I've talked previously about why Japan opted for war with the United States, here, why Japan entered the war at all here and the supposed 'irrationality' of Imperial Japan here. While there was pressure within the highest levels of command from the Imperial Japanese Army for exactly what you describe: war against the British and Dutch to seize their colonies, the Navy had several reasons why it advocated for war against the United States as well:

1. The Philippines. The Philippines was an American colony, with American aircraft based out of Clark Field near Manila and a naval base at Cavite. Were Japan to leave the Philippines under American control, the bases there would've given the United States the ability to cut off Japanese trade routes to the southern territories. By seizing the Philippines as well at the outbreak of war, Japan would forestall this eventuality.

2. The balance of power was shifting in the Pacific. The United States had passed the Two-Ocean Navy Act in 1940, which called for a truly massive increase in U.S. naval construction. In 1941, while Japan was at a numerical inferiority relative to the U.S. Navy, once the construction from the Two Ocean Navy Act was complete, Japan would be utterly outnumbered to an extent it could not match. If Japan was to go to war with the United States, it would have to act sooner rather than later if it wanted to have any ability to fight the U.S. Navy at anything resembling parity.

3. The IJN had built itself into an organization built nearly completely around the prospect of war with the United States. This was not only institutional in the doctrine and tactics of the IJN, but also philosophical. Japanese naval thought leaders would argue that the future of the Pacific would be determined by the great clash of civilisations between Japan and the United States. War was inevitable.

Given all of these, it's hard to describe Japan's decision to go to war with the United States as a "mistake". While it was clearly bad policy that resulted in the destruction of Imperial Japan as a state referring to it as a "mistake" creates the implication that it was an unforced error. That Japan could've just chosen not to attack the United States. However, examining the situation facing Japan in 1940-41 and the thought processes which guided Imperial decision making makes it clear that the decision to go to war with the United States was the product of deliberation and seen as the best step forward. The seeds of Japanese-American antagonism in the Pacific had been sown long ago, with Japan desiring a true imperial sphere that would have to include China, while the United States was determined to preserve its own position in China. From the Japanese perspective, the U.S. was clearly angling for a decisive showdown on its terms, in a few more years, when the U.S. Navy had been built up to such an extent that Japan would be unable to resist. The decision to go to war in 1941 was thus forcing the showdown before the U.S. would be ready, on the closest thing to Japan's terms as it could muster. If we want to play alternate history (and we can't hear) the decision point for preventing war between Japan and the United States would likely be decades prior, not 1941.

Furthermore, in a war, all powers make mistakes. In terms of policy, the United States drastically misread the mood in Tokyo, and so thought the throttling of exports of materiel and oil would threaten the Japanese with collapse, and thus allow the return of "moderates" to power. Instead, Japanese leadership saw the sanctions and embargo as an existential threat which unified both the Army and Navy around the need to seize the European colonies in South East Asia. In terms of tactical mis-steps, at Midway, the USS Hornet wasted nearly all its striking power sending its aircraft in a flight to nowhere which resulted in nearly all her aircraft scattered across the battlespace in exchange for 0 hits on Japanese warships. At Savo Island, the United States Navy's lack of precautions enabled a Japanese cruiser force to close in and sink four Allied heavy cruisers for limited damage in return. You can not simply boil down the outcome of the war to something as simple as one side made mistakes and other did not. Everyone in war makes mistakes. What matters is whether you have the opportunity to learn from them and if you take advantage of that opportunity to learn from them. For Japan, limited economic resources made it so that there was little opportunity to take the lessons learned from early war mistakes, as Japan could not replace the resources it had lost. The United States on the other hand, had ample opportunity to take the hit from learning lessons on the battlefield and learn from them.

To put it succinctly, probably not, if not even absolutely not

u/desoulis lays it out here: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/3pbuii/what_were_hitlers_chances_on_winning_the_war/

It looks like at the most optimistic they had a chance until they stalled trying to take Moscow and the US entered the war. Probably the most eyebrow raising statistic I'll see today is the estimate that the US had 50% of the world's war making capacity alone in 1941. That's pretty hard to compete against.

Everyone makes mistakes in war. The difference is whether or not they have the resources to rectify those mistakes. The Allies had them, the Axis did not. End of discussion. It is no coincidence that three major defeats (Stalingrad, El Alamein, Midway) were enough to change the course of the war. Not that there was any lack of Allied defeats in the previous three years. But they always had the resources to rebuild their forces and return to the attack. The Axis at the first serious defeat did not have them.

Just look at the sum of the GDPs of the warring powers. That of the Allies, counting in these also the USSR, was ten times (10!) higher than that of the Axis, in which Germany was the only real industrial power. Japan had to spend between 30 and 40 per cent (sic!) of its GDP to build a fleet barely capable of fighting the American fleet.