and Diplomacy, ed. Ljubica Erickson and Mark Erickson (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005).

Stephen Fritz, Ostkrieg: Hitler's War of Annihilation in the East (U of Kentucky Press, 2011)

Christian Hartmann, Operation Barbarossa: Germany's War in the East, 1941-1945 (Oxford UP, 2013)

Hannes Heer and Christian Streit, Vernichtungskrieg im Osten: Judenmord, Kriegsgefangene und Hungerpolitik (VSA, 2020)

Alex J. Kay, Jeff Rutherford, and David Stahel, eds., Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization (U of Rochester Press, 2012).

Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetische Kriegsgefangene (Dietz, 1997)