Oh, what a fun question! I'll break it down by group and include lots of caveats below, but to provide a simple answer: No. In its early years the state did not live up to the expectations of the vast majority of residents, and there was a general sense of frustration and disappointment. In many ways this shouldn't be surprising—many streams of Zionist thought were fairly utopian in outlook, and the contrast between ideology and reality in a poor embattled state, engaged in interethnic conflict and struggling to absorb a massive influx of immigrants was extremely stark. This disappointment had a significant range, and for some was likely fairly quotidian, IE they imagined things would be easier after statehood but their sense of nationalism and belief in Zionism was left intact, to far more shattering shaking some’s commitment to the state and even Judaism. For some general groups, assessments read below.

Veteran elite: For the mostly Ashkenazi elite who had been in the land for over a generation, the general expectation was that the victory in 1948 would mark the culmination of their struggle and sacrifice. However, in its early years the Labor government, dealing with a sluggish economy and a massive influx of immigrants, was forced to impose severe austerity and rationing policies. These policies, designed by the minister of supply, Dov Yosef, were reviled by the population, as they affected access to everyday goods (especially food), as well as luxury items. There was a general sense of gloom among this group, accompanied by a feeling that they were falling behind the rest of the world. The urban elite was especially bitter because they felt the austerity policies were not only onerous but unfair. They saw that kibbutzniks (who were also the government and military leaders) suffered less because they could supplement their rations with what they grew and felt that those in power were trying to cheat them. While new immigrants faced the same (or worst) austerity, the veterans largely felt it was the immigrants' turn to sacrifice for Zionism, so they did not feel like sharing the burden.

On a practical level, this dissatisfaction manifested in greater support for the general Zionist party in local elections (though not significantly on the national level partially out of high levels of personal loyalty to David Ben Gurion). More intangibly this dissatisfaction led to a waning of Israelis' sense of collectivism and willingness to sacrifice for the collective, however, accompanied by a waning of chauvinism.

Immigrants from Arab countries: The best scholarship on this is of Iraqi immigrants, who had the most dramatic contrast with their home, but these experiences are shared to a lesser degree with other immigrants from Arab countries. Iraqi immigrants were horrified and traumatized by moving to Israel, many tried unsuccessfully to leave, and wrote back to those who remained in Iraq not to come. While this experience certainly improved over time, for the early years of their residence in Israel Iraqi immigrants were beyond disappointed with the reality of the Israeli state.

Of particular concern was the conditions in the transit camps in which they were initially placed. Hygiene was lacking, food rations were poor, and they often had to pay for housing and services but had no legal way of making money. This all contrasted with the relatively comfortable conditions many Iraqi Jews experienced in Iraq. Iraqi Jews had been materially well off and had a high degree of Western education (ironically often much higher than Ashkenazi Israelis).

Iraqi Jews felt condescended, cheated, and lied to by the Ashkenazi leaders, and experienced a sense of hopelessness and confusion at the dramatic reversal of their fortunes. The decision of why so many Iraqi Jews moved to Israel is complex and poorly studied, but a sense of messianic destiny was certainly part of it, and the contrast between this messianism and the horrible conditions of the transit camp was devasting to many Iraqi Jews.

Arab population: In a way, this is the most poorly studied of these groups, both because there are few sources to help us understand what the Arab population felt in the early years of statehood, but also because there is less of a sense of what they “expected” of the Jewish state should it come to be. Most Arabs were in something of a state of shock in the early days of the Arab state and were consumed with day-to-day concerns, navigating the military regime under which most of them lived, and recovering lost family and wealth. The most abundant sources from this period come from the Arab communist party, and, compared to the present reality are very surprising. While the communist party certainly disagreed with many of the policies of the state, they were MUCH more willing to cooperate with the state and seek compromise than contemporary Arab parties. Memorial ceremonies commemorating Arab dead (such as ceremonies remembering those who died in a village in the 1948 war) always also included Jewish deaths and Jewish participants. When the Israeli government briefly tried to draft Arabs into the army (mainly to prove that they wouldn’t enlist) the communist party held enlistment parties.

All of this isn’t to say that Arabs supported the state, or weren’t horrified by what happened in the 48 war or the subsequent military regime, but rather to suggest that rejectionism was by no means the default of Arabs in Palestine, with many willing to defer ultimate judgment on the state.

As for the Ultra-Orthodox, I really have little to no insight. All I can say is that rabbi Herzog, the first chief rabbi of the state, was deeply disappointed in the legal system in Israel and that there wasn’t a unitary religious system of justice. This is a very very incomplete answer but likely speaks to a larger phenomenon that even the ultraorthodox who were far more willing to accommodate the state were disappointed in its largely secular nature and legal system.

So now the caveats

First: I’m writing this late at night as I tend to, and have no strength left to edit, so sorry for the typos, I may fix them tomorrow.

Second: this is almost all based on secondary sources. Usually I like to have some knowledge of the primary sources before I give an answer like this, but I’m not much of a social historian, however, I feel fairly confident in the authors I’m referencing here.

Third and finally: As with any social history these are very rough generalizations, and of course one could find dozens of counterexamples, but I think these generalizations hold pretty true across these groups