In the fighting in the rubble of Stalingrad? The Soviets fought in small squads, with machine pistols, a sack of grenades and a sharpened shovel. They tunneled through cellars and attics, held out as detached units for days, improvised weapons (an anti-tank rifle mounted on a cartwheel for AA against Stukas). Chuikov withdrew all the long-range guns to the other bank and called strikes on German forming up areas using forward radio observers. So lots of local initiative and determination. For all that, shells were in short supply, explosives were inferior and a good deal of equipment was near obsolete - the result of the loss of much industry in 41 and early 42.

In the bigger picture, as historians like David Glantz point out, the Red Army was caught mid-transition in 41,lost most of it experienced NCOs and junior officers, then fought with its back to the wall in 42. 43 was the learning year, when the survivors knew their trade and could teach, and the new gear came on line in quantity. In 44 and 45 it was doing combined arms in depth on a scale the Germans had never matched. Note also that in things like river crossings the Red Army showed a high degree of local initiative and daring.

The broad stats tell the same story: the Soviets lost 11.5 million military in the war; the Axis lost 5 million on the Eastern Front (so 2:1). BUT - 3.5- 4.5 million of the Soviet military casualties were murdered POWs - most captured in 41 (German and Soviet sources differ), and most of the losses were in the first years. So by late 43 and through 44 and 45 the Soviets were giving better than they took. They had more numbers than the Axis, but applied those numbers with skill and flair.

The German generals memoirs and diaries established the narrative, and it persists (not helped by Soviet secrecy and then Russian propaganda). But the German accounts have been shown to be self-serving at best, and often deliberately falsified to distance the authors from the Nazi regime.

The idea that the Heer didn’t treat its troops as disposable is largely a myth. It demanded that they fight and die even when orders were suicidal and the military situation was hopeless. An order from 4 Panzer Army on strengthening morale from 7/19/1944:

In the tough defensive battle that now has also broken out in our sector, the political orientation of the soldiers is even more important than before. It is ordered to counter any opinion that may arise that there is no time for this. Right now, at every available opportunity, the unit leaders and NSFO have to point out that it is not important where and when the war is decided, only that the final decision is ours. The prerequisites for this are only created at this time through the unconditional commitment of officers and men, even in the most seemingly hopeless situations - With our perseverance, we will give the Führer time to take measures that will one day have a decisive effect on the war in our favor in the East.

(NARA T313, Roll 410, Frame 8,703,478)

Here’s Army Group North Ukraine's commander Harpe repeating what amounts to propaganda in confidential orders to his subordinates (1 Panzer Army and 4 Panzer Army) on 7/20/1944:

The enemy's initial attack with massed infantry and armored forces against our front, which was only sparsely manned in many places, made breakthroughs in a few places, for the covering of which it was necessary here and there to withdraw the rest of the front to prepared rear positions. It must be assumed that the enemy's attack momentum has been paralyzed to a considerable degree by the heavy losses in personnel and material.

It is now important for us to remain where we are under all circumstances. I cannot approve of entire fronts being pushed back and the most valuable, irreplaceable weapons and equipment being lost in the process without there being a compelling need for this. I now demand, more than before, personal influence from the [Army] Commanders-in-Chief and Commanding Generals on the battlefield and the frequent sending of general staff officers with clearly defined assignments to the focal points of the battle.

(BAMA RH-19/VI, Page 221)

Obviously, this was completely detached from the reality on the ground for the Army Group.

Even relatively excusable or understandable failures during periods of crisis could lead German OBs to lash out with draconian military justice, such as this case in AG North Ukraine on 7/27/1944:

First Lieutenant Dopwiker let a 300 cbm fuel depot fall into enemy hands undamaged. In doing so, he criminally gave enemy armored units, which had serious fuel problems, the opportunity to advance further. He is to blame for the enemy breaking into an important point.

Lieutenant Dopwiker was sentenced to death, and the sentence was carried out immediately.

I would like to point out once again that not a liter of fuel should be left behind, not even in a damaged vehicle or one taken by surprise by the enemy. Anyone who disobeys this order is to be punished in the severest form, considering the dangerous effect of such carelessness.

(BAMA RH-19/VI, Page 193)